Narrative:

Weather had been showing bands of thunderstorms in the vicinity; but looked as if landing would be possible with no more than minor delays due to small cells. Upon arrival in area; approach informed us that the active runway was being reversed and to plan on the ILS 5.at approximately 7 NM from the field I could see a strong cell and microburst over the field. I informed the captain that I could not see the runway and was uncomfortable with the approach and suggested holding until the cell passed. The captain replied that he would shoot the ILS. I stated that the cell was on the field and did not look suitable for landing. The captain reiterated that he would shoot the ILS and maneuvered from his last assigned vector to intercept the localizer; which he complained was giving erroneous information. The captain continued inbound essentially visually based on his knowledge of the local area all the while complaining that the localizer was not coming alive. At approximately 1;000 ft tower informed us that they had failed to reverse the active localizer to our runway; immediately after the wind shear alarm went off in the cockpit and I called for the go-around. Go-around maneuver was executed per the SOP; and we asked for alternate missed as the published profile would have directed us into the rain shaft of the storm.we were asked our intentions by ATC; at which time I suggested holding until the cell cleared and was told that the captain would come back around and land the aircraft. ATC informed us that a challenger which had followed us in had just gone missed due to strong shear on final. I again suggested holding and the captain stated his intent to continue as he could now see the runway.upon approach to runway 5 the second time; wind was called with a nearly 90 degree offset to the runway and a peak gust of 32 KTS. I pointed this out to the captain and he chose to continue (be-400A max crosswind 25 KIAS). The captain completed the landing with a touch down speed of reference +25 and full right spoileron. All wheels touched down left of centerline.it is my opinion that safety was sacrificed to make this landing; as well as on both approaches. Passengers have since complained about the landing and their concerns. While I expressed my concerns; I felt it unsafe to call for control as the captain would certainly resist my assertion of control; instead I prepared for the resulting go-around. While I cannot speak to the captain's thought process; I feel poor judgment was demonstrated in an attempt to both get home and show his flight skills to me.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE-400 First Officer reported concern over his Captain's refusal to observe crosswind landing limits and to categorically reject input regarding the propriety of continuing attempts to land under adverse wind and weather conditions.

Narrative: Weather had been showing bands of thunderstorms in the vicinity; but looked as if landing would be possible with no more than minor delays due to small cells. Upon arrival in area; Approach informed us that the active runway was being reversed and to plan on the ILS 5.At approximately 7 NM from the field I could see a strong cell and microburst over the field. I informed the Captain that I could not see the runway and was uncomfortable with the approach and suggested holding until the cell passed. The Captain replied that he would shoot the ILS. I stated that the cell was on the field and did not look suitable for landing. The Captain reiterated that he would shoot the ILS and maneuvered from his last assigned vector to intercept the LOC; which he complained was giving erroneous information. The Captain continued inbound essentially visually based on his knowledge of the local area all the while complaining that the LOC was not coming alive. At approximately 1;000 FT Tower informed us that they had failed to reverse the active LOC to our runway; immediately after the wind shear alarm went off in the cockpit and I called for the go-around. Go-around maneuver was executed per the SOP; and we asked for alternate missed as the published profile would have directed us into the rain shaft of the storm.We were asked our intentions by ATC; at which time I suggested holding until the cell cleared and was told that the Captain would come back around and land the aircraft. ATC informed us that a Challenger which had followed us in had just gone missed due to strong shear on final. I again suggested holding and the Captain stated his intent to continue as he could now see the runway.Upon approach to Runway 5 the second time; wind was called with a nearly 90 degree offset to the runway and a peak gust of 32 KTS. I pointed this out to the Captain and he chose to continue (BE-400A max crosswind 25 KIAS). The Captain completed the landing with a touch down speed of REF +25 and full right spoileron. All wheels touched down left of centerline.It is my opinion that safety was sacrificed to make this landing; as well as on both approaches. Passengers have since complained about the landing and their concerns. While I expressed my concerns; I felt it unsafe to call for control as the Captain would certainly resist my assertion of control; instead I prepared for the resulting go-around. While I cannot speak to the Captain's thought process; I feel poor judgment was demonstrated in an attempt to both get home and show his flight skills to me.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.