Narrative:

Basic background information: I was pilot in command of a us military helicopter engaged in a northcomm/norad sponsored mission to deter and prevent incursions into the washington D.C. Sfra and frz. For this mission; the aircraft was crewed by two pilots and a flight mechanic.we were conducting a routine training mission within the frz. The co-pilot assisting me was an experienced mh-65C pilot; but he was assigned to a distant coast guard command; and had never flown in the frz or sfra around washington; D.C. The primary purpose of our mission was area familiarization for this new pilot.we were conducting pattern work at daa when the eastern air defense sector (eads) contacted us on their dedicated frequency to inform us that they had spotted a target-of-interest (toi) on their radars (and other sensors); and they immediately directed us to 'investigate.' eads passed vectors for the suspect air-track (initially bearing 050 from us; reported at 5;000 ft; heading southeast).under tasking from eads; our protocol is to immediately suspend training and conduct our rotary wing air intercept (rwai) procedures. Rwai procedures are an extremely challenging; and checklist intensive; evolution for coast guard pilots; and we are specially trained for this mission. Part of the protocol requires one pilot to work ATC frequencies while the other pilot works eads tasking on a separate frequency. Because of the intensive workload; neither pilot is able to monitor the external communications of the other.hence; I was communicating on the eads radio; gathering and confirming a steady stream of eads tasking; while the other pilot was working the ATC radios; in this case potomac approach. Neither of us was privy to the external communications of the other.as a result; we climbed into class B airspace without securing proper clearance from potomac approach. Potomac approach informed us (post flight; via phone call) that the event triggered a TCAS 'RA' advisory in a nearby air carrier aircraft.in retrospect (and this goes right to contributing factors); as the pilot with better area familiarity; I should have been working the potomac approach radio. My co-pilot should have been working the radio with eads (which would not have required any local area knowledge). I knew for certain that the co-pilot had established communication with potomac approach; buy I assumed (erroneously) that he had been able to communicate our intent and secure the required clearances to operate in class B airspace. This was my error; and I should have been more assertive in confirming with him that we had coordinated proper clearances into the airspace above us.another contributing factor was that eads use of the domestic events network (den) and other multi-agency notification tools was either slow; or non-existent. Normally; eads quickly announces (via the den) that they are tasking helicopter intercept of a toi. As a military pilot; my paradigm is to assume that the FAA controller is already aware of our general tasking from eads the moment we check in. The controllers in this case had no knowledge of eads tasking and furthermore that the tasking eads gave us ('investigate') is non-standard. We are normally either tasked to intercept; or orbit a certain location to stand guard against distant toi's that may come closer to the frz. There is no 'investigate' procedure.corrective actions: I have mentally replayed this event hundreds of times; assessing the chain of events that lead to it. The following 'corrective' measures come to mind:1. Never assume that the pilot communicating with ATC has secured clearances. Be proactive about getting confirmation from the co-pilot that he/she has secured proper clearances.2. To the maximum extent possible; a military pilot with no flight experience in the sfra should be afforded a familiarization flight where the flight is not divertible. This is our practice; but weather/maintenance sometimes precludes that orientation flight. This was the case in this instance as well (previous day's orientation flight with a non-divert aircraft was canceled due to maintenance).3. Challenge eads if tasking is vague or non-standard.4. Encourage eads to be more proactive about communicating toi concerns and tasking to the FAA via den and other instantaneous reporting methods.5. Slow down the pace of the intercept if the prior four items have not been accomplished.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CH65 pilot reports uncoordinated entry into DCA SFRA during a military exercise causing a regional jet to deviate for a TCAS RA.

Narrative: Basic background information: I was pilot in command of a U.S. military helicopter engaged in a NORTHCOMM/NORAD sponsored mission to deter and prevent incursions into the Washington D.C. SFRA and FRZ. For this mission; the aircraft was crewed by two pilots and a flight mechanic.We were conducting a routine training mission within the FRZ. The co-pilot assisting me was an experienced MH-65C pilot; but he was assigned to a distant Coast Guard command; and had never flown in the FRZ or SFRA around Washington; D.C. The primary purpose of our mission was area familiarization for this new pilot.We were conducting pattern work at DAA when the Eastern Air Defense Sector (EADS) contacted us on their dedicated frequency to inform us that they had spotted a target-of-interest (TOI) on their RADARs (and other sensors); and they immediately directed us to 'investigate.' EADS passed vectors for the suspect air-track (initially bearing 050 from us; reported at 5;000 FT; heading southeast).Under tasking from EADS; our protocol is to immediately suspend training and conduct our Rotary Wing Air Intercept (RWAI) procedures. RWAI procedures are an extremely challenging; and checklist intensive; evolution for Coast Guard pilots; and we are specially trained for this mission. Part of the protocol requires one pilot to work ATC frequencies while the other pilot works EADS tasking on a separate frequency. Because of the intensive workload; neither pilot is able to monitor the external communications of the other.Hence; I was communicating on the EADS radio; gathering and confirming a steady stream of EADS tasking; while the other pilot was working the ATC radios; in this case Potomac Approach. Neither of us was privy to the external communications of the other.As a result; we climbed into Class B airspace without securing proper clearance from Potomac Approach. Potomac Approach informed us (post flight; via phone call) that the event triggered a TCAS 'RA' advisory in a nearby Air Carrier aircraft.In retrospect (and this goes right to contributing factors); as the pilot with better area familiarity; I should have been working the Potomac Approach radio. My Co-pilot should have been working the radio with EADS (which would not have required any local area knowledge). I knew for certain that the Co-pilot had established communication with Potomac Approach; buy I assumed (erroneously) that he had been able to communicate our intent and secure the required clearances to operate in Class B airspace. This was my error; and I should have been more assertive in confirming with him that we had coordinated proper clearances into the airspace above us.Another contributing factor was that EADS use of the Domestic Events Network (DEN) and other multi-agency notification tools was either slow; or non-existent. Normally; EADS quickly announces (via the DEN) that they are tasking helicopter intercept of a TOI. As a military pilot; my paradigm is to assume that the FAA Controller is already aware of our general tasking from EADS the moment we check in. The Controllers in this case had no knowledge of EADS tasking and furthermore that the tasking EADS gave us ('investigate') is non-standard. We are normally either tasked to intercept; or orbit a certain location to stand guard against distant TOI's that may come closer to the FRZ. There is no 'investigate' procedure.Corrective actions: I have mentally replayed this event hundreds of times; assessing the chain of events that lead to it. The following 'corrective' measures come to mind:1. Never assume that the pilot communicating with ATC has secured clearances. Be proactive about getting confirmation from the Co-pilot that he/she has secured proper clearances.2. To the maximum extent possible; a military pilot with no flight experience in the SFRA should be afforded a familiarization flight where the flight is not divertible. This IS our practice; but weather/maintenance sometimes precludes that orientation flight. This was the case in this instance as well (previous day's orientation flight with a non-divert aircraft was canceled due to maintenance).3. Challenge EADS if tasking is vague or non-standard.4. Encourage EADS to be more proactive about communicating TOI concerns and tasking to the FAA via DEN and other instantaneous reporting methods.5. Slow down the pace of the intercept if the prior four items have not been accomplished.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.