Narrative:

Sector a/sector B there was a fighter cap over ZZZ from FL250 and below which resulted in numerous reroutes into the sector which included climbing aircraft and arrival aircraft that are not normally worked. Also the fighter cap extends 25 miles and enters sector B airspace limiting the space needed to vector. Warning area (WA123) went active prior to unsafe event occurring. WA123 was active from FL320 and below. By activating WA123 sector a is cut in half and results in a very narrow corridor that all aircraft have to funnel through and also results in the departure flow to be rerouted up the airways in sector B resulting in numerous head on conflicts with north to south departures. Weather was located out to the west of the sector situated to points far south. This resulted in massive route closures into other sectors and funneling more aircraft into sector B sector. During the event; 5 jetways all closed with little or no notice and required airborne reroutes down 2 jetways into sector B sector and the adjacent center. Training was in progress at sector B until the situation become so unsafe that the trainer removed the trainee to try and resolve the situation. At XA00 sector B become extremely unsafe for a period of about 1.5 hours. Due to weather; fighter caps; warning areas; and reroutes the sector became saturated with aircraft. At the beginning of the event there was a controller in charge; the sector was so overloaded that numerous aircraft had to hold in other sectors before continuing into sector B. No traffic situation should ever get like this. 2 cpc's requested numerous times to have the traffic flow to be stopped going into sector B and nothing was done. We had no tracker; and when the supervisor arrived his idea was to split the sector; however it was already to busy to attempt a split and all of the aircraft were in sector B and only one or two would have been high enough to be in sector C.with all of the reroutes there were too many aircraft transitioning to airports not normally worked and the warning areas were not flexible to allow us to vector or route aircraft into safer airspace. Also at the end of the event the fighter cap wanted to relocate. It took way too much coordination and I found out the person I was coordinating with was not even controlling the aircraft in the cap or the cap airspace itself. I was coordinating with a middle man that had to coordinate with someone else and back and forth. There was a direct line of communication between the cap controller and sector a but they would not answer the line; and when they did they did not know the airspace or what they were suppose to do. This entire situation could have been avoided with better planning; smarter tmu involvment; implementing ground stops when needed and not allowing the military to take airspace that is needed to safely move traffic.the supervisor; when in place was ineffective and was reluctant to implement the needed ground stops to protect the sector. The sector would have been considered saturated without the warning areas being active. Need better supervisor involvement to get ground stops in place when requested. Need to monitor the flow of traffic better into saturated sectors. Need to have better coordination with the military when it comes to the airspace. Need to have better weather planning; we all saw the weather coming; why didn't anyone else and put in a plan of action other than spur of the moment reroute into an already overly busy sector. Need to listen to the controllers when they say no more aircraft. We know when to say no more; we know our breaking points and what we can handle.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ARTCC Controller reported that a military mission combined with an active warning area and significant weather development in the area combined to make the sector unmanageable. Reporter stated Supervisor's would not take actions to reduce sector workload.

Narrative: Sector A/Sector B there was a Fighter Cap over ZZZ from FL250 and below which resulted in numerous reroutes into the sector which included climbing aircraft and arrival aircraft that are not normally worked. Also the Fighter Cap extends 25 miles and enters Sector B airspace limiting the space needed to vector. Warning Area (WA123) went active prior to unsafe event occurring. WA123 was active from FL320 and below. By activating WA123 Sector A is cut in half and results in a very narrow corridor that all aircraft have to funnel through and also results in the departure flow to be rerouted up the airways in Sector B resulting in numerous head on conflicts with north to south departures. Weather was located out to the west of the sector situated to points far south. This resulted in massive route closures into other sectors and funneling more aircraft into Sector B sector. During the event; 5 jetways all closed with little or no notice and required airborne reroutes down 2 jetways into Sector B Sector and the adjacent Center. Training was in progress at Sector B until the situation become so unsafe that the Trainer removed the Trainee to try and resolve the situation. At XA00 Sector B become extremely unsafe for a period of about 1.5 hours. Due to weather; Fighter Caps; Warning Areas; and Reroutes the sector became saturated with aircraft. At the beginning of the event there was a Controller in Charge; the sector was so overloaded that numerous aircraft had to hold in other sectors before continuing into Sector B. No traffic situation should ever get like this. 2 CPC's requested numerous times to have the traffic flow to be stopped going into Sector B and nothing was done. We had no tracker; and when the Supervisor arrived his idea was to split the sector; however it was already to busy to attempt a split and all of the aircraft were in Sector B and only one or two would have been high enough to be in Sector C.With all of the reroutes there were too many aircraft transitioning to airports not normally worked and the warning areas were not flexible to allow us to vector or route aircraft into safer airspace. Also at the end of the event the fighter cap wanted to relocate. It took way too much coordination and I found out the person I was coordinating with was not even controlling the aircraft in the cap or the cap airspace itself. I was coordinating with a middle man that had to coordinate with someone else and back and forth. THERE WAS a direct line of communication between the Cap controller and Sector A but they would not answer the line; and when they did they did not know the airspace or what they were suppose to do. This entire situation could have been avoided with better planning; smarter TMU involvment; implementing ground stops when needed and not allowing the military to take airspace that is needed to safely move traffic.The Supervisor; when in place was ineffective and was reluctant to implement the needed ground stops to protect the sector. The sector would have been considered saturated without the warning areas being active. Need better Supervisor involvement to get ground stops in place when requested. Need to monitor the flow of traffic better into saturated sectors. Need to have better coordination with the military when it comes to the airspace. Need to have better weather planning; we all saw the weather coming; why didn't anyone else and put in a plan of action other than spur of the moment reroute into an already overly busy sector. NEED TO LISTEN TO THE CONTROLLERS WHEN THEY SAY NO MORE AIRCRAFT. We know when to say no more; we know our breaking points and what we can handle.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.