Narrative:

The morning started out with the first aircraft we were scheduled to flying showing up late at the gate due to maintenance being completed on the engine. Upon arrival at the gate the crew and I began our originating checks. Soon after starting the checks I noticed; while doing the EICAS check; that the aircraft had another issue with the engine and informed maintenance. They almost immediately said they needed to take the airplane back to the hangar to do more work. Soon thereafter we were informed that we had been downgraded to a crj-200 and maintenance would be bringing one over from the hangar. When the crj-200 arrived at the gate we were already almost an hour late so there was pressure to get the aircraft off the gate to get as many people to the scheduled destination as possible without breaking all the connections. There were low ceilings in at destination so we were given an alternate. Since I had not performed an originating checks on a crj-200 in a couple of months I made sure to go slower than normal to ensure I did not miss anything; that decision; while absolutely correct; lead to additional time pressure as the operation would eventually be waiting on me before we could depart. During the originating check and while testing the anti-skid system I noticed that when I released the parking brake I would immediately get the a/skid inbrd amber cas message. As this was not normal I called maintenance control and they sent over a mechanic immediately. By the time this was discovered; boarding had already begun in order to not waste any more time since we were already very late. Upon arrival at the aircraft the mechanic took the logbook and the MEL/cdl book off the aircraft and into to the maintenance truck to begin deferring a channel of the anti-skid system. With the logbook and MEL/cdl book outside the aircraft the first officer and I could only brief what we knew and wait for the books to return. When the mechanic returned with the books the aircraft had already been fully loaded and the weight and balance delivered to us. I finally got my hands on the MEL and read all the conditions to our operating without on anti-skid channel. One of the conditions was having anti-skid system channel inoperative performance data. I called dispatch and was told they were working on the new release so I then informed the gate that I needed a new copy of the release plus performance when it came up. Since we had the logbook and MEL then I briefed the first officer on the upcoming takeoff including no flex and the need to ensure the proper performance data (once channel a/skid inoperative). The gate agent brought down to us a copy of the new release; but they had not included the performance data as typically for them an MEL addition just means a new release is needed. Since we had completed the before start checklist and were simply waiting on the new performance numbers I went up to the gate to make sure it was all printed out properly. Once the new release with performance was printed I looked over the performance data and saw that the proper performance penalties had been applied and that we were good to go. We pushed back from the gate and departed. It wasn't until we were with approach that I had realized I had made an error. I had noticed that the landing distance had been increased for our condition; however the enormity of that increase did not 'click' in my head until approach tried to give us 36R for landing and we found out we were too heavy for that 8;600+ ft runway even with thrust reverser credit. It was then that I realized that we were most likely too heavy to ever land at our filed alternate. After landing on 36C and taxiing to the gate I checked the minimum landing distance required and sure enough; we were too heavy to ever land on the 8;000 ft alternate airport's runway. This event occurred because I let the time pressure of getting the aircraft out interfered with my taking the time to understand how a specific MEL will affect all aspects of my flight. Sure; I complied with all the points listed in the MEL itself; but I did not think beyond the words in that book. While I did the right thing in slowing down during my originating checks to ensure accuracy; for some reason I did not do the same with the addition of the MEL. Personally; I will enter this event into my bank of lessons learned. It does not matter how long you have been doing this; you are still vulnerable to being rushed to a point where you will make mistakes. I will slow down; not only my physical checks of the aircraft; but also my checking of the paperwork including running a quick flight in my head to find any scenarios that than MEL may come into play. Slowing down; especially when there is a last minute change; would have allowed me to discover this issue before it became an event. I know we are pressured to hurry up sometimes; but we must slow ourselves down when something unexpected occurs to prevent omitting important information. Additionally; I would suggest adding wording to the MEL that describes how much the takeoff and landing distance is increased to trigger the pilots to think more about it. We run into mels all the time that require the takeoff and landing performance to be updated but very rarely do any of them include noticeable changes. This specific MEL however has a very drastic effect on takeoff and landing distances. Reading that the MEL will increase landing distance by a factor of 2 will get the attention of any pilot; even if they are in a hurry. Even if a specific number is not feasible; simply including a 'caution' about a large increase in required runway would work well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ200 Captain departed with an ANTI-SKID MEL which limited the aircraft's takeoff and landing performance. Late departure distractions and passenger connection issues resulted in the full impact of the MEL not being realized until he discovered the aircraft was too heavy for the initially assigned landing runway.

Narrative: The morning started out with the first aircraft we were scheduled to flying showing up late at the gate due to maintenance being completed on the engine. Upon arrival at the gate the crew and I began our originating checks. Soon after starting the checks I noticed; while doing the EICAS check; that the aircraft had another issue with the engine and informed maintenance. They almost immediately said they needed to take the airplane back to the hangar to do more work. Soon thereafter we were informed that we had been downgraded to a CRJ-200 and maintenance would be bringing one over from the hangar. When the CRJ-200 arrived at the gate we were already almost an hour late so there was pressure to get the aircraft off the gate to get as many people to the scheduled destination as possible without breaking all the connections. There were low ceilings in at destination so we were given an alternate. Since I had not performed an originating checks on a CRJ-200 in a couple of months I made sure to go slower than normal to ensure I did not miss anything; that decision; while absolutely correct; lead to additional time pressure as the operation would eventually be waiting on me before we could depart. During the originating check and while testing the anti-skid system I noticed that when I released the parking brake I would immediately get the A/SKID INBRD amber CAS message. As this was not normal I called Maintenance Control and they sent over a mechanic immediately. By the time this was discovered; boarding had already begun in order to not waste any more time since we were already very late. Upon arrival at the aircraft the Mechanic took the logbook and the MEL/CDL book off the aircraft and into to the maintenance truck to begin deferring a channel of the anti-skid system. With the logbook and MEL/CDL book outside the aircraft the First Officer and I could only brief what we knew and wait for the books to return. When the mechanic returned with the books the aircraft had already been fully loaded and the weight and balance delivered to us. I finally got my hands on the MEL and read all the conditions to our operating without on anti-skid channel. One of the conditions was having anti-skid system channel inoperative performance data. I called Dispatch and was told they were working on the new release so I then informed the gate that I needed a new copy of the release plus performance when it came up. Since we had the logbook and MEL then I briefed the First Officer on the upcoming takeoff including no FLEX and the need to ensure the proper performance data (once channel a/skid inoperative). The Gate Agent brought down to us a copy of the new release; but they had not included the performance data as typically for them an MEL addition just means a new release is needed. Since we had completed the before start checklist and were simply waiting on the new performance numbers I went up to the gate to make sure it was all printed out properly. Once the new release with performance was printed I looked over the performance data and saw that the proper performance penalties had been applied and that we were good to go. We pushed back from the gate and departed. It wasn't until we were with Approach that I had realized I had made an error. I had noticed that the landing distance had been increased for our condition; however the enormity of that increase did not 'click' in my head until Approach tried to give us 36R for landing and we found out we were too heavy for that 8;600+ FT runway even with thrust reverser credit. It was then that I realized that we were most likely too heavy to ever land at our filed alternate. After landing on 36C and taxiing to the gate I checked the minimum landing distance required and sure enough; we were too heavy to ever land on the 8;000 FT alternate airport's runway. This event occurred because I let the time pressure of getting the aircraft out interfered with my taking the time to understand how a specific MEL will affect all aspects of my flight. Sure; I complied with all the points listed in the MEL itself; but I did not think beyond the words in that book. While I did the right thing in slowing down during my originating checks to ensure accuracy; for some reason I did not do the same with the addition of the MEL. Personally; I will enter this event into my bank of lessons learned. It does not matter how long you have been doing this; you are still vulnerable to being rushed to a point where you will make mistakes. I will slow down; not only my physical checks of the aircraft; but also my checking of the paperwork including running a quick flight in my head to find any scenarios that than MEL may come into play. Slowing down; especially when there is a last minute change; would have allowed me to discover this issue before it became an event. I know we are pressured to hurry up sometimes; but we must slow ourselves down when something unexpected occurs to prevent omitting important information. Additionally; I would suggest adding wording to the MEL that describes how much the takeoff and landing distance is increased to trigger the pilots to think more about it. We run into MELs all the time that require the takeoff and landing performance to be updated but very rarely do any of them include noticeable changes. This specific MEL however has a very drastic effect on takeoff and landing distances. Reading that the MEL will increase landing distance by a factor of 2 will get the attention of any pilot; even if they are in a hurry. Even if a specific number is not feasible; simply including a 'CAUTION' about a large increase in required runway would work well.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.