Narrative:

Ever since the deep water horizon sank; we have had a tfr in that area surface to 3;000'. In the beginning we would offer traffic advisories in the area; even though the area is already busy with helicopters to/from the rigs and several military areas active daily. Today the tfr was monitored by a military flight that usually orbits around FL200. Routinely aircraft go out to the area to assist in spill clean up and/or to observe the area. The aircraft associated with the clean up get permission to operate in the tfr from houma operations. They'll receive squawk codes and frequencies for the area from this houma operations. Routinely aircraft operate outside the tfr; usually at higher altitudes up to altitudes of 17;500' and make erratic turns. Sometimes this will go on inside active warning area; unknown to any of us working the airspace; including military pilots. Today; it was IFR almost down to the surface. Aircraft associated with the tfr cannot maintain VFR and therefore require IFR. Controllers in the area are expected to handle the increased work load without help or prior coordination. There are no procedures in place to handle such VFR aircraft that climb up out of the tfr on a discreet code. Controllers do not know who's working the area in cooperation with the spill area and who is not. The spill area is outside the ADIZ; and we were also asked if we are observing strange codes entering us airspace. Even though we do not have a list of who is working with the tfr. Controllers are routinely asked how to get permission to work in the tfr. This information is not always readily available; plus it adds to our workload. We do not have a procedure in place for aircraft to transition to the tfr because we are not in contact with the people working the tfr. Recommendation staffing is key; we do not have enough controllers to handle daily traffic; let alone extra events such as this. Make the tfr higher and develop procedures for entering the tfr. Coordinate with the military and involve them as to the changes to the warning areas before the pilots fly out to the warning area.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZHU controller voiced concern regarding the TFR operational procedures being used involving the recent off shore oil platform accident; indicating additional staffing; closer coordination and specific procedural development is needed to handle future like events.

Narrative: Ever since the Deep Water Horizon sank; we have had a TFR in that area surface to 3;000'. In the beginning we would offer traffic advisories in the area; even though the area is already busy with helicopters to/from the rigs and several military areas active daily. Today the TFR was monitored by a military flight that usually orbits around FL200. Routinely aircraft go out to the area to assist in spill clean up and/or to observe the area. The aircraft associated with the clean up get permission to operate in the TFR from HOUMA Operations. They'll receive squawk codes and frequencies for the area from this HOUMA Operations. Routinely aircraft operate outside the TFR; usually at higher altitudes up to altitudes of 17;500' and make erratic turns. Sometimes this will go on inside active warning area; unknown to any of us working the airspace; including military pilots. Today; it was IFR almost down to the surface. Aircraft associated with the TFR cannot maintain VFR and therefore require IFR. Controllers in the area are expected to handle the increased work load without help or prior coordination. There are no procedures in place to handle such VFR aircraft that climb up out of the TFR on a discreet code. Controllers do not know who's working the area in cooperation with the spill area and who is not. The spill area is outside the ADIZ; and we were also asked if we are observing strange codes entering US airspace. Even though we do not have a list of who is working with the TFR. Controllers are routinely asked how to get permission to work in the TFR. This information is not always readily available; plus it adds to our workload. We do not have a procedure in place for aircraft to transition to the TFR because we are not in contact with the people working the TFR. Recommendation staffing is key; we do not have enough controllers to handle daily traffic; let alone extra events such as this. Make the TFR higher and develop procedures for entering the TFR. Coordinate with the military and involve them as to the changes to the warning areas before the pilots fly out to the warning area.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.