Narrative:

The flight was conducted under a ferry permit. I was flying right seat; with the chief pilot in the left. Due to traffic conflicts; we were kept high in cruise until close to the destination; requiring a steep descent; with several intermediate level-offs due to traffic in holds. We were cleared to 11;000 ft; then down to 3;200 ft. We were asked what type approach we would like; and as the weather was reporting a high ceiling in agreement with the area forecast; I advised ATC that; 'we'd like a visual to runway 6.' center advised us to; 'report the field in sight.' I set 3;200 ft in the altitude alerter. The flight had been conducted by the chief pilot; but during the descent he told me to take the airplane. My initial descent planning was for the ILS 24; which would give us an additional 20 miles to descend. As we were already higher than desired; and with a change to runway 6; he took the airplane back and executed a descending 360 degree turn on the inbound radial to runway 6. He asked me for the approach chart for the VOR to runway 6; which I provided; and then asked me the minimum altitudes for the procedure. I advised ATC that we were circling to descend; and ATC responded; 'roger.' the captain asked the altitude on the procedure; and I replied; '2;500 ft outbound; with 1;700 inbound; minimum.' he instructed me to set 2;500 ft. As the ATIS was reporting 3;200 ft; we expected to breakout and see the runway. The chief pilot continued around his turn and began referencing the RMI for the inbound course. He flew a series of s-turns across the course descending. I advised I didn't have the runway in sight. We broke out over the approach end of runway 06; too high to be in a position to land. I advised the runway at 12 0' clock; too high; and the chief pilot announced going around. He said he would like the ILS. I let ATC know we were going to request the ILS; and ATC replied; 'you should have had permission to descend below your cleared altitude.' he then cleared us for the approach and advised us to report inbound. At the captains' request; I briefed the procedure to the flight engineer. The captain flew the outbound localizer for runway 24 and executed a procedure turn on the south side of the course. Prior to localizer intercept; he said; 'you got it.' the airplane was on autopilot; with autothrottles engaged; with the ILS tuned and identified. My vertical speed indicator had failed; and upon the localizer coming alive; the glideslope flagged; the flight director disappeared and was replaced with flags; I got a disconnect tone; and a flashing autopilot and autothrottle warning. A 'computer' flag appeared on my ADI. I advised the captain that I had no references to fly the approach; and that I had no comparator warning. I began a turn to intercept the localizer; and the captain took the airplane again; and continued the approach. He had no indication errors on his side of the cockpit. I monitored his instruments. We broke out with a decreasing ceiling at 500 to 600 ft; and landed. Several problems occurred on the flight; not the least of which was poor crew coordination. The captain flew an approach for which we weren't cleared. Erratic turns; including 360 degree turns and 90 degree s-turns across the non-precision final approach course were slightly disorienting and non-standard. When I read back that we would take the visual; we expected to break out any moment; and later that readback would be recalled as readback of a visual clearance...which it was not. When the captain asked for procedure altitudes to be put in the altitude alerter; this cemented the mentality that we were on the procedure. We intended to follow the VOR procedure; visually; and given reported conditions; expected to break out early. When we did not; the captain continued along the final approach course; continuing to descend; until we did break out; far too late to land. On the second approach we had a precision approach procedure; but decreasing capability on my instrumentation. Weather was decreasing. The flight involved a ferry operation with an airplane that had been sitting in the desert for some time; and did not offer full functionality; the airplane was recently purchased and was being moved to a new location for inspection; repairs; and evaluation. The procedure turn was flown on the south side of the ILS course; when the course reversal is depicted on the right side. The captain asked repeatedly during the outbound leg of the ILS about the distance from the airport for the IAF. Simply handing the airplane off during the procedure turn was not good coordination. He took the airplane back as we intercepted the localizer; after my insistence twice that I had no guidance. As a junior first officer; the disparity between my standing in the company and the role of the captain as chief pilot may have played a part in my less aggressive stance. No discussion was made by the captain regarding the erratic descent maneuvers to get in position to land; his intent; or that he was taking the airplane to maneuver into position. The changing instrument availability was inconvenient; and the airplane we were ferrying had different instrumentation and navigation than those to which we were accustomed; as well as a different layout. Among the differences was the reversion method by which I might have selected the captain's flight director computer for my approach reference. Were I to fly the descent and arrival again; I would have simply asked for vectors for the ILS. Runway 6 was requested as it offered a faster; straight-in option that ultimately provided not only no benefit; but contributed to the problem by reducing the available descent distance. The straight-in procedure also provided less navigational precision and capability. When problems occurred on the procedure; we should have requested a delaying vector to sort them out. We had departed with our minimum fuel; but with legal IFR reserves; and had time to re-brief a complete approach without having to rush or repeatedly change hands on the controls.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 First Officer describes crew coordination issues that occurred during a ferry flight with a senior Captain. A late descent; followed by a runway change; and confusion about an approach clearance result in a missed approach. The nonstandard instrument panel layout and instrument failures result in the First Officer returning control of the aircraft to the Captain at localizer intercept on the second approach.

Narrative: The flight was conducted under a ferry permit. I was flying right seat; with the Chief Pilot in the left. Due to traffic conflicts; we were kept high in cruise until close to the destination; requiring a steep descent; with several intermediate level-offs due to traffic in holds. We were cleared to 11;000 FT; then down to 3;200 FT. We were asked what type approach we would like; and as the weather was reporting a high ceiling in agreement with the area forecast; I advised ATC that; 'We'd like a visual to Runway 6.' Center advised us to; 'Report the field in sight.' I set 3;200 FT in the altitude alerter. The flight had been conducted by the Chief Pilot; but during the descent he told me to take the airplane. My initial descent planning was for the ILS 24; which would give us an additional 20 miles to descend. As we were already higher than desired; and with a change to Runway 6; he took the airplane back and executed a descending 360 degree turn on the inbound radial to Runway 6. He asked me for the approach chart for the VOR to Runway 6; which I provided; and then asked me the minimum altitudes for the procedure. I advised ATC that we were circling to descend; and ATC responded; 'Roger.' The Captain asked the altitude on the procedure; and I replied; '2;500 FT outbound; with 1;700 inbound; minimum.' He instructed me to set 2;500 FT. As the ATIS was reporting 3;200 FT; we expected to breakout and see the runway. The Chief Pilot continued around his turn and began referencing the RMI for the inbound course. He flew a series of S-turns across the course descending. I advised I didn't have the runway in sight. We broke out over the approach end of Runway 06; too high to be in a position to land. I advised the runway at 12 0' clock; too high; and the Chief Pilot announced going around. He said he would like the ILS. I let ATC know we were going to request the ILS; and ATC replied; 'You should have had permission to descend below your cleared altitude.' He then cleared us for the approach and advised us to report inbound. At the Captains' request; I briefed the procedure to the Flight Engineer. The Captain flew the outbound localizer for Runway 24 and executed a procedure turn on the south side of the course. Prior to localizer intercept; he said; 'You got it.' The airplane was on autopilot; with autothrottles engaged; with the ILS tuned and identified. My vertical speed indicator had failed; and upon the localizer coming alive; the glideslope flagged; the flight director disappeared and was replaced with flags; I got a disconnect tone; and a flashing autopilot and autothrottle warning. A 'computer' flag appeared on my ADI. I advised the Captain that I had no references to fly the approach; and that I had no comparator warning. I began a turn to intercept the localizer; and the Captain took the airplane again; and continued the approach. He had no indication errors on his side of the cockpit. I monitored his instruments. We broke out with a decreasing ceiling at 500 to 600 FT; and landed. Several problems occurred on the flight; not the least of which was poor crew coordination. The Captain flew an approach for which we weren't cleared. Erratic turns; including 360 degree turns and 90 degree S-turns across the non-precision final approach course were slightly disorienting and non-standard. When I read back that we would take the visual; we expected to break out any moment; and later that readback would be recalled as readback of a visual clearance...which it was not. When the Captain asked for procedure altitudes to be put in the altitude alerter; this cemented the mentality that we were on the procedure. We intended to follow the VOR procedure; visually; and given reported conditions; expected to break out early. When we did not; the Captain continued along the final approach course; continuing to descend; until we did break out; far too late to land. On the second approach we had a precision approach procedure; but decreasing capability on my instrumentation. Weather was decreasing. The flight involved a ferry operation with an airplane that had been sitting in the desert for some time; and did not offer full functionality; the airplane was recently purchased and was being moved to a new location for inspection; repairs; and evaluation. The procedure turn was flown on the south side of the ILS course; when the course reversal is depicted on the right side. The Captain asked repeatedly during the outbound leg of the ILS about the distance from the airport for the IAF. Simply handing the airplane off during the procedure turn was not good coordination. He took the airplane back as we intercepted the localizer; after my insistence twice that I had no guidance. As a junior First Officer; the disparity between my standing in the company and the role of the Captain as Chief Pilot may have played a part in my less aggressive stance. No discussion was made by the Captain regarding the erratic descent maneuvers to get in position to land; his intent; or that he was taking the airplane to maneuver into position. The changing instrument availability was inconvenient; and the airplane we were ferrying had different instrumentation and navigation than those to which we were accustomed; as well as a different layout. Among the differences was the reversion method by which I might have selected the Captain's flight director computer for my approach reference. Were I to fly the descent and arrival again; I would have simply asked for vectors for the ILS. Runway 6 was requested as it offered a faster; straight-in option that ultimately provided not only no benefit; but contributed to the problem by reducing the available descent distance. The straight-in procedure also provided less navigational precision and capability. When problems occurred on the procedure; we should have requested a delaying vector to sort them out. We had departed with our minimum fuel; but with legal IFR reserves; and had time to re-brief a complete approach without having to rush or repeatedly change hands on the controls.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.