Narrative:

I had flown with this captain on one or two previous occasions and with the relief pilot quite a few times. I was the first officer. The captain's brief prior to departure was unusual; and; as I remember; very different from the previous time(s) we had flown. Early in the brief; he said that he would accept input; but as the captain he would make the final determination on any action; and as the final decision maker; he would in all likelihood end up doing what he wanted to do anyway. That is an almost direct verbatim quote. He went on to say that he wanted us to check with him prior to every radio call; change to the MCP; or FMS. He was emphatic that he would not tolerate a jet that was not smoothly flown; and if we could not fly it smoothly; then we ought to use the autopilot. He said we needed 'to fly the airplane the way the company wants us to fly it.' he also mentioned after engine start; the first officer was to take the closeout; and go through the numbers with him. After engine start we taxied from the gate to the runway. When we were switched to tower by ground control; captain asked first officer to go through the numbers; which he did. What neither of us evidently had a clear understanding of; is that the usual 'weights and temperatures check good; we have 240 people on board; security check is 'ok' was not what the captain was looking for. He wanted the first officer to go down the closeout number by number; so he could compare each number to the FMC. There were some fits and starts to this new process; as it was unfamiliar to both of us. (The first officer did it exactly the way the captain wanted on the return trip.) we did find a couple of errors in the FMC; which was good. What was less good is that we missed two radio calls from tower; as the captain had to emphatically state several times to the first officer; 'read each number!' we did finally get through the takeoff data part of the checklist; after which the captain went through the standard litany of how we were to handle aborts; and which runway we should come back to in the event of an emergency. This was hard to concentrate on; since I'm used to hearing it in the pre-departure briefing; tower was telling us to take the runway. We then took off without incident. The captain flew a very smooth airplane.the captain did not come to the hotel that night; so there was no opportunity to discuss anything with him there. Last night; in the pre-departure briefing; the captain asked me to request FL380 (instead of the flight planned FL340) from clearance. This was approved. The captain stated that 'it's hard to get higher sometimes; and you can get stuck.' upon engagement of the autopilot passing FL200; the captain thanked me for flying a very smooth airplane. At level off; we had about 130 KTS of headwind; and the 'optimal' and 'recommended' altitudes in the FMC were FL350 and FL360 respectively. On a couple of occasions the captain talked to the controller in spanish; not only to say 'hello' but to give position reports; etc. While I speak spanish; I could not help but think about a first officer who wasn't a spanish speaker; and again; how he would be out of the loop. After about 45 minutes at cruise; I said: 'the reason I asked you yesterday whether you had some issues with previous first officers; is that your pre-departure briefing may result in you getting less input than you might otherwise want from them. I'm sure your intent is not to shut that input out. A discussion ensued on this matter; with him reiterating that he was in command of the aircraft; he was the captain; it's not a democracy; it's a dictatorship; and that really is just the way it is. I told him I understood his position of authority; did not question it; and suspected that the vast majority of first officer's didn't either. But what I took away from the brief was that: 'it's my way or the highway' and I thought it created an environment that was less than optimal; and in fact; unsafe. He told me he calibrates his briefings to his audience; and that if I had been a 'new first officer' that he would not have felt the need to be so emphatic about his command authority; and that in the old days; when he was a first officer; it was: 'yes captain; yes sir; etc. The issue of flaps 25 came up; and how some first officer's had resisted his demand that a flaps 25 approach and landing be flown. (It was only then that it became clear to me that he expected me to do this as well.)I took the second break; and when the captain returned from his break; we were nearing our initial descent point. There was some radio chatter on ATC frequency about deviations around weather; and on my radar presentation there were some returns just to the northwest or out intersection. I asked the captain: 'what do you think; go around to the east?' he said something to the effect that I was on too great a gain; that his scope looked fine; and that we would be ok. As we neared the intersection; and leveled off at 10;000 ft; I asked him if we could query ATC if anyone was deviating around weather to the north of the intersection. He said something to the effect 'I'm okay with it.' I took this to mean that it was okay to ask ATC. I need to be very clear here; in no way did I interpret his comment to mean that no radio call should be made. I just wanted to have a comfort level about the weather; and it wasn't part of my thought pattern that he would deny me that. I then asked ATC: 'has anyone been deviation to the north of the intersection?' they answered in the negative; and that one of our airplanes had just gone through without incident. I felt comfortable at this point that we were in good shape. At that moment the captain; enraged; put his finger inches from my face; and yelled at the top of his voice: 'don't you ever do that to me again! Don't you ever; ever do that to me!' he went on to say some more things at the top of his lungs; rising out of his seat towards me; with his finger still in my face. My only response was: 'please take your finger out of my face.' he replied with' I'll put my finger wherever I want.' a short discussion ensued as to what exactly he was upset about; (it was the radio call I'd made) and when I told him that it was clearly a misunderstanding because I thought he'd given me de-facto permission to talk to ATC he replied with: 'you knew exactly what you were doing.' that of course meant that I had; in his mind; directly violated an order. At that moment we broke out of the weather and the lights of the city were clearly visible. He shouted: 'see; there is the city just like I told you!' I did not engage by raising my voice; and I think I said that we should talk about it later; and the subject was dropped.my overriding concerns:1)this captain is on a hair trigger regarding captain's authority. My 'insubordinate act' caused him to lose control in the cockpit; act verbally and physically aggressively with me; and endanger the operation. Had I been on a similar hair trigger; the situation might have easily devolved even further. 2) in spite of his statement during the initial brief that he flies the aircraft as the company wants us to fly it; I think the numerous events of this sequence do not bear that out: the non standard takeoff briefing; non inclusion of the first officer during FMC edits; requesting non-FMC or flight plan altitudes; exclusion of the first officer during planning; and entirely disregarding first officer's input or concerns. In fact; I cannot think of a single time that any of my suggestions; offers to help; or input; were accepted. They were usually completely ignored. 3) I generally disregard other pilot input regarding eccentric captains; as my experience is that I am able to fly with most anyone. That said; during this sequence; no fewer than four pilots said 'sorry' or something to that effect; when they found out that I was flying with this captain. Clearly this captain has established a reputation; and it isn't good. 4) this captain's personal life may be bleeding over to his professional life. Suffice it to say that his personal life is 'complex' and leave it at that. While a strong reaction to perceived insubordination might be appropriate (in this case; after landing); the extreme nature of the incident suggests to me that outside factors are at work.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777-200 First Officer describes a two leg international trip that leads to a near altercation with the Captain during arrival on the second leg. The Captain apparently believed the First Officer had been insubordinate.

Narrative: I had flown with this Captain on one or two previous occasions and with the Relief Pilot quite a few times. I was the First Officer. The Captain's brief prior to departure was unusual; and; as I remember; very different from the previous time(s) we had flown. Early in the brief; he said that he would accept input; but as the Captain he would make the final determination on any action; and as the final decision maker; he would in all likelihood end up doing what he wanted to do anyway. That is an almost direct verbatim quote. He went on to say that he wanted us to check with him prior to every radio call; change to the MCP; or FMS. He was emphatic that he would not tolerate a jet that was not smoothly flown; and if we could not fly it smoothly; then we ought to use the autopilot. He said we needed 'to fly the airplane the way the company wants us to fly it.' He also mentioned after engine start; the First Officer was to take the closeout; and go through the numbers with him. After engine start we taxied from the gate to the runway. When we were switched to Tower by Ground Control; Captain asked First Officer to go through the numbers; which he did. What neither of us evidently had a clear understanding of; is that the usual 'weights and temperatures check good; we have 240 people on board; security check is 'OK' was not what the Captain was looking for. He wanted the First Officer to go down the closeout number by number; so he could compare each number to the FMC. There were some fits and starts to this new process; as it was unfamiliar to both of us. (The First Officer did it exactly the way the Captain wanted on the return trip.) We did find a couple of errors in the FMC; which was good. What was less good is that we missed two radio calls from Tower; as the Captain had to emphatically state several times to the First Officer; 'read each number!' We did finally get through the takeoff data part of the checklist; after which the Captain went through the standard litany of how we were to handle aborts; and which runway we should come back to in the event of an emergency. This was hard to concentrate on; since I'm used to hearing it in the pre-departure briefing; Tower was telling us to take the runway. We then took off without incident. The Captain flew a very smooth airplane.The Captain did not come to the hotel that night; so there was no opportunity to discuss anything with him there. Last night; in the pre-departure briefing; the Captain asked me to request FL380 (instead of the flight planned FL340) from clearance. This was approved. The Captain stated that 'it's hard to get higher sometimes; and you can get stuck.' Upon engagement of the autopilot passing FL200; the Captain thanked me for flying a very smooth airplane. At level off; we had about 130 KTS of headwind; and the 'optimal' and 'recommended' altitudes in the FMC were FL350 and FL360 respectively. On a couple of occasions the Captain talked to the Controller in Spanish; not only to say 'hello' but to give position reports; etc. While I speak Spanish; I could not help but think about a First Officer who wasn't a Spanish speaker; and again; how he would be out of the loop. After about 45 minutes at cruise; I said: 'the reason I asked you yesterday whether you had some issues with previous First Officers; is that your pre-departure briefing may result in you getting less input than you might otherwise want from them. I'm sure your intent is not to shut that input out. A discussion ensued on this matter; with him reiterating that he was in command of the aircraft; he was the Captain; it's not a democracy; it's a dictatorship; and that really is just the way it is. I told him I understood his position of authority; did not question it; and suspected that the vast majority of First Officer's didn't either. But what I took away from the brief was that: 'It's my way or the highway' and I thought it created an environment that was less than optimal; and in fact; unsafe. He told me he calibrates his briefings to his audience; and that if I had been a 'new First Officer' that he would not have felt the need to be so emphatic about his command authority; and that in the old days; when he was a First Officer; it was: 'yes Captain; yes sir; etc. The issue of flaps 25 came up; and how some First Officer's had resisted his demand that a flaps 25 approach and landing be flown. (It was only then that it became clear to me that he expected me to do this as well.)I took the second break; and when the Captain returned from his break; we were nearing our initial descent point. There was some radio chatter on ATC frequency about deviations around weather; and on my radar presentation there were some returns just to the northwest or out intersection. I asked the Captain: 'what do you think; go around to the east?' He said something to the effect that I was on too great a gain; that his scope looked fine; and that we would be OK. As we neared the intersection; and leveled off at 10;000 FT; I asked him if we could query ATC if anyone was deviating around weather to the north of the intersection. He said something to the effect 'I'm okay with it.' I took this to mean that it was okay to ask ATC. I need to be very clear here; in no way did I interpret his comment to mean that no radio call should be made. I just wanted to have a comfort level about the weather; and it wasn't part of my thought pattern that he would deny me that. I then asked ATC: 'has anyone been deviation to the north of the intersection?' They answered in the negative; and that one of our airplanes had just gone through without incident. I felt comfortable at this point that we were in good shape. At that moment the Captain; enraged; put his finger inches from my face; and yelled at the top of his voice: 'Don't you ever do that to me again! Don't you ever; ever do that to me!' He went on to say some more things at the top of his lungs; rising out of his seat towards me; with his finger still in my face. My only response was: 'please take your finger out of my face.' He replied with' I'll put my finger wherever I want.' A short discussion ensued as to what exactly he was upset about; (it was the radio call I'd made) and when I told him that it was clearly a misunderstanding because I thought he'd given me de-facto permission to talk to ATC he replied with: 'you knew exactly what you were doing.' That of course meant that I had; in his mind; directly violated an order. At that moment we broke out of the weather and the lights of the city were clearly visible. He shouted: 'See; there is the city just like I told you!' I did not engage by raising my voice; and I think I said that we should talk about it later; and the subject was dropped.My overriding concerns:1)This Captain is on a hair trigger regarding Captain's authority. My 'insubordinate act' caused him to lose control in the cockpit; act verbally and physically aggressively with me; and endanger the operation. Had I been on a similar hair trigger; the situation might have easily devolved even further. 2) In spite of his statement during the initial brief that he flies the aircraft as the company wants us to fly it; I think the numerous events of this sequence do not bear that out: the non standard takeoff briefing; non inclusion of the First Officer during FMC edits; requesting non-FMC or flight plan altitudes; exclusion of the First Officer during planning; and entirely disregarding First Officer's input or concerns. In fact; I cannot think of a single time that any of my suggestions; offers to help; or input; were accepted. They were usually completely ignored. 3) I generally disregard other pilot input regarding eccentric Captains; as my experience is that I am able to fly with most anyone. That said; during this sequence; no fewer than four pilots said 'sorry' or something to that effect; when they found out that I was flying with this Captain. Clearly this Captain has established a reputation; and it isn't good. 4) This Captain's personal life may be bleeding over to his professional life. Suffice it to say that his personal life is 'complex' and leave it at that. While a strong reaction to perceived insubordination might be appropriate (in this case; after landing); the extreme nature of the incident suggests to me that outside factors are at work.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.