Narrative:

On the departure out of teb; I had briefed the first officer that we were going to fly the ruudy 2 departure in LNAV/VNAV mode. The departure has an initial altitude of 1500 ft at wentz intersection then a final altitude of 2000.the initial departure was uneventful until flap retraction. The auto pilot was engaged and the flaps were raised. (Very seldom do we use the VNAV mode for departures. The normal call after flap retraction is manual speed 200 and flch mode for vertical.) the airplane was leveling at the required altitude of 1500 ft with autopilot engaged and LNAV/VNAV engaged.as the flaps retracted; out of habit I called for flch mode for vertical; before I could correct myself the first officer pushed the flch mode which dropped the VNAV mode and caused the airplane to start climbing to the altitude set in the altitude alerter which was 2000 ft. As soon as the first officer switched to flch I switched it back to VNAV. We did not recognize the altitude deviation as the aircraft climbed the 500 ft rather quickly.in the initial departure brief I had wanted 1500 ft set in the altitude alerter; to protect ourselves from busting the altitude. However; in the VNAV mode it is normal to set the altitude to the highest or lowest altitude in the procedure and as long as you are in the VNAV mode the aircraft will level off at each required altitude. So we decided to set it at 2000 ft. After discussing the deviation both of us realized that there were mistakes made by both crew members. It had been a quick turn on the ground and although we briefed the departure correctly both crew members resorted to our normal calls and procedures. We had even talked on the inbound leg that we really needed to brief and go over the departures out of teb because they were very complicated.as the captain I felt like I rushed myself too much because of the quick turn. This was the first time as a crew we had flown out of teb. I should have been more prepared to hand fly the aircraft if there was a deviation. Automation requires management that sometimes leads you away from what the aircraft is actually doing. The aircraft did exactly what we told it to do. Had we not touched the flch mode this would have been a non-event departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GIV Captain reports climbing early on the RUUDY 2. After correctly briefing and setting up for the RNAV departure the aircraft is taken out of VNAV inadvertently when FLCH is called for after flap retraction out of habit.

Narrative: On the departure out of TEB; I had briefed the First Officer that we were going to fly the RUUDY 2 Departure in LNAV/VNAV mode. The departure has an initial altitude of 1500 FT at WENTZ Intersection then a final altitude of 2000.The initial departure was uneventful until flap retraction. The auto pilot was engaged and the flaps were raised. (Very seldom do we use the VNAV mode for departures. The normal call after flap retraction is manual speed 200 and FLCH mode for vertical.) The airplane was leveling at the required altitude of 1500 FT with autopilot engaged and LNAV/VNAV engaged.As the flaps retracted; out of habit I called for FLCH mode for vertical; before I could correct myself the First Officer pushed the FLCH mode which dropped the VNAV mode and caused the airplane to start climbing to the altitude set in the ALT alerter which was 2000 FT. As soon as the First Officer switched to FLCH I switched it back to VNAV. We did not recognize the altitude deviation as the aircraft climbed the 500 FT rather quickly.In the initial departure brief I had wanted 1500 FT set in the ALT alerter; to protect ourselves from busting the altitude. However; in the VNAV mode it is normal to set the altitude to the highest or lowest altitude in the procedure and as long as you are in the VNAV mode the aircraft will level off at each required altitude. So we decided to set it at 2000 FT. After discussing the deviation both of us realized that there were mistakes made by both crew members. It had been a quick turn on the ground and although we briefed the departure correctly both crew members resorted to our normal calls and procedures. We had even talked on the inbound leg that we really needed to brief and go over the departures out of TEB because they were very complicated.As the Captain I felt like I rushed myself too much because of the quick turn. This was the first time as a crew we had flown out of TEB. I should have been more prepared to hand fly the aircraft if there was a deviation. Automation requires management that sometimes leads you away from what the aircraft is actually doing. The aircraft did exactly what we told it to do. Had we not touched the FLCH mode this would have been a non-event departure.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.