Narrative:

I was working the radar position at sectors 85/79 at ZID. Traffic levels were coming down after a busy session. D-side training in progress. [The embraer] called on frequency at hvq and I descended him to FL350 atop another aircraft; a heavy DC10 at FL340. I had to wait until sufficient in-trail separation was realized between the DC10 and [the embraer]. When [the embraer] was 6 miles in-trail of the DC10; I issued a descent to FL300. Meanwhile I had attempted a frequency change to an aircraft to which I received no response. The next transmission was from [the embraer] saying that he needed to descend further or turn off the trailing path of the DC10 because '...we were rocked pretty hard.' he indicated he wanted to turn 90 degrees. At this point; [the embraer] was within a couple of miles of the next sector's boundary. My thought was that he should be out of the wake turbulence very shortly since he was descending through FL330 and already about 8 miles in trail of the DC10 so; I responded with '...contact indy center on 128.22 and restate your request' his response was that he was going to turn or advise the next sector of a turn because '...we were rocked 90 degrees.' meanwhile; the d-side team began coordinating the situation and his desires. [The embraer] questioned the frequency and I stated the frequency again and that the next sector knew of his request to turn and that he may make that turn now. Shortly thereafter I was relieved for a break. Coming back from my break I was told to report to the operations manager and give my side of the story regarding [the embraer]. The pilot of [the embraer] expressed his dislike of my handling his situation. Apparently he advised the next sector that a loss of power was the result of the wake turbulence. It was made known that [the embraer] thought I mishandled the situation and that I should have allowed him to take any action necessary to avoid further wake turbulence prior to any frequency change. Two factors lead to this situation. One; the pilot's phraseology describing the importance of the turbulence was not conveyed to me. He stated he was 'rocked' 90 degrees. In retrospect; I can surmise that to mean a roll of 90 degrees; which is severe; or subsequent rolls of 45 degrees back and forth. Since the aircraft was continuing a descent; I projected that he would be out of the turbulence very shortly. Second; with the aircraft being in proximity to the upcoming boundary (aircraft was pointed out to sector 93 which has a jurisdiction of FL320 through FL360 above the receiving sector) the situation would have required two coordinations with both the receiving sector and the sector having received a point out. I was concerned that turning this aircraft on the boundary at that moment might have lead to something much worse. Thought I could see limited data blocks but I would not have known about any 'primary only' targets. Again; regarding the nature of wake turbulence; I projected that [the embraer] would soon be out of the turbulence.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A ZID Center Controller reported an EMB he descended behind a DC-10 experienced a wake turbulence encounter and was unhappy with his ATC technique.

Narrative: I was working the RADAR position at sectors 85/79 at ZID. Traffic levels were coming down after a busy session. D-side training in progress. [The Embraer] called on frequency at HVQ and I descended him to FL350 atop another aircraft; a heavy DC10 at FL340. I had to wait until sufficient in-trail separation was realized between the DC10 and [the Embraer]. When [the Embraer] was 6 miles in-trail of the DC10; I issued a descent to FL300. Meanwhile I had attempted a frequency change to an aircraft to which I received no response. The next transmission was from [the Embraer] saying that he needed to descend further or turn off the trailing path of the DC10 because '...we were rocked pretty hard.' He indicated he wanted to turn 90 degrees. At this point; [the Embraer] was within a couple of miles of the next sector's boundary. My thought was that he should be out of the wake turbulence very shortly since he was descending through FL330 and already about 8 miles in trail of the DC10 so; I responded with '...contact Indy Center on 128.22 and restate your request' His response was that he was going to turn or advise the next sector of a turn because '...we were rocked 90 degrees.' Meanwhile; the D-side team began coordinating the situation and his desires. [The Embraer] questioned the frequency and I stated the frequency again and that the next sector knew of his request to turn and that he may make that turn now. Shortly thereafter I was relieved for a break. Coming back from my break I was told to report to the Operations Manager and give my side of the story regarding [the Embraer]. The pilot of [the Embraer] expressed his dislike of my handling his situation. Apparently he advised the next sector that a loss of power was the result of the wake turbulence. It was made known that [the Embraer] thought I mishandled the situation and that I should have allowed him to take any action necessary to avoid further wake turbulence prior to any frequency change. Two factors lead to this situation. One; the pilot's phraseology describing the importance of the turbulence was not conveyed to me. He stated he was 'rocked' 90 degrees. In retrospect; I can surmise that to mean a roll of 90 degrees; which is severe; or subsequent rolls of 45 degrees back and forth. Since the aircraft was continuing a descent; I projected that he would be out of the turbulence very shortly. Second; with the aircraft being in proximity to the upcoming boundary (aircraft was pointed out to sector 93 which has a jurisdiction of FL320 through FL360 above the receiving sector) the situation would have required two coordinations with both the receiving sector and the sector having received a point out. I was concerned that turning this aircraft on the boundary AT THAT MOMENT might have lead to something much worse. Thought I could see limited data blocks but I would not have known about any 'primary only' targets. Again; regarding the nature of wake turbulence; I projected that [the Embraer] would soon be out of the turbulence.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.