Narrative:

On departure at approximately 300 ft AGL the first officer's pfd and nd went blank. I; the captain; assumed control of the aircraft and after reaching a safe altitude called for the first officer to open his QRH and to find the appropriate abnormal for our situation (loss of right pfd and nd). The first officer said he was ready to proceed and he read the first item on the checklist. I do not recall whether the first officer read the title of the checklist aloud before he read the first item on the checklist. The checklist called for us to check two circuit breakers supplying power to the symbol generator. Both circuit breakers were in. Next item on the list called for the symbol generator-1 power circuit breaker to be pulled and then reset. The circuit breaker was pulled and this resulted in the loss of the captain's pfd and nd. At this point it was determined that the first officer was reading the checklist for loss of left pfd and nd and we immediately attempted to reset the symbol generator-1 power circuit breaker with no success. We then completed the QRH procedure for loss of right pfd and nd; but we did not regain the first officer's pfd or nd. After consulting with dispatch; maintenance control; and the first officer; and considering the potential for developing weather along the route of flight to our scheduled destination we elected to divert and make an overweight landing. We declared an emergency; requested that airport rescue and fire fighting vehicles be standing by to check for potentially hot brakes on roll-out and proceeded to land uneventfully. Upon reaching the gate; maintenance met the aircraft and upon opening the east&east compartment they discovered a great deal of water had accumulated in that compartment from an unknown source. It would appear that the accumulated moisture/water caused the loss of the first officer's pfd and nd and prevented the successful reset of the symbol generator-1 power circuit breaker. We obviously made our situation worse by starting the wrong checklist; however; absent the water in the east&east bay the symbol generator-1 circuit breaker should have reset. Additionally; from a systems point of view I should have questioned the first officer as to why we were pulling the symbol generator-1 power circuit breaker for a loss of the right pfd and nd. In the future I will always confirm that the appropriate checklist for the situation at hand is being accomplished by referring to my QRH or the first officer's prior to accomplishment of any individual steps in that checklist. I will also attempt to ascertain that from a systems point of view the steps of the checklist make sense for the abnormal situation encountered.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 First Officer's PFD and ND failed after takeoff. An improper QRH checklist selection led to the Captain's PFD and ND being taken off line. An emergency was declared and the flight to a nearby airport. Maintenance found excessive water in the E and E compartment.

Narrative: On departure at approximately 300 FT AGL the First Officer's PFD and ND went blank. I; the Captain; assumed control of the aircraft and after reaching a safe altitude called for the First Officer to open his QRH and to find the appropriate abnormal for our situation (loss of right PFD and ND). The First Officer said he was ready to proceed and he read the first item on the checklist. I do not recall whether the First Officer read the title of the checklist aloud before he read the first item on the checklist. The checklist called for us to check two circuit breakers supplying power to the symbol generator. Both circuit breakers were in. Next item on the list called for the symbol generator-1 power circuit breaker to be pulled and then reset. The circuit breaker was pulled and this resulted in the loss of the Captain's PFD and ND. At this point it was determined that the First Officer was reading the checklist for loss of left PFD and ND and we immediately attempted to reset the symbol generator-1 power circuit breaker with no success. We then completed the QRH procedure for loss of right PFD and ND; but we did not regain the First Officer's PFD or ND. After consulting with Dispatch; Maintenance Control; and the First Officer; and considering the potential for developing weather along the route of flight to our scheduled destination we elected to divert and make an overweight landing. We declared an emergency; requested that Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting vehicles be standing by to check for potentially hot brakes on roll-out and proceeded to land uneventfully. Upon reaching the gate; Maintenance met the aircraft and upon opening the E&E Compartment they discovered a great deal of water had accumulated in that compartment from an unknown source. It would appear that the accumulated moisture/water caused the loss of the First Officer's PFD and ND and prevented the successful reset of the symbol generator-1 power circuit breaker. We obviously made our situation worse by starting the wrong checklist; however; absent the water in the E&E bay the symbol generator-1 circuit breaker should have reset. Additionally; from a systems point of view I should have questioned the First Officer as to why we were pulling the symbol generator-1 power circuit breaker for a loss of the right PFD and ND. In the future I will always confirm that the appropriate checklist for the situation at hand is being accomplished by referring to my QRH or the First Officer's prior to accomplishment of any individual steps in that checklist. I will also attempt to ascertain that from a systems point of view the steps of the checklist make sense for the abnormal situation encountered.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.