Narrative:

During ILS approach to runway xx while I was the flying pilot; an aircraft anomaly and my failure to address it in a timely manner caused an unstabilized approach and subsequent go-around during which the selected flaps were overspeed by 15 KTS for approximately 5 seconds. We were initially cleared for the arrival to runway yy at but then changed to the ILS xx at the IAF. We were also told to maintain 220 KTS on the approach but; when switched to the final controller; were asked to increase to 250 KTS for spacing. We were in IMC during the whole approach. At about 5;000 ft; just as we were intercepting the glide slope; we were told to decrease to 220 KTS or less and contact tower. I selected managed speed and deployed the speed brake at this time. The first officer had already activated and confirmed the ILS xx approach on his mcdu at my request (I watched him do it). As we started down the glide slope; I did not initially notice that the engine thrust had not reverted to idle; and I couldn't understand why the airspeed was not decreasing. After a few seconds; I saw the positive thrust indications and in an attempt to salvage the approach; I disconnected the autothrust and autopilot. As I maneuvered above the glide slope in an attempt to slow the aircraft more quickly; I began to experience spatial disorientation and vertigo but did not recognize what was happening to me right away. I continued to try to slow the aircraft and fly the approach; but after s-turning on the localizer a few times and remaining well above the glide path; I finally realized I needed to make a go-around at about 3;000 ft. The go-around was not pretty because of my disorientation but I finally got everything under control with the exception of overspeeding the flaps in position 1 (I estimate I increased to 250 KTS for about 5 seconds before they were up). The second approach was uneventful and; when we arrived at the gate; maintenance did an overspeed inspection of the flaps with no damage noted. We ended up pushing back 11 minutes late for our next leg. Several things contributed to this event happening. First; the high workload associated with flying into this high density airport during IMC operations where runway changes at the last minute and speed changes during the approach are common. Secondly; the aircraft anomaly of the thrust not coming back to idle when you expect it to (I have had this happen to me one other time; but it was during a VMC approach; so was not a serious problem). Thirdly; the fact that this was an A321 aircraft - an airplane I rarely fly and one which is harder to slow down and has different flap speed limits than the A319/A320 model. And last and most importantly; because I made several bad decisions - to keep my speed up as long as I did; to disconnect the autopilot in IMC hence causing the subsequent spatial disorientation; to try saving the approach for as long as I did; and to not be prepared for the missed approach when it became obvious I needed to do it. I want to add that the first officer wasn't just sitting on his hands while all this was going on - he was attempting to help me by stating localizer and glide slope deviations; airspeeds and altitudes; and reminding me of gear and flap settings but neither of us really recognized I was experiencing vertigo until after the fact. A few ways I could have handled this situation better are: 1) not letting ATC dictate my speed schedule so much - just say no! 2) staying with the automation in IMC. 3) not trying to salvage unstable approaches. 4) being prepared for a go-around on every approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A321 Captain executed a go around at 3000 FT on an unstabilized approach after ATC asked him to keep his speed up while IMC and then changed runways. During the go-around the automation was disconnected; he got vertigo and oversped the flaps.

Narrative: During ILS Approach to Runway XX while I was the flying pilot; an aircraft anomaly and my failure to address it in a timely manner caused an unstabilized approach and subsequent go-around during which the selected flaps were overspeed by 15 KTS for approximately 5 seconds. We were initially cleared for the arrival to Runway YY at but then changed to the ILS XX at the IAF. We were also told to maintain 220 KTS on the approach but; when switched to the final Controller; were asked to increase to 250 KTS for spacing. We were in IMC during the whole approach. At about 5;000 FT; just as we were intercepting the glide slope; we were told to decrease to 220 KTS or less and Contact Tower. I selected managed speed and deployed the speed brake at this time. The First Officer had already activated and confirmed the ILS XX approach on his MCDU at my request (I watched him do it). As we started down the glide slope; I did not initially notice that the engine thrust had not reverted to idle; and I couldn't understand why the airspeed was not decreasing. After a few seconds; I saw the positive thrust indications and in an attempt to salvage the approach; I disconnected the autothrust and autopilot. As I maneuvered above the glide slope in an attempt to slow the aircraft more quickly; I began to experience spatial disorientation and vertigo but did not recognize what was happening to me right away. I continued to try to slow the aircraft and fly the approach; but after s-turning on the localizer a few times and remaining well above the glide path; I finally realized I needed to make a go-around at about 3;000 FT. The go-around was not pretty because of my disorientation but I finally got everything under control with the exception of overspeeding the flaps in position 1 (I estimate I increased to 250 KTS for about 5 seconds before they were up). The second approach was uneventful and; when we arrived at the gate; Maintenance did an overspeed inspection of the flaps with no damage noted. We ended up pushing back 11 minutes late for our next leg. Several things contributed to this event happening. First; the high workload associated with flying into this high density airport during IMC operations where runway changes at the last minute and speed changes during the approach are common. Secondly; the aircraft anomaly of the thrust not coming back to idle when you expect it to (I have had this happen to me one other time; but it was during a VMC approach; so was not a serious problem). Thirdly; the fact that this was an A321 aircraft - an airplane I rarely fly and one which is harder to slow down and has different flap speed limits than the A319/A320 model. And last and most importantly; because I made several bad decisions - to keep my speed up as long as I did; to disconnect the autopilot in IMC hence causing the subsequent spatial disorientation; to try saving the approach for as long as I did; and to not be prepared for the missed approach when it became obvious I needed to do it. I want to add that the First Officer wasn't just sitting on his hands while all this was going on - he was attempting to help me by stating localizer and glide slope deviations; airspeeds and altitudes; and reminding me of gear and flap settings but neither of us really recognized I was experiencing vertigo until after the fact. A few ways I could have handled this situation better are: 1) Not letting ATC dictate my speed schedule so much - just say no! 2) Staying with the automation in IMC. 3) Not trying to salvage unstable approaches. 4) Being prepared for a go-around on every approach.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.