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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 898761 |
Time | |
Date | 201007 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | FO |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Exterior Pax/Crew Door |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
As first officer; my leg as pilot flying. On takeoff roll above 80 KTS; the forward entry door light; door on 6-pack and master caution illuminated. I called out the condition. Captain elected to abort. After clearing the runway; we went through the brake cooling chart and flight attendant/customer interactions. We completely missed going through the QRH aborted takeoff procedure which would have had us return for maintenance inspection. Our determination from the chart was to have a 6 minute in-flight brake cool down. Dispatch was notified enroute; and the airplane was written up for inspection at our destination. Upon reflection the following day; I realized we should have gone through the QRH first which would have resulted in the required inspection before the next takeoff. Since aborts are critical yet rare; after every abort in the simulator during training; re-emphasize the need to go first to the QRH (and to take the time to actually do so) followed by brake cooling chart.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B737 Captain rejected the takeoff at about 120 KTS when the Forward Entry Door light illuminated. The aircraft was not returned to the gate for a high speed reject inspection as specified in the QRH after door handle repositioning cleared the fault.
Narrative: As First Officer; my leg as pilot flying. On takeoff roll above 80 KTS; the Forward Entry door light; door on 6-pack and Master Caution illuminated. I called out the condition. Captain elected to abort. After clearing the runway; we went through the brake cooling chart and Flight Attendant/customer interactions. We completely missed going through the QRH Aborted Takeoff procedure which would have had us return for maintenance inspection. Our determination from the chart was to have a 6 minute in-flight brake cool down. Dispatch was notified enroute; and the airplane was written up for inspection at our destination. Upon reflection the following day; I realized we should have gone through the QRH first which would have resulted in the required inspection before the next takeoff. Since aborts are critical yet rare; after every abort in the simulator during training; re-emphasize the need to go first to the QRH (and to take the time to actually do so) followed by Brake Cooling Chart.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.