Narrative:

I was the captain and pilot not flying. This flight included a diversion and termination. This chain of events begins at the gate before departure. We had finished loading passengers and were awaiting a windshield wash to remove insect remains. Operations informed us that maintenance was supposed to come to the aircraft and perform the windshield wash. After waiting a few minutes our dispatcher told us that operations handles the windshield wash. After waiting for approximately 30 minutes no windshield wash was performed. The oncoming electrical storm was threatening to close the ramp so we pushed off the gate. This push back included non standard phraseology from the push back coordinator. We had a tough time getting them to plug back into the inter phone system to be sure that the tow bar was removed and the steering was reengaged. As we attempted to taxi; ramp informed us that the traffic was backing up and there was a ground stop for air traffic going into effect. As we turned the corner onto the taxiway; we noticed that we were about to become the tail end of a 30 airplane lineup. With no departures; this was going to take some time. While waiting to continue our taxi; we were listening to ground and tower frequencies to gain information on how long the delay was going to be and how the weather was impacting our departure. After making several passenger announcements and communications with the flight attendants and dispatch; another issue began to arise. Ground controllers started querying aircraft how long it had been since they pushed back. After one aircraft stated 1:50; tower controllers started pushing an aircraft to depart. We feel the passenger bill of rights and the threat of financial impact may have led to the pushing of aircraft to depart. With continuous monitoring of our radar; we continued the taxi to the end of the runway. As we pulled onto the runway; we checked the radar and our departure path. The storm had moved out of the way for the first few fixes of the departure; but was still lingering over some of the further north fixes. Several aircraft that departed before us on the same departure path only complained of light chop with occasional moderate turbulence; but nothing severe. We initially asked for heading changes to bring us to the east; but departure assured us aircraft ahead of us were making it through the weather ahead of us with nothing more than moderate turbulence. Eventually ATC gave us a few headings around some towering cumulus by the initial portion of the departure. As we turned more north we found a significant radar return with small breaks that we could weave our way through. ATC cleared us on a heading that an aircraft in front of us took that kept them in only light chop. As we flew this heading; we requested deviations both left and right to navigate around massive building cumulonimbus. While staying clear of the intense radar echoes; we encountered severe turbulence that made the aircraft uncontrollable for a brief period. The airspeed plummeted and the yoke was pushed forward with the thrust at its maximum setting in order to prevent stall. The aircraft lost altitude and then we quickly regained airspeed in an updraft and exited the billowing cumulonimbus on the other side in a few seconds. Once clear of any immediate threats the first officer obtained information from the cabin; that there was no one hurt; but things flew around the cabin and it had been the worst turbulence the cabin crew had been through in their aviation careers. When the airplane was under our control and the weather had been circumnavigated; we assessed our situation and decided to review the QRH procedure for severe turbulence. The conditions met for a possible structural damage that we were unsure of. At this point we were in touch with dispatch via ACARS; but this was a big hindrance; as we were unable to reach anyone on the company radio frequencies listed on the appropriate chart. While attempting to accomplish this procedure; ATC would not allow us the requirements to meet this goal. An emergency was declared in order to accomplish this task and move on. Due to the guidance of the procedure we decided to divert to a nearby airport. Our original destination was surrounded by intense thunderstorm activity and it was not known the amount of turbulence we would fly through going to our scheduled destination. Upon normal landing; we taxied to the gate; followed by airport crash fire rescue; and were met quickly by a professional ground handling crew. During the deplaning process; most revenue passengers were understanding and thanked us for their safety. As soon as we finished the parking checklist; the first officer took care of the back of the airplane; and I took care of the administrative items. Dispatch was called to inform them of the maintenance write up and that I needed to talk to maintenance control. After writing up the severe turbulence encounter; maintenance advised that contract maintenance would come out and complete a phase I inspection. We were really surprised as to why a dvdr (digital video & data recorder) download was not accomplished. If the airplane would have landed at a company maintenance facility that is the first task that would have been completed. It seems that safety comes at the cost of convenience to the company. When the mechanic got to the aircraft; it was some time before the inspection actually began. By this time; it was dark and the mechanic had poor lighting with inadequate equipment allowing him to inspect the tail section properly. This was our reasoning for requiring the download to see if any limitations were exceeded to help determine structural failure. The inspection was completed and the aircraft signed off; but in our opinion it was just that; a sign off. The turbulence was strong enough to injure a flight attendant; which we will get to later; who was buckled in his jumpseat. After the administration items were complete; I was able to make the phone calls to dispatch; scheduling and the chief pilot on duty. Then it was time to debrief with the crew. At this point I ascertained the fact that the flight attendant in the back of the cabin sustained a lower back injury from the turbulence. With this knowledge; it was under my direction he be taken to a local facility for evaluation. The first officer accompanied the injured flight attendant to the facility. The flight attendant was evaluated; medicated and released. At this point we let scheduling know the medicine prescribed was not conducive to flight attendant duties. Finally; scheduling decided to let us go to the hotel. We then proceeded to make sure the other flight attendant was safe. We went to the facility where the flight attendant and the first officer were. The doctor was just releasing the flight attendant and explaining that the medicine he was administered would make him 'loopy.' we accompanied the flight attendant to the pharmacy to fill the prescription from the facility. This was a big pain because it was unknown to essentially anyone at the company at this time in the morning as to the information needed for the fulfillment of the prescription of workers compensation insurance information. At this point; it was not known what our schedule would be for the next morning. After expressing our concerns of the safety of the aircraft many times to the chief pilot on duty and maintenance control; we felt pressed into the corner to reposition the aircraft the next morning. After being so stressed for the better part of 5 hours; I was frazzled beyond the point of actually determine my fitness for duty. This continued; as my sleep was not adequate; however I felt I had made a safe decision at that time. Looking back; this was not safe to be pushed into operating this flight due to stress and fatigue. What we need to learn..... The company is spending a lot of money for safety programs; safety education and further more proclaims to hold safety as its number one priority. The operation that just occurred was no way close to even thinking about the safety of my crew; let alone being a priority. More procedures and education of these procedures need to be put in place when we have crew injuries.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Air Carrier Captain described the events after encountering severe turbulence on departure that injured a Flight Attendant and caused an enroute diversion.

Narrative: I was the Captain and pilot not flying. This flight included a diversion and termination. This chain of events begins at the gate before departure. We had finished loading passengers and were awaiting a windshield wash to remove insect remains. Operations informed us that maintenance was supposed to come to the aircraft and perform the windshield wash. After waiting a few minutes our Dispatcher told us that Operations handles the windshield wash. After waiting for approximately 30 minutes no windshield wash was performed. The oncoming electrical storm was threatening to close the ramp so we pushed off the gate. This push back included non standard phraseology from the push back coordinator. We had a tough time getting them to plug back into the inter phone system to be sure that the tow bar was removed and the steering was reengaged. As we attempted to taxi; Ramp informed us that the traffic was backing up and there was a ground stop for air traffic going into effect. As we turned the corner onto the taxiway; we noticed that we were about to become the tail end of a 30 airplane lineup. With no departures; this was going to take some time. While waiting to continue our taxi; we were listening to Ground and Tower frequencies to gain information on how long the delay was going to be and how the weather was impacting our departure. After making several passenger announcements and communications with the Flight Attendants and Dispatch; another issue began to arise. Ground Controllers started querying aircraft how long it had been since they pushed back. After one aircraft stated 1:50; Tower Controllers started pushing an aircraft to depart. We feel the Passenger Bill of Rights and the threat of financial impact may have led to the pushing of aircraft to depart. With continuous monitoring of our radar; we continued the taxi to the end of the runway. As we pulled onto the runway; we checked the radar and our departure path. The storm had moved out of the way for the first few fixes of the departure; but was still lingering over some of the further north fixes. Several aircraft that departed before us on the same departure path only complained of light chop with occasional moderate turbulence; but nothing severe. We initially asked for heading changes to bring us to the east; but Departure assured us aircraft ahead of us were making it through the weather ahead of us with nothing more than moderate turbulence. Eventually ATC gave us a few headings around some towering cumulus by the initial portion of the departure. As we turned more north we found a significant radar return with small breaks that we could weave our way through. ATC cleared us on a heading that an aircraft in front of us took that kept them in only light chop. As we flew this heading; we requested deviations both left and right to navigate around massive building cumulonimbus. While staying clear of the intense radar echoes; we encountered severe turbulence that made the aircraft uncontrollable for a brief period. The airspeed plummeted and the yoke was pushed forward with the thrust at its maximum setting in order to prevent stall. The aircraft lost altitude and then we quickly regained airspeed in an updraft and exited the billowing cumulonimbus on the other side in a few seconds. Once clear of any immediate threats the First Officer obtained information from the cabin; that there was no one hurt; but things flew around the cabin and it had been the worst turbulence the cabin crew had been through in their aviation careers. When the airplane was under our control and the weather had been circumnavigated; we assessed our situation and decided to review the QRH procedure for severe turbulence. The conditions met for a possible structural damage that we were unsure of. At this point we were in touch with Dispatch via ACARS; but this was a big hindrance; as we were unable to reach anyone on the Company radio frequencies listed on the appropriate chart. While attempting to accomplish this procedure; ATC would not allow us the requirements to meet this goal. An emergency was declared in order to accomplish this task and move on. Due to the guidance of the procedure we decided to divert to a nearby airport. Our original destination was surrounded by intense thunderstorm activity and it was not known the amount of turbulence we would fly through going to our scheduled destination. Upon normal landing; we taxied to the gate; followed by airport crash fire rescue; and were met quickly by a professional ground handling crew. During the deplaning process; most revenue passengers were understanding and thanked us for their safety. As soon as we finished the parking checklist; the First Officer took care of the back of the airplane; and I took care of the administrative items. Dispatch was called to inform them of the maintenance write up and that I needed to talk to Maintenance Control. After writing up the severe turbulence encounter; maintenance advised that Contract Maintenance would come out and complete a phase I inspection. We were really surprised as to why a DVDR (Digital Video & Data Recorder) download was not accomplished. If the airplane would have landed at a Company Maintenance facility that is the first task that would have been completed. It seems that safety comes at the cost of convenience to the company. When the mechanic got to the aircraft; it was some time before the inspection actually began. By this time; it was dark and the mechanic had poor lighting with inadequate equipment allowing him to inspect the tail section properly. This was our reasoning for requiring the download to see if any limitations were exceeded to help determine structural failure. The inspection was completed and the aircraft signed off; but in our opinion it was just that; a sign off. The turbulence was strong enough to injure a Flight Attendant; which we will get to later; who was buckled in his jumpseat. After the administration items were complete; I was able to make the phone calls to Dispatch; Scheduling and the Chief Pilot on duty. Then it was time to debrief with the crew. At this point I ascertained the fact that the Flight Attendant in the back of the cabin sustained a lower back injury from the turbulence. With this knowledge; it was under my direction he be taken to a local facility for evaluation. The First Officer accompanied the injured Flight Attendant to the facility. The Flight Attendant was evaluated; medicated and released. At this point we let Scheduling know the medicine prescribed was not conducive to flight attendant duties. Finally; Scheduling decided to let us go to the hotel. We then proceeded to make sure the other Flight Attendant was safe. We went to the facility where the Flight Attendant and the First Officer were. The Doctor was just releasing the Flight Attendant and explaining that the medicine he was administered would make him 'loopy.' We accompanied the Flight Attendant to the pharmacy to fill the prescription from the facility. This was a big pain because it was unknown to essentially anyone at the company at this time in the morning as to the information needed for the fulfillment of the prescription of workers compensation insurance information. At this point; it was not known what our schedule would be for the next morning. After expressing our concerns of the safety of the aircraft many times to the Chief Pilot on duty and Maintenance Control; we felt pressed into the corner to reposition the aircraft the next morning. After being so stressed for the better part of 5 hours; I was frazzled beyond the point of actually determine my fitness for duty. This continued; as my sleep was not adequate; however I felt I had made a safe decision at that time. Looking back; this was not safe to be pushed into operating this flight due to stress and fatigue. What we need to learn..... The company is spending a lot of money for safety programs; safety education and further more proclaims to hold safety as its number one priority. The operation that just occurred was no way close to even thinking about the safety of my crew; let alone being a priority. More procedures and education of these procedures need to be put in place when we have crew injuries.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.