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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 911178 |
Time | |
Date | 201009 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B767-300 and 300 ER |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | Relief Pilot Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
While performing pre-flight duties in the cockpit; we saw a cloud of what appeared to be smoke and fire trucks outside the aircraft. I called ramp control and asked what was going on and they replied (with the tone of voice of no big deal; don't worry about it) that a ground vehicle had a problem. A little while later a guy came up to deliver toilet paper to one of our lavatories and excitedly asked if we knew there was a fire under our aircraft! What?! The crew was on board and we had around 100;000# of fuel onboard as well! When we went down to the ramp; we found the cargo loader had caught fire. The ground crew extinguished it to the best of their ability and called ramp tower. The fire trucks showed up; but no one was there to tell them where the incident was and they drove around looking for the fire. Apparently the fire chief was a bit upset by this. When we asked why we weren't told about having a fire under the belly of our aircraft the ramp supervisor in charge heatedly told us to leave him alone; that he was busy! When we asked; 'what about the crew?' he said he's concerned about his ramp guys and leave him alone (the actual wording I don't remember). When the captain; first officer; and relief pilot initially went down to the ramp to investigate the situation the captain left instructions not to board the aircraft until we knew what was going on and that it was safe to do so. When we went back to the jetbridge the agent was well into the boarding process. That looks good to the passengers! Here; you sit over a smoking vehicle with fire trucks all around and lights flashing so I can get an on time departure (that's late anyway)! The complete disregard and lack of any respect at all for the captain of the aircraft is inexcusable! If people were injured you can bet the FAA would be asking him lots of questions about why he allowed his crew to remain aboard the aircraft. After raising the flaps on climbout the configuration warning/flaps illuminated on the EICAS and the warning horn sounded. The warning went away after the throttles reduced below ~72% or so and came back on above that. We held to sort out the problem and determined that we should return for landing. Center fuel was dumped and we configured to burn down the fuel further. Additionally after takeoff the nose gear brakes seemed to fail with associated moderate vibration (much more than normal). The flight attendants said they smelled a slight burning rubber smell that eventually went away. Although we had no indications of a fire or other issues associated with the gear; it was a consideration that something else could have happened that we were unaware of. It seemed prudent to land without undue delay to burn down fuel below max landing weight. The captain made a normal landing using minimum breaking and had a descent rate of around 3-400 FPM. It should be well noted that we had 3 pilots fully engaged with this issue and at times each of us was talking to a separate agency or person in the resolution of the problem. We were just starting our crew duty day but it was well into the day for us all. Fatigue wasn't a big issue; but had it been later with just two of us as the FAA proposes it would have been a different story all together! The constant horn noise made communication very difficult and we had to repeat ourselves several times on many occasions. It was also very distracting to basic flying and communication with ATC. To further complicate the problem; the aircraft had an upgraded flight instrument display! While I've seen the display on several trips; it is still like learning to fly all over again each time I see it. I look for the altitude and see the time; I look for the airspeed and see this big map and get distracted by it. I find what I'm looking for and have to think about what it is telling me. With enough time using the system it would be adequate; but I have not had enough time looking at it and using it to be proficient at it. In this incident I found it a huge distraction. Thank god there was no weather to deal with and that it was at the beginning of the day. At the end of one of these long flights I really have a hard time with these displays and I even find them more difficult to see clearly. (The steam gauges are fine!) my training was wholly inadequate for the upgraded flight instrument display. I had one sim with the upgraded flight instrument display and it broke. We went to another sim for the session. Quite frankly; even one full simulator session followed by a 6 month break before I see another upgraded flight instrument display is inadequate training and leaves me completely non-proficient with my crosscheck in these aircraft. I suspect the incidence of flap over speeds will dramatically increase in these aircraft. We need more and better training for this system before we start revenue flights. The flight operations manual needs to be changed to read that from the time the captain arrives at the aircraft he is in charge of the flight. Period. The passengers look to him for answers and sound decisions and having everybody and his brother second guessing him and overriding him is just plane stupid and unsafe. Our company's policy and corporate culture of disregarding the captain and the cockpit crew as irrelevant is just asking for problems and needs to be changed as well. We were very lucky this didn't result in any injuries!
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B767 flight crew was informed after the fact that a belt loader had caught fire under their aircraft yet passengers were boarded while the crew was investigating. After takeoff a configuration warning was received for flaps that cannot be silenced. The crew elected to dump fuel and return while another config warning was received as the spoilers were armed.
Narrative: While performing pre-flight duties in the cockpit; we saw a cloud of what appeared to be smoke and fire trucks outside the aircraft. I called ramp control and asked what was going on and they replied (with the tone of voice of no big deal; don't worry about it) that a ground vehicle had a problem. A little while later a guy came up to deliver toilet paper to one of our lavatories and excitedly asked if we knew there was a fire under our aircraft! WHAT?! The crew was on board and we had around 100;000# of fuel onboard as well! When we went down to the ramp; we found the cargo loader had caught fire. The ground crew extinguished it to the best of their ability and called Ramp Tower. The fire trucks showed up; but no one was there to tell them where the incident was and they drove around looking for the fire. Apparently the Fire Chief was a bit upset by this. When we asked why we weren't told about having a fire under the belly of our aircraft the Ramp Supervisor in charge heatedly told us to leave him alone; that he was busy! When we asked; 'what about the crew?' he said he's concerned about his ramp guys and leave him alone (the actual wording I don't remember). When the Captain; First Officer; and Relief Pilot initially went down to the ramp to investigate the situation the Captain left instructions not to board the aircraft until we knew what was going on and that it was safe to do so. When we went back to the jetbridge the agent was well into the boarding process. THAT looks good to the passengers! Here; you sit over a smoking vehicle with fire trucks all around and lights flashing so I can get an on time departure (that's late anyway)! The complete disregard and lack of any respect at all for the Captain of the aircraft is inexcusable! If people were injured you can bet the FAA would be asking him LOTS of questions about why he allowed his crew to remain aboard the aircraft. After raising the flaps on climbout the Configuration Warning/Flaps illuminated on the EICAS and the warning horn sounded. The warning went away after the throttles reduced below ~72% or so and came back on above that. We held to sort out the problem and determined that we should return for landing. Center fuel was dumped and we configured to burn down the fuel further. Additionally after takeoff the nose gear brakes seemed to fail with associated moderate vibration (much more than normal). The Flight Attendants said they smelled a slight burning rubber smell that eventually went away. Although we had no indications of a fire or other issues associated with the gear; it was a consideration that SOMETHING else could have happened that we were unaware of. It seemed prudent to land without undue delay to burn down fuel below max landing weight. The Captain made a normal landing using minimum breaking and had a descent rate of around 3-400 FPM. It should be well noted that we had 3 pilots FULLY engaged with this issue and at times each of us was talking to a separate agency or person in the resolution of the problem. We were just starting our crew duty day but it was well into the day for us all. Fatigue wasn't a big issue; but had it been later with just two of us as the FAA proposes it would have been a different story all together! The constant horn noise made communication very difficult and we had to repeat ourselves several times on many occasions. It was also VERY distracting to basic flying and communication with ATC. To further complicate the problem; the aircraft had an upgraded flight instrument display! While I've seen the display on several trips; it is still like learning to fly all over again each time I see it. I look for the altitude and see the time; I look for the airspeed and see this big map and get distracted by it. I find what I'm looking for and have to think about what it is telling me. With enough time using the system it would be adequate; but I have not had enough time looking at it and using it to be proficient at it. In this incident I found it a HUGE distraction. Thank God there was no weather to deal with and that it was at the beginning of the day. At the end of one of these long flights I REALLY have a hard time with these displays and I even find them more difficult to see clearly. (The steam gauges are fine!) My training was wholly inadequate for the upgraded flight instrument display. I had one SIM with the upgraded flight instrument display and it broke. We went to another SIM for the session. Quite frankly; even one full simulator session followed by a 6 month break before I see another upgraded flight instrument display is inadequate training and leaves me completely non-proficient with my crosscheck in these aircraft. I suspect the incidence of flap over speeds will dramatically increase in these aircraft. We need more and better training for this system before we start revenue flights. The Flight Operations Manual needs to be changed to read that from the time the Captain arrives at the aircraft he is in charge of the flight. Period. The passengers look to him for answers and sound decisions and having everybody and his brother second guessing him and overriding him is just plane stupid and unsafe. Our company's policy and corporate culture of disregarding the Captain and the cockpit crew as irrelevant is just asking for problems and needs to be changed as well. We were very lucky this didn't result in any injuries!
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.