Narrative:

I was operating as captain of this flight and my first officer had very little experience with the company (about 1 month flying the line). After receiving the one minute weather at destination (340 at 14; overcast 300) we decided that it would be better if I flew the approach and he performed the duties of pilot not flying. I briefed the ILS via the straight in feeder route. Since it was the first officer's leg; we switched flight controls prior to the descent so that I could fly the approach. When we crossed the IAF; we were instructed to contact tower which the first officer did. Tower then instructed us to contact them upon crossing the FAF. My first officer appeared to be overwhelmed with the situation (it was his first approach to minimums flying the line). His callouts were poor (some were missed; some were late). He also had some trouble reading the approach plate which led to additional task saturation on my part. We failed to report crossing the FAF and as a result did not get cleared to land by tower. Upon landing we were informed by tower that we failed to report and were not cleared to land. At our arrival time there were no other aircraft waiting for departure or moving about the airport surface and conditions were night IMC.contributing factors to this incident include: 1) fatigue (it was day 5 of 5 days on duty. We had also not finished until early in the morning the previous 3 nights on duty) 2) task saturation 3) inexperience of the first officer (resulting in task saturation) 4) failure of the captain to monitor the first officer's assigned duties 5) poor 'final checklist' procedure recommendations: I feel that this incident could easily be prevented in the future by changing our 'final checklist' procedure on this aircraft. As it currently stands; we cannot complete the final checklist until we go visual on an ILS which in this case was just over 200 ft above the runway. In this extremely critical phase of flight; the pilot not flying must divert his/her attention away from the task at hand to read three checklist items; followed by three callouts. By the time 'cleared to land' is stated; the aircraft is approximately 50 ft over the ground; which isn't the safest location to discover that you are not cleared to land. Below 200 ft you are busy calling out airspeeds and performing other duties so saying 'cleared to land' becomes more of a trained reaction than an actual check. I have over 3;500 hours total time; 2;500 hours with the company and 1;400 hours as a captain with this company and I have never come close to landing without a clearance until this incident. On my previous aircraft the final checklist was to be completed no lower than 1;000 ft AGL when IMC. This worked very well because it allows for the concentration to be focused on landing the aircraft as opposed to running a checklist at 200 ft AGL. My recommendation would be to have the same requirement for this aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Turboprop Captain reports landing without clearance after his recently hired First Officer becomes overloaded during a night IMC approach and forgets to call the Tower. Company checklist procedures are also cited as a contributing factor.

Narrative: I was operating as Captain of this flight and my First Officer had very little experience with the company (about 1 month flying the line). After receiving the one minute weather at destination (340 at 14; Overcast 300) we decided that it would be better if I flew the approach and he performed the duties of Pilot Not Flying. I briefed the ILS via the straight in feeder route. Since it was the First Officer's leg; we switched flight controls prior to the descent so that I could fly the approach. When we crossed the IAF; we were instructed to contact Tower which the First Officer did. Tower then instructed us to contact them upon crossing the FAF. My First Officer appeared to be overwhelmed with the situation (it was his first approach to minimums flying the line). His callouts were poor (some were missed; some were late). He also had some trouble reading the approach plate which led to additional task saturation on my part. We failed to report crossing the FAF and as a result did not get cleared to land by Tower. Upon landing we were informed by Tower that we failed to report and were not cleared to land. At our arrival time there were no other aircraft waiting for departure or moving about the airport surface and conditions were night IMC.Contributing factors to this incident include: 1) Fatigue (It was day 5 of 5 days on duty. We had also not finished until early in the morning the previous 3 nights on duty) 2) Task saturation 3) Inexperience of the First Officer (resulting in task saturation) 4) Failure of the Captain to monitor the First Officer's assigned duties 5) Poor 'Final Checklist' procedure Recommendations: I feel that this incident could easily be prevented in the future by changing our 'Final Checklist' procedure on this aircraft. As it currently stands; we cannot complete the Final Checklist until we go visual on an ILS which in this case was just over 200 FT above the runway. In this extremely critical phase of flight; the Pilot Not Flying must divert his/her attention away from the task at hand to read three checklist items; followed by three callouts. By the time 'Cleared to Land' is stated; the aircraft is approximately 50 FT over the ground; which isn't the safest location to discover that you are not cleared to land. Below 200 FT you are busy calling out airspeeds and performing other duties so saying 'Cleared to Land' becomes more of a trained reaction than an actual check. I have over 3;500 hours total time; 2;500 hours with the company and 1;400 hours as a Captain with this company and I have never come close to landing without a clearance until this incident. On my previous aircraft the Final Checklist was to be completed no lower than 1;000 FT AGL when IMC. This worked very well because it allows for the concentration to be focused on landing the aircraft as opposed to running a checklist at 200 FT AGL. My recommendation would be to have the same requirement for this aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.