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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 900775 |
Time | |
Date | 201007 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZDC.ARTCC |
State Reference | VA |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Descent |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Person 2 | |
Function | Supervisor / CIC |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I was involved in a proximity event involving many factors that may or may not have played into my not maintaining standard separation as required. I take responsibility because I should maintain separation at all times regardless of my surroundings or circumstances. ZDC continues to practice a policy of center wide qualifications for all flm's and it continues to be a major safety issue as the flm's are sometimes put in positions of responsibility where they do not have adequate working knowledge of the areas they get assigned. Area 5 was being supervised by a flm from area 3 an area that shares no boundaries or procedures and never even coordinates with each other. The flm had never worked in area 5 as a controller or been assigned there as a full time flm. I came back from break and asked for a work assignment. The flm was supervising area 5; he is from area 3; because I think our assigned flm called in sick. The assigned flm expressed concern because he had no knowledge of area 5 but was assigned anyway. A person doing their job as omic (operations manager in charge) might have put a more experienced flm in the area. Based on what I experienced today; the assigned flm put forth a very good effort considering what he was tasked with. He was constantly checking on the area and kept asking if we needed anything and said if we needed help or to split sectors that he would do it immediately. When the omic became involved and ordered an odd sector split; things snowballed for me. As I asked if I should get the next person; the omic approached the flm and said sector 34/50 was red. The flm said that is why he had a d-side there and that trying to spit it now would be more of a distraction. The omic ordered the flm to split out R-50. The flm used his best resource since he did not know the area; the experienced cpc's and things ran well. The omic; who almost never ventures away from the watch desk; ignored all of the above and set things in motion that led to my screw up. I sat at R-50 and told the controller that I was splitting out R-50. He was slightly concerned that he did not want the distraction and he had it under control. I quick looked him and we started the process to split the sectors. I asked if he was ready and then made the 'cs' message entry myself because the flm had stepped away for a minute. It seemed odd because we usually split R39 out from R54/23 first due to the greater complexity at R54. The other common option is to split both highs out R39 and R50 together at once. The combination we did as per the omic orders was odd and it only took a couple of minutes to realize that the controller working R23/54/39 was getting very busy and seemed to need help. Once I took R-50 I noticed the help needed at R3/54/39 and walked to the edge of the area to look for the flm to tell him. I yelled that the sector split the omic ordered had not helped R54 and that someone had to get help. Another flm came over from another area and I expressed my concern and suggested that I take R39 from the controller at R23/54/39. That flm told the controller that he was opening R-39 and made the 'cs' entry. Just after I took the sectors the flm advised us that we would be getting some clt traffic on the 'east side'. This is a reroute that we see sometimes from new york and boston as they come from the north and pass over orf and turn southwest. Yet what happened was the bay 1 flow of clt traffic from new york and boston that usually passes over dca then gve then near gso was deviating from our west into our sector R34 and R50 and then were to make almost immediate 90 plus degree right turn and leave our airspace. This flow conflicted with and intersected our daily departure flow during a busy departure push and we were being fed at the same altitudes we were climbing departures to. I have never seen a flow like this in my time in area 5. I then yelled for flm and explained how this was a big problem and not what we expected from what he had told us. I asked him to go to area 7 and tmu (traffic management unit) and get the clt traffic lower so we could top them with the departures. I then sat down and decided that I needed to get two of my jfk arrivals lower. They were at FL390 and they have to be delivered at or above FL370. They had head-on multiple traffic a ways out at FL380 on the same airway opposite direction and if I did not take action they would be stuck at my north boundary too high. I turned the first one 20 left and turned the southbound air carrier 15L. I was pinched on both sides by other traffic at FL380 and active restricted area. I took care of some things to the south and about 30 seconds after the initial vectors I dumped air carrier X to FL350 and climbed air carrier Y to FL400 as his requested altitude. Based on my experience the vectors were plenty and the planes were still over 30 miles apart with one offset to the west. I received a call from another controller who was complaining about the so called short cuts that I had not given and was too busy to reroute. I then looked north just in time to see the two air carrier targets merge; the two targets showing the same altitude. I thought they had literally got together and for a split second I thought it was too late. Then the data blocks re-acquired on the aircraft and I realized that it must have been a track jump. That was one of the sickest feelings I have ever had. I am still deeply bothered by it. I told the flm that I thought I had a deal and he took the call from the watch desk on the immediate alert. Nobody from second level management on up understands why this bothers me so much. Recommendation; stop the facility certification flm program and if need be qualify the flm's in a maximum of two areas; either across the isle from each other or areas that work flows together. Rotate the supervisors between these areas to get currency. Make the flm's work at least one radar in each of the two areas and maintain currency. ZDC still has a vast majority of flm's that are not certified on any radar sectors. I think the last five flm's that have come from other facilities do not have any radar certifications. Put the flm's back in the areas via desks at the ends of the areas facing in like before. Get rid of the flm quads that serve as a barrier between the flm's and the areas.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZDC Controller described loss of separation event involving two air carrier aircraft; noting the assistance provided by the FLM was confusing and of little help because of the facility's FLM certification policy/practice.
Narrative: I was involved in a Proximity Event involving many factors that may or may not have played into my not maintaining standard separation as required. I take responsibility because I should maintain separation at all times regardless of my surroundings or circumstances. ZDC continues to practice a policy of Center wide qualifications for all FLM's and it continues to be a major safety issue as the FLM's are sometimes put in positions of responsibility where they do not have adequate working knowledge of the areas they get assigned. Area 5 was being supervised by a FLM from Area 3 an area that shares no boundaries or procedures and never even coordinates with each other. The FLM had never worked in Area 5 as a controller or been assigned there as a full time FLM. I came back from break and asked for a work assignment. The FLM was supervising Area 5; he is from area 3; because I think our assigned FLM called in sick. The assigned FLM expressed concern because he had no knowledge of Area 5 but was assigned anyway. A person doing their job as OMIC (Operations Manager In Charge) might have put a more experienced FLM in the area. Based on what I experienced today; the assigned FLM put forth a very good effort considering what he was tasked with. He was constantly checking on the area and kept asking if we needed anything and said if we needed help or to split sectors that he would do it immediately. When the OMIC became involved and ordered an odd sector split; things snowballed for me. As I asked if I should get the next person; the OMIC approached the FLM and said Sector 34/50 was red. The FLM said that is why he had a D-Side there and that trying to spit it now would be more of a distraction. The OMIC ordered the FLM to split out R-50. The FLM used his best resource since he did not know the area; the experienced CPC's and things ran well. The OMIC; who almost never ventures away from the watch desk; ignored all of the above and set things in motion that led to my screw up. I sat at R-50 and told the Controller that I was splitting out R-50. He was slightly concerned that he did not want the distraction and he had it under control. I quick looked him and we started the process to split the sectors. I asked if he was ready and then made the 'CS' message entry myself because the FLM had stepped away for a minute. It seemed odd because we usually split R39 out from R54/23 first due to the greater complexity at R54. The other common option is to split both highs out R39 and R50 together at once. The combination we did as per the OMIC orders was odd and it only took a couple of minutes to realize that the Controller working R23/54/39 was getting very busy and seemed to need help. Once I took R-50 I noticed the help needed at R3/54/39 and walked to the edge of the area to look for the FLM to tell him. I yelled that the sector split the OMIC ordered had not helped R54 and that someone had to get help. Another FLM came over from another area and I expressed my concern and suggested that I take R39 from the controller at R23/54/39. That FLM told the Controller that he was opening R-39 and made the 'CS' entry. Just after I took the sectors the FLM advised us that we would be getting some CLT traffic on the 'east side'. This is a reroute that we see sometimes from New York and Boston as they come from the north and pass over ORF and turn southwest. Yet what happened was the Bay 1 flow of CLT traffic from New York and Boston that usually passes over DCA then GVE then near GSO was deviating from our west into our Sector R34 and R50 and then were to make almost immediate 90 plus degree right turn and leave our airspace. This flow conflicted with and intersected our daily departure flow during a busy departure push and we were being fed at the same altitudes we were climbing departures to. I have never seen a flow like this in my time in Area 5. I then yelled for FLM and explained how this was a big problem and not what we expected from what he had told us. I asked him to go to area 7 and TMU (Traffic Management Unit) and get the CLT traffic lower so we could top them with the departures. I then sat down and decided that I needed to get two of my JFK arrivals lower. They were at FL390 and they have to be delivered at or above FL370. They had head-on multiple traffic a ways out at FL380 on the same airway opposite direction and if I did not take action they would be stuck at my north boundary too high. I turned the first one 20 left and turned the southbound air carrier 15L. I was pinched on both sides by other traffic at FL380 and active restricted area. I took care of some things to the south and about 30 seconds after the initial vectors I dumped Air Carrier X to FL350 and climbed Air Carrier Y to FL400 as his requested altitude. Based on my experience the vectors were plenty and the planes were still over 30 miles apart with one offset to the west. I received a call from another controller who was complaining about the so called short cuts that I had not given and was too busy to reroute. I then looked north just in time to see the two air carrier targets merge; the two targets showing the same altitude. I thought they had literally got together and for a split second I thought it was too late. Then the data blocks re-acquired on the aircraft and I realized that it must have been a track jump. That was one of the sickest feelings I have ever had. I am still deeply bothered by it. I told the FLM that I thought I had a deal and he took the call from the watch desk on the immediate alert. Nobody from second level management on up understands why this bothers me so much. Recommendation; stop the facility certification FLM program and if need be qualify the FLM's in a maximum of two areas; either across the isle from each other or areas that work flows together. Rotate the supervisors between these areas to get currency. Make the FLM's work at least one RADAR in each of the two areas and maintain currency. ZDC still has a vast majority of FLM's that are NOT certified on any RADAR sectors. I think the last five FLM's that have come from other facilities do not have any RADAR certifications. Put the FLM's back in the areas via desks at the ends of the areas facing in like before. Get rid of the FLM quads that serve as a barrier between the FLM's and the areas.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.