Narrative:

On approach to tist we were given direct to jaqyy (FAF for runway 10) at 3;000 ft. Approach control repeatedly asked us if we could see the runway. Due to haze; we could not see the runway. I got the feeling that this controller just wanted to give us a visual approach; hand us to tower; and be done with us. We tried to request a lower altitude; but were unable to get the request into approach control. Approach control finally let us descend to 2;800 ft just prior to jaqyy; told us to cross jaqyy at 2;800 ft; cleared us for the ILS to runway 10 (as we crossed jaqyy); and sent us to tower frequency. The published glideslope intercept altitude at jaqyy is 2;100 ft therefore we were already 700 ft high at the FAF. At my request; the first officer asked for a visual approach from tower; at first the tower acted confused by the request; but he then gave it to us. I disconnected the autopilot to help me descend quicker; but I soon felt that I would not be able to have a stabilized approach at 1;000 ft. At this point I had the first officer request a right 360 to rejoin the final approach course so I could get down to a lower altitude to continue the approach. Tower approved the request for a right 360 turn and to rejoin the final approach course. I started the right turn and we leveled off at 1;000 ft in the turn. Tower then started telling us about some traffic that was on an extended final (south of the final approach course) and approaching to land at tist. At first the tower said he was at 10 miles; and then he corrected himself and said that the traffic was at 7 miles. Tower did not specify if that distance was from us or from the runway and I do not recall hearing tower giving us an altitude for the traffic. Tower then started a discussion with the other traffic as to what type of aircraft it was. At this point; the first officer asked tower if we were supposed to follow the traffic. After a little hesitation; the tower said yes; follow the traffic. At this point I had my hands full; I was hand flying the aircraft and trying to determine the best course of action. My first officer said that he told me he was setting a heading for me to rollout on; but with all that was going on in the cockpit and the radio chatter; I did not hear him. I started a rollout while looking for the traffic. I got visual contact with the traffic and announced it to the crew. He was in the middle of my windscreen and moving left to right; he also looked to be below me. With this information and looking at the geometry of the aircraft; I decided to make a climbing left turn. At this point; the line check airman (lca) that was in the jumpseat giving me a line check; very strongly insisted that I make a right turn. As forceful as he was; I assumed that he saw something that I didn't; so I started a right turn. This took us over the top of the traffic and caused a TCAS resolution advisory (RA) to climb the aircraft. I followed the guidance and we remained clear of the traffic. A later discussion with the lca revealed that he did not have the traffic in sight and did not hear me say that I had the traffic in sight. He was basing his strong suggestion for a right turn solely on what he saw on the TCAS navigation display. Had I known this at the time; I would have continued my left climbing turn and I am convinced that if I had; we would not have received the TCAS RA. I then maneuvered back to the final approach course and followed the traffic for an uneventful landing. Contributing factors: I personally feel that ATC played a major role in setting us up for this event. Having flown into tjsj and tist on many occasions; it seems to me that approach control takes more interest in aircraft landing in tjsj than they do for aircraft landing in tist. The fact that approach kept asking if we could see that field and then had us cross jaqyy at 2;800 ft instead of the published 2;100 ft brings into question the issue of his focus. There is a fix called kutho that is5 NM outside of jaqyy and it has a crossing altitude of 2;800 ft. Was the controller not clear as to where he was clearing us and the appropriate altitudes? I don't know the answer to that question. If we would have been sent to kutho or given an altitude of 2;100 ft at jaqyy; there would not have been a need for the 360 degree turn to lose altitude on the approach and the event would not have happened. It is something to consider. In retrospect; I would have requested radar vectors when I was given the 2;800 ft crossing at jaqyy. I don't know if tist tower was aware of the traffic that was behind us when we requested the right 360 turn; but if I had been made aware of the aircraft before the turn; I would have done things differently. I would have reconnected the autopilot before making the turn to help with my situational awareness and the spotting of the traffic. This event emphasizes the need for all parties to remain vigilant and maintain situational awareness.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier Captain described the confusion which developed on a ILS to TIST Runway 10 after ATC issued late clearance making the aircraft high and forcing a 360 turn. In the turn they had a TCAS RA with another aircraft on approach to the same runway.

Narrative: On approach to TIST we were given direct to JAQYY (FAF for Runway 10) at 3;000 FT. Approach Control repeatedly asked us if we could see the runway. Due to haze; we could not see the runway. I got the feeling that this Controller just wanted to give us a visual approach; hand us to Tower; and be done with us. We tried to request a lower altitude; but were unable to get the request into Approach Control. Approach Control finally let us descend to 2;800 FT just prior to JAQYY; told us to cross JAQYY at 2;800 FT; cleared us for the ILS to Runway 10 (as we crossed JAQYY); and sent us to Tower frequency. The published glideslope intercept altitude at JAQYY is 2;100 FT therefore we were already 700 FT high at the FAF. At my request; the First Officer asked for a visual approach from Tower; at first the Tower acted confused by the request; but he then gave it to us. I disconnected the autopilot to help me descend quicker; but I soon felt that I would not be able to have a stabilized approach at 1;000 FT. At this point I had the First Officer request a right 360 to rejoin the final approach course so I could get down to a lower altitude to continue the approach. Tower approved the request for a right 360 turn and to rejoin the final approach course. I started the right turn and we leveled off at 1;000 FT in the turn. Tower then started telling us about some traffic that was on an extended final (south of the final approach course) and approaching to land at TIST. At first the Tower said he was at 10 miles; and then he corrected himself and said that the traffic was at 7 miles. Tower did not specify if that distance was from us or from the runway and I do not recall hearing Tower giving us an altitude for the traffic. Tower then started a discussion with the other traffic as to what type of aircraft it was. At this point; the First Officer asked Tower if we were supposed to follow the traffic. After a little hesitation; the Tower said yes; follow the traffic. At this point I had my hands full; I was hand flying the aircraft and trying to determine the best course of action. My First Officer said that he told me he was setting a heading for me to rollout on; but with all that was going on in the cockpit and the radio chatter; I did not hear him. I started a rollout while looking for the traffic. I got visual contact with the traffic and announced it to the crew. He was in the middle of my windscreen and moving left to right; he also looked to be below me. With this information and looking at the geometry of the aircraft; I decided to make a climbing left turn. At this point; the Line Check Airman (LCA) that was in the jumpseat giving me a line check; VERY STRONGLY INSISTED that I make a right turn. As forceful as he was; I assumed that he saw something that I didn't; so I started a right turn. This took us over the top of the traffic and caused a TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA) to climb the aircraft. I followed the guidance and we remained clear of the traffic. A later discussion with the LCA revealed that he did not have the traffic in sight and did not hear me say that I had the traffic in sight. He was basing his strong suggestion for a right turn solely on what he saw on the TCAS navigation display. Had I known this at the time; I would have continued my left climbing turn and I am convinced that if I had; we would not have received the TCAS RA. I then maneuvered back to the final approach course and followed the traffic for an uneventful landing. Contributing Factors: I personally feel that ATC played a major role in setting us up for this event. Having flown into TJSJ and TIST on many occasions; it seems to me that approach control takes more interest in aircraft landing in TJSJ than they do for aircraft landing in TIST. The fact that approach kept asking if we could see that field and then had us cross JAQYY at 2;800 FT instead of the published 2;100 FT brings into question the issue of his focus. There is a fix called KUTHO that is5 NM outside of JAQYY and it has a crossing altitude of 2;800 FT. Was the Controller not clear as to where he was clearing us and the appropriate altitudes? I don't know the answer to that question. If we would have been sent to KUTHO or given an altitude of 2;100 FT at JAQYY; there would not have been a need for the 360 degree turn to lose altitude on the approach and the event would not have happened. It is something to consider. In retrospect; I would have requested radar vectors when I was given the 2;800 FT crossing at JAQYY. I don't know if TIST Tower was aware of the traffic that was behind us when we requested the right 360 turn; but if I had been made aware of the aircraft before the turn; I would have done things differently. I would have reconnected the autopilot before making the turn to help with my situational awareness and the spotting of the traffic. This event emphasizes the need for all parties to remain vigilant and maintain situational awareness.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.