Narrative:

I was working the arrival radar positions combined. I took a hand off on aircraft X descending to 5;000 per SOP. I took another hand off descending to 5;000. At the time it appeared that the aircraft were going to be a tie on a 15 mile final; so I decided to make aircraft Y first by assigning them a 360 heading to get them in front of aircraft X. While still in an adjacent airspace aircraft Y stated that they were having flight control issues and needed to 'circle around out here to run the checklist'. I coordinated with the adjacent sector and they said that aircraft Y was my control. I was about to issue box vectors to aircraft Y but they then stated that they were having 'rudder fail 1 and 2 messages; we need priority to the airport; and roll the trucks'. Having been an airline pilot myself; I grasped the reality of the situation and cleared them direct to the airport. At the same time I hollered for the supervisor to come over to my sector so I could alert him to the situation. While I told him what was going on; I issued aircraft X a 090 heading to fall in behind aircraft Y. I received the necessary information (souls; fuel; etc) and passed them along to the supervisor. My plan was to run aircraft Y into the airport first since they had a possible flight control failure. In my book this ranks right up there along with fire and fuel starvation. Aircraft X would have to hold as the runway would be closed once aircraft Y landed; but that is a minor inconvenience. I issued aircraft Y clearance to 3;000 ft and to report the field in sight for the visual approach. At this point the supervisor told me to make aircraft X number one for the airport since the runway would be closing and they would be delayed. I asked him if that was what he really wanted me to do; knowing full well that I didn't want to unnecessarily vector an airplane that may or may not have directional control. He stated again to make aircraft X number one; and I issued instructions as such. I had to issue aircraft X direct to the airport and maintain maximum forward speed to a 5 mile final. Aircraft Y on the other hand was on a 010 heading direct to the airport; and subsequently I had to give them a left turn heading 320 and reduce speed to 210 KTS; and advised that they were now number two to follow a dash 8. Making an aircraft with questionable controllability do a 90 degree turn while reducing airspeed made me feel uncomfortable; and apparently the flight crew thought so as well when they then stated 'are we still receiving priority to the airport'? I stated for the record 'I was told to put another airplane in before you. These are vectors for sequence'. I had to vector the aircraft Y to a 15 mile final as to allow room behind aircraft X; who was on an 8 mile final; cleared for the visual approach to the runway best forward speed to a 5 mile final; and talking to the tower. At that point; I turned aircraft Y to a 050 heading; and reduced their speed to 170 KTS (another 90 degree turn). Spacing was sufficient behind aircraft X; and I cleared them for a visual approach to the runway with a speed restriction of 170 KTS to a 5 mile final to account for compression. Aircraft Y landed without incident and taxied to the ramp. Please note that during all the vectoring that no separation was ever lost between the two aircraft. Recommendation; I would like to use this section to discuss what I view as a significant safety hazard that occurred during the aforementioned narrative. As you may be able to discern; as the radar controller; I had every intention to make aircraft Y number 1 for the airport. As a former airline pilot; I know what a major issue a loss of flight controls is; and that ranks very highly on the scale of in-flight emergencies. When I issued aircraft Y direct to the airport; I did not want them to have to turn a lot because they may not have been able to do so; resulting in loss of control of the aircraft. I was; quite frankly; flabbergasted beyondbelief when the supervisor told me to make an emergency aircraft number 2 for the airport. Making aircraft Y do two 90 degree turns with simultaneous speed reductions just to get behind another aircraft is not what a flight crew with a controllability issue needs or wants at any point. If aircraft Y was allowed to continue as number one; the most they would have needed to do was a shallow 30 degree turn to line up with the runway. Aircraft X would have had to hold for 5 or 10 minutes while the runway inspection was completed; but I was not that busy where I couldn't allow that. If worse came to worse; say; the weather was IFR; and aircraft X had to divert to another airport; so what - as long as the emergency aircraft gets on the ground safely; that is the important thing. I believe our facility did the crew and passengers on that aircraft a dangerous disservice by making them follow the dash 8. I believe a serious safety event was created as a result of the supervisor's direction to make aircraft Y number two for the airport. I; as well as the flight crew; had no idea if they could make those kinds of turns. As it turned out; they were able; but why would ATC want to put a flight crew in a position to test the limits of questionable control authority? What if they had lost their rudder; and couldn't do what I was told to do by the supervisor? If that airplane lost control and crashed merely because I was told to make them number two; does that meet the .65 requirement of providing maximum assistance to an aircraft in distress? I spoke with the supervisor the next day (today) as I am very distressed and concerned about the decision to vector aircraft Y around. He more or less told me that was the decision he had made; and that was that. Be that as it may; it displayed to me an utter disregard for the safety of flight of aircraft Y. I am not trying to get the supervisor in trouble; I am merely ensuring my concerns about safety of flight are heard by the appropriate parties in case this happens in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Flight crew declared emergency due aircraft control problems while on final approach. TRACON Controller issued priority sequencing to the emergency aircraft; but was instructed by Supervisor to change the sequence and make the emergency aircraft follow another aircraft.

Narrative: I was working the Arrival RADAR positions combined. I took a hand off on Aircraft X descending to 5;000 per SOP. I took another hand off descending to 5;000. At the time it appeared that the aircraft were going to be a tie on a 15 mile final; so I decided to make Aircraft Y first by assigning them a 360 heading to get them in front of Aircraft X. While still in an adjacent airspace Aircraft Y stated that they were having flight control issues and needed to 'circle around out here to run the checklist'. I coordinated with the adjacent sector and they said that Aircraft Y was my control. I was about to issue box vectors to Aircraft Y but they then stated that they were having 'rudder fail 1 and 2 messages; we need priority to the airport; and roll the trucks'. Having been an airline pilot myself; I grasped the reality of the situation and cleared them direct to the airport. At the same time I hollered for the Supervisor to come over to my sector so I could alert him to the situation. While I told him what was going on; I issued Aircraft X a 090 heading to fall in behind Aircraft Y. I received the necessary information (souls; fuel; etc) and passed them along to the Supervisor. My plan was to run Aircraft Y into the airport first since they had a possible flight control failure. In my book this ranks right up there along with fire and fuel starvation. Aircraft X would have to hold as the runway would be closed once Aircraft Y landed; but that is a minor inconvenience. I issued Aircraft Y clearance to 3;000 FT and to report the field in sight for the visual approach. At this point the Supervisor told me to make Aircraft X number one for the airport since the runway would be closing and they would be delayed. I asked him if that was what he really wanted me to do; knowing full well that I didn't want to unnecessarily vector an airplane that may or may not have directional control. He stated again to make Aircraft X number one; and I issued instructions as such. I had to issue Aircraft X direct to the airport and maintain maximum forward speed to a 5 mile final. Aircraft Y on the other hand was on a 010 heading direct to the airport; and subsequently I had to give them a left turn heading 320 and reduce speed to 210 KTS; and advised that they were now number two to follow a Dash 8. Making an aircraft with questionable controllability do a 90 degree turn while reducing airspeed made me feel uncomfortable; and apparently the flight crew thought so as well when they then stated 'Are we still receiving priority to the airport'? I stated for the record 'I was told to put another airplane in before you. These are vectors for sequence'. I had to vector the Aircraft Y to a 15 mile final as to allow room behind Aircraft X; who was on an 8 mile final; cleared for the visual approach to the runway best forward speed to a 5 mile final; and talking to the Tower. At that point; I turned Aircraft Y to a 050 heading; and reduced their speed to 170 KTS (another 90 degree turn). Spacing was sufficient behind Aircraft X; and I cleared them for a visual approach to the runway with a speed restriction of 170 KTS to a 5 mile final to account for compression. Aircraft Y landed without incident and taxied to the ramp. Please note that during all the vectoring that no separation was ever lost between the two aircraft. Recommendation; I would like to use this section to discuss what I view as a significant safety hazard that occurred during the aforementioned narrative. As you may be able to discern; as the Radar Controller; I had every intention to make Aircraft Y number 1 for the airport. As a former airline pilot; I know what a major issue a loss of flight controls is; and that ranks very highly on the scale of in-flight emergencies. When I issued Aircraft Y direct to the airport; I did not want them to have to turn a lot because they may not have been able to do so; resulting in loss of control of the aircraft. I was; quite frankly; flabbergasted beyondbelief when the Supervisor told me to make an emergency aircraft number 2 for the airport. Making Aircraft Y do two 90 degree turns with simultaneous speed reductions just to get behind another aircraft is not what a flight crew with a controllability issue needs or wants at any point. If Aircraft Y was allowed to continue as number one; the most they would have needed to do was a shallow 30 degree turn to line up with the runway. Aircraft X would have had to hold for 5 or 10 minutes while the runway inspection was completed; but I was not that busy where I couldn't allow that. If worse came to worse; say; the weather was IFR; and Aircraft X had to divert to another airport; so what - as long as the emergency aircraft gets on the ground safely; that is the important thing. I believe our facility did the crew and passengers on that aircraft a dangerous disservice by making them follow the Dash 8. I believe a serious safety event was created as a result of the Supervisor's direction to make Aircraft Y number two for the airport. I; as well as the flight crew; had no idea if they could make those kinds of turns. As it turned out; they were able; but why would ATC want to put a flight crew in a position to test the limits of questionable control authority? What if they had lost their rudder; and couldn't do what I was told to do by the Supervisor? If that airplane lost control and crashed merely because I was told to make them number two; does that meet the .65 requirement of providing maximum assistance to an aircraft in distress? I spoke with the Supervisor the next day (today) as I am very distressed and concerned about the decision to vector Aircraft Y around. He more or less told me that was the decision he had made; and that was that. Be that as it may; it displayed to me an utter disregard for the safety of flight of Aircraft Y. I am not trying to get the Supervisor in trouble; I am merely ensuring my concerns about safety of flight are heard by the appropriate parties in case this happens in the future.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.