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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 902691 |
Time | |
Date | 201008 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZFW.ARTCC |
State Reference | TX |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Handoff / Assist |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types |
Narrative:
I was working uim-right combined with the D. We had weather moving through the area very quickly from north to south. Because of the weather; we were one departure route on the 94 radial; normally; we are 4. I was not receiving in trail and speeds were not being assigned to the aircraft by D10. The aircraft were coming to me requesting to deviate south due to the weather in the sector. I had to point out each aircraft to 29 immediately. I was trying to ensure separation via speeds and stacks. High altitude was having a difficult time; because the aircraft could only stay on basically one route which was deviating into 89's airspace; where arrivals were coming into dfw. The controller in charge requested the tmu stop east departures for safety issues. He was told; 'no.' I noticed that 2 aircraft that I had taken were up by the 74 radial; on what appeared the triss route. The controller in charge asked me if we had opened the triss route and I told him; 'no; nothing has been coordinated with me. I'm not sure if the aircraft are deviating. I'm not talking to them yet.' the controller in charge and I decided that when the next aircraft checked in we would have him be a test ship out the 74 radial. I took 2 more hand-offs; an air carrier X and an air carrier Y. The air carrier X was a 94 radial aircraft and so I anticipated the aircraft to turn towards the 94 radial. The air carrier X checked in and I climbed him to FL230. Then air carrier Y checked in with an overtake very close to the air carrier X. I asked the air carrier X to verify that he was turning direct clare and he said; 'no; we were assigned the 74 radial.' the air carrier Y was out of 15;600 and the air carrier X was at 13;600. I stopped air carrier X at 15;000 and climbed air carrier Y to FL230. This was still in D10's airspace. I asked the air carrier X if they were able to turn to poten; they were unable. When I described the weather to them; they turned to clare. When I had established separation; I climbed the air carrier X to FL230. I called D10 to find out what was going on and the controller told me that they were told to move the departures to the 74 radial. I questioned this since nothing had been coordinated with me. I asked if we were using both the 74 and 94 radial and I was told; 'no; we were told to put all departures on the 74 radial.' shortly there after; I was given a d-side. The controller in charge came over and told me that when he had called the tmu about the first aircraft being a test ship; he was informed that they had already moved all the departures to the 74 radial. He questioned the safety in this because we hadn't had anyone fly out that radial yet and there was weather throughout the sector. The tmu would not listen to our concerns about aircraft safety and continued to allow departures out the east gate. My concern about safety was that nothing was coordinated with my entire area; much less my sector about changing the departure route. I had no knowledge about the 94 radial being moved to the 74 radial and safety was compromised. It became obvious that the tmu was more concerned with moving aircraft; than keeping people safe. I would recommend that the tmu always coordinate with each area; specifically the sector impacted; before opening/closing routes. We are the people who are actually talking to the aircraft and know what they will and will not do. They continually push the controllers to do unsafe operations by forcing situations. Controllers want to get the airplanes in the air; but we do not want to compromise safety. If the controller says; 'no; it's an unsafe situation.'; then that should be the final decision. We; the controllers; don't purposely say no just to 'dodge traffic'. We are constantly being reminded to issue precipitation; give updates and get pilot reports. The tmu needs to be reminded that to ensure safety; they are not the final say; the pilot and the controller are the final word.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZFW Controller voiced concern regarding the actions of the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) during limiting weather conditions; noting the controllers working the aircraft should decide the safety of weather impacted routes.
Narrative: I was working UIM-R combined with the D. We had weather moving through the area very quickly from north to south. Because of the weather; we were one departure route on the 94 radial; normally; we are 4. I was not receiving in trail and speeds were not being assigned to the aircraft by D10. The aircraft were coming to me requesting to deviate south due to the weather in the sector. I had to point out each aircraft to 29 immediately. I was trying to ensure separation via speeds and stacks. High altitude was having a difficult time; because the aircraft could only stay on basically one route which was deviating into 89's airspace; where arrivals were coming into DFW. The CIC requested the TMU stop east departures for safety issues. He was told; 'No.' I noticed that 2 aircraft that I had taken were up by the 74 radial; on what appeared the TRISS route. The CIC asked me if we had opened the TRISS route and I told him; 'No; nothing has been coordinated with me. I'm not sure if the aircraft are deviating. I'm not talking to them yet.' The CIC and I decided that when the next aircraft checked in we would have him be a test ship out the 74 radial. I took 2 more hand-offs; an Air Carrier X and an Air Carrier Y. The Air Carrier X was a 94 radial aircraft and so I anticipated the aircraft to turn towards the 94 radial. The Air Carrier X checked in and I climbed him to FL230. Then Air Carrier Y checked in with an overtake very close to the Air Carrier X. I asked the Air Carrier X to verify that he was turning direct CLARE and he said; 'No; we were assigned the 74 radial.' The Air Carrier Y was out of 15;600 and the Air Carrier X was at 13;600. I stopped Air Carrier X at 15;000 and climbed Air Carrier Y to FL230. This was still in D10's airspace. I asked the Air Carrier X if they were able to turn to POTEN; they were unable. When I described the weather to them; they turned to CLARE. When I had established separation; I climbed the Air Carrier X to FL230. I called D10 to find out what was going on and the Controller told me that they were told to move the departures to the 74 radial. I questioned this since nothing had been coordinated with me. I asked if we were using both the 74 and 94 radial and I was told; 'No; we were told to put all departures on the 74 radial.' Shortly there after; I was given a D-Side. The CIC came over and told me that when he had called the TMU about the first aircraft being a test ship; he was informed that they had already moved all the departures to the 74 radial. He questioned the safety in this because we hadn't had anyone fly out that radial yet and there was weather throughout the sector. The TMU would not listen to our concerns about aircraft safety and continued to allow departures out the east gate. My concern about safety was that nothing was coordinated with my entire area; much less my sector about changing the departure route. I had no knowledge about the 94 radial being moved to the 74 radial and safety was compromised. It became obvious that the TMU was more concerned with moving aircraft; than keeping people safe. I would recommend that the TMU always coordinate with each area; specifically the sector impacted; before opening/closing routes. We are the people who are actually talking to the aircraft and know what they will and will not do. They continually push the controllers to do unsafe operations by forcing situations. Controllers want to get the airplanes in the air; but we do not want to compromise safety. If the controller says; 'No; it's an unsafe situation.'; then that should be the final decision. We; the Controllers; don't purposely say no just to 'dodge traffic'. We are constantly being reminded to issue precipitation; give updates and get pilot reports. The TMU needs to be reminded that to ensure safety; they are not the final say; the pilot and the controller are the final word.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.