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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 896215 |
Time | |
Date | 201006 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.ARTCC |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | MD-82 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Route In Use | Direct |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | APU |
Person 1 | |
Function | Dispatcher |
Qualification | Dispatch Dispatcher |
Experience | Dispatch Dispatch 14 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural FAR |
Narrative:
This report describes loss of operational control/interference of certified aircraft dispatcher in the duties of scheduled 121 air carrier operations. I was exercising operational control over a flight en route. The flight contacted me (the dispatcher in control of flight) and reported a failure of right electrical generator. Flight captain stated they were experiencing electrical interruptions and unable to start APU. Captain requested that a maintenance controller be brought up on phone patch. After bringing up maintenance; captain repeated his inability to start APU. The maintenance controller suggested he descend further in altitude (if able) to attempt a start. Flight vacated approximately FL240 for FL200. During the interim; maintenance and myself stood by on phone patch to await word from crew. As maintenance discussed options for deferring equipment in at the scheduled destination for the return flight; I stated clearly to them that should flight be unable to start the APU I would divert them to an en route station where we have maintenance. The manager of dispatch at this point stood up and walked over and declared that I did not need to divert the flight and that the QRH did not require such. Although this individual was not on the phone patch and privileged to the conversation regarding specifics; or the weather conditions at the destination airport; he stated firmly that this was unnecessary. Two other dispatchers on duty were witness to this event. The weather at the scheduled destination airport was IFR at that time with what I believe was a 400 ft overcast ceiling. During this period of interruption of my phone patch; the crew was able to start the APU and informed myself and maintenance. They stated they were climbing back to scheduled cruise altitude of FL320 and would continue. I acknowledged this and the phone patch was terminated. After said event; the dispatch manager approached me and showed me the QRH procedure which although does not demand a diversion does state that a precautionary landing may be permissible. It should be noted after this event that the return flight (for which another dispatcher relieved me and took over the duty shift) that aircraft experienced loss of total electrical power of APU and generators and diverted. Although the circumstances regarding this flight would not have necessitated a diversion had there not been interference with the aircraft dispatcher; the outcome could have been different if the flight crew had not been able to re-start the APU. Dispatchers should not be put under pressure by management to accept a different decision than they feel is the most conservative for safety. Dispatch operational control as stated by FAA regulations should be treated with the utmost respect and dispatchers be provided a work environment where they are not required to explain themselves regarding the details of a decision in the midst of that decision making process when it occurs during a critical phase of flight. Interfering with a dispatcher in any way during an commercial radio phone patch is unnecessary and unsafe. Decisions regarding diversions should not be made only or mostly with respect to the routing difficulties of the flight schedule because an airplane may end up out of position. Corrective actions should include a written dispatch policy and procedures (preferably included in a formalized manual) with respect to operational control and the dispatcher's authority. Further efforts need to be made to enhance training at our carrier in dispatch resource management that include managers at the system operations control level in understanding and agreement of how they collaboratively must make decisions with dispatch without directly impinging on a dispatcher's FAA operational control.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A MD80 Dispatcher was approached by his Manager during a routing discussion with an airborne aircraft experiencing difficult and given orders conflicting with his decision. The Dispatcher considered that the Manager interfered with is FAA duties.
Narrative: This report describes loss of operational control/interference of certified aircraft dispatcher in the duties of scheduled 121 air carrier operations. I was exercising operational control over a flight en route. The flight contacted me (the Dispatcher in control of flight) and reported a failure of right electrical generator. Flight Captain stated they were experiencing electrical interruptions and unable to start APU. Captain requested that a Maintenance Controller be brought up on phone patch. After bringing up Maintenance; Captain repeated his inability to start APU. The Maintenance Controller suggested he descend further in altitude (if able) to attempt a start. Flight vacated approximately FL240 for FL200. During the interim; Maintenance and myself stood by on phone patch to await word from crew. As Maintenance discussed options for deferring equipment in at the scheduled destination for the return flight; I stated clearly to them that should flight be unable to start the APU I would divert them to an en route station where we have Maintenance. The Manager of Dispatch at this point stood up and walked over and declared that I did not need to divert the flight and that the QRH did not require such. Although this individual was not on the phone patch and privileged to the conversation regarding specifics; or the weather conditions at the destination airport; he stated firmly that this was unnecessary. Two other dispatchers on duty were witness to this event. The weather at the scheduled destination airport was IFR at that time with what I believe was a 400 FT overcast ceiling. During this period of interruption of my phone patch; the crew was able to start the APU and informed myself and Maintenance. They stated they were climbing back to scheduled cruise altitude of FL320 and would continue. I acknowledged this and the phone patch was terminated. After said event; the Dispatch Manager approached me and showed me the QRH procedure which although does not DEMAND a diversion DOES STATE that a precautionary landing may be permissible. It should be noted after this event that the return flight (for which another Dispatcher relieved me and took over the duty shift) that aircraft experienced loss of total electrical power of APU and generators and diverted. Although the circumstances regarding this flight would not have necessitated a diversion had there not been interference with the aircraft Dispatcher; the outcome could have been different if the flight crew had not been able to re-start the APU. Dispatchers should not be put under pressure by management to accept a different decision than they feel is the most conservative for safety. Dispatch operational control as stated by FAA regulations should be treated with the utmost respect and dispatchers be provided a work environment where they are not required to explain themselves regarding the details of a decision in the midst of that decision making process when it occurs during a critical phase of flight. Interfering with a Dispatcher in any way during an commercial radio phone patch is unnecessary and unsafe. Decisions regarding diversions should not be made only or mostly with respect to the routing difficulties of the flight schedule because an airplane may end up out of position. Corrective actions should include a written Dispatch Policy and Procedures (preferably included in a formalized manual) with respect to operational control and the Dispatcher's authority. Further efforts need to be made to enhance training at our Carrier in Dispatch Resource Management that include Managers at the System Operations Control level in understanding and agreement of how they collaboratively must make decisions with Dispatch without directly impinging on a Dispatcher's FAA operational control.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.