Narrative:

While climbing out we were given a climb to FL190 but asked to comply with all restrictions on the SID. Approaching the next waypoint; I meant to select VNAV and speed intervention at 210 KIAS; but inadvertently hit level change at 210 KIAS instead. Climbing rapidly toward the 7;000 or below restriction; I saw that VNAV was not engaged and; in my haste; selected VNAV again. Desiring a 210 KIAS climb speed; I meant to select speed intervention 210 KIAS but repeated my previous systems error and reselected level change a second time. Of course we flew through the restriction and leveled late at about 8;000 MSL; and then descended back to 7;000 just to or beyond the fix. The first officer stated I confused him with what I was attempting (VNAV/level change) and by the time he realized I meant VNAV/speed intervention; we were sailing through the restriction. My error was not as much a lack of systems knowledge as it was not watching which button my finger was pressing under the time constraint. The first officer and I both discussed the need to speak up and coordinate more assertively; fly; and monitor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Captain of a B737-700 fumbled with the autoflight mode selections on climb out and failed to meet a crossing restriction on the SID as a direct result.

Narrative: While climbing out we were given a climb to FL190 but asked to comply with all restrictions on the SID. Approaching the next waypoint; I meant to select VNAV and Speed Intervention at 210 KIAS; but inadvertently hit Level Change at 210 KIAS instead. Climbing rapidly toward the 7;000 or below restriction; I saw that VNAV was not engaged and; in my haste; selected VNAV again. Desiring a 210 KIAS climb speed; I meant to select Speed Intervention 210 KIAS but repeated my previous systems error and reselected Level Change a second time. Of course we flew through the restriction and leveled late at about 8;000 MSL; and then descended back to 7;000 just to or beyond the fix. The First Officer stated I confused him with what I was attempting (VNAV/Level Change) and by the time he realized I meant VNAV/Speed Intervention; we were sailing through the restriction. My error was not as much a lack of systems knowledge as it was not watching which button my finger was pressing under the time constraint. The First Officer and I both discussed the need to speak up and coordinate more assertively; fly; and monitor.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.