Narrative:

I was working cmh lo (sector 30) and yrk lo (sector 23) combined at the cmh lo position. We have worked this configuration for at least two years because of lack of traffic volume. Yrk lo is rarely removed from cmh lo. I noticed a limited data block climbing off of cmh lo. I brought it up and read it. It was a PC12; cmh.dqn.cvg.RDSTN2.klou; requesting 140. Cmh departures are vectored westbound by cmh approach and then handed off to ltl lo (sector 31); so as to stay clear of my sector. If this aircraft were given direct cvg; it would stay within my airspace. However; direct cvg would conflict with cvg arrivals; of which I had one; CRJ2 ...TIGRR1.kcvg descending to FL200. I then dropped the limited data block; thinking that ltl lo would keep the aircraft westbound in their climb shelf; staying out of my airspace. However; I soon noticed the PC12's limited data block flying southwest bound and then climbing out of 104 into my airspace. I once again brought the full data block to see what was going on. I called ltl lo and told them that the PC12 was point out approved. Ltl lo responded by saying that they called sector 23 and someone answered saying point out approved. I told him that I never received a call. I then asked the sector next to me; pkb lo; if they took a point out on the PC12. The pkb lo d-side said that 31 called and started talking right away. The pkb lo d-side said that 31 did not let him identify who he was. The PC12 was in pkb lo's shelf proceeding westbound. So; the pkb lo d-side said point out approved. The radar trainer at pkb lo then said he noticed the PC12 begin tracking southwest bound. He then looked on my radar scope and noticed that I had pulled the PC12's full data block up on my radar scope. The PC12 was climbed to 140 by ltl lo and given direct cvg. I still had my cvg arrival; the CRJ2. The CRJ2 was faster than the PC12; so I descended the CRJ2 to 150. When the CRJ2 was 5 NM past the PC12; I descended him to 110. No separation was lost. Recommendation; because of the excessive number of sectors in our area; our vscs is not always operating as normal areas do. Our pik lo sector is not even physically located in our area because we do not have enough room. Therefore; pik lo almost always stays combined at pkb lo; and yrk lo almost always stays combined with cmh lo. If on the rare occasion that yrk lo or pik lo need to open; we open up yrk lo with pik lo combined with it. In order to do this; the supervisor has to reconfigure the vscs to activate yrk lo. However; as I previously mentioned; yrk lo rarely opens up. We are unable to manually plug into yrk lo and forward the phone calls to cmh lo. So; the calls from yrk lo must be transferred to pkb lo (from many months ago). There is no way to tell visually unless the supervisor reconfigures the area's vscs maps. Ltl lo said they dialed 23 for a point out to yrk and this dialed into the pkb lo d-side. Ltl lo did not allow the pkb lo d-side to identify himself; talking immediately giving the point out of the PC12. If the ltl lo controller had let pkb lo identify himself; he would have responded; 'pkb and pik lo d-side.' so ltl lo thought that by just dialing 23 they pointed out the PC12 to yrk lo. They were incorrect. The pkb lo d-side was not wrong in accepting the point-out because the aircraft was within their climb box airspace. My recommendation is for ltl lo to slow down and let the receiving caller identify himself. Ltl lo's area also needs a review as to how our vscs is limited. We also have a vscs limitation on our ultra high sector when it combines in the evening. Traffic is slow; there is no need to rush through procedures. Let everyone speak as they should for proper phone call transmissions; and the process will reveal what is needed.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZID Controller described a coordination event between sectors where an aircraft was directed to the wrong sector as a result of flawed VSCS programming and incomplete phraseology procedures.

Narrative: I was working CMH LO (Sector 30) and YRK LO (Sector 23) combined at the CMH LO position. We have worked this configuration for at least two years because of lack of traffic volume. YRK LO is rarely removed from CMH LO. I noticed a limited data block climbing off of CMH LO. I brought it up and read it. It was a PC12; CMH.DQN.CVG.RDSTN2.KLOU; requesting 140. CMH departures are vectored westbound by CMH Approach and then handed off to LTL LO (Sector 31); so as to stay clear of my sector. If this aircraft were given direct CVG; it would stay within my airspace. However; direct CVG would conflict with CVG arrivals; of which I had one; CRJ2 ...TIGRR1.KCVG descending to FL200. I then dropped the limited data block; thinking that LTL LO would keep the aircraft westbound in their climb shelf; staying out of my airspace. However; I soon noticed the PC12's limited Data Block flying southwest bound and then climbing out of 104 into my airspace. I once again brought the full Data Block to see what was going on. I called LTL LO and told them that the PC12 was point out approved. LTL LO responded by saying that they called Sector 23 and someone answered saying point out approved. I told him that I never received a call. I then asked the sector next to me; PKB LO; if they took a point out on the PC12. The PKB LO D-Side said that 31 called and started talking right away. The PKB LO D-Side said that 31 did not let him identify who he was. The PC12 was in PKB LO's shelf proceeding westbound. So; the PKB LO D-Side said point out approved. The RADAR trainer at PKB LO then said he noticed the PC12 begin tracking southwest bound. He then looked on my RADAR scope and noticed that I had pulled the PC12's full data block up on my RADAR scope. The PC12 was climbed to 140 by LTL LO and given direct CVG. I still had my CVG arrival; the CRJ2. The CRJ2 was faster than the PC12; so I descended the CRJ2 to 150. When the CRJ2 was 5 NM past the PC12; I descended him to 110. No separation was lost. Recommendation; because of the excessive number of sectors in our area; our VSCS is not always operating as normal areas do. Our PIK LO sector is not even physically located in our area because we do not have enough room. Therefore; PIK LO almost always stays combined at PKB LO; and YRK LO almost always stays combined with CMH LO. If on the rare occasion that YRK LO or PIK LO need to open; we open up YRK LO with PIK LO combined with it. In order to do this; the Supervisor has to reconfigure the VSCS to activate YRK LO. However; as I previously mentioned; YRK LO rarely opens up. We are unable to manually plug into YRK LO and forward the phone calls to CMH LO. So; the calls from YRK LO must be transferred to PKB LO (from many months ago). There is no way to tell visually unless the Supervisor reconfigures the area's VSCS maps. LTL LO said they dialed 23 for a point out to YRK and this dialed into the PKB LO D-Side. LTL LO did not allow the PKB LO D-Side to identify himself; talking immediately giving the point out of the PC12. If the LTL LO Controller had let PKB LO identify himself; he would have responded; 'PKB and PIK LO D-Side.' So LTL LO thought that by just dialing 23 they pointed out the PC12 to YRK LO. They were incorrect. The PKB LO D-Side was not wrong in accepting the point-out because the aircraft was within their climb box airspace. My recommendation is for LTL LO to slow down and let the receiving caller identify himself. LTL LO's area also needs a review as to how our VSCS is limited. We also have a VSCS limitation on our ultra high sector when it combines in the evening. Traffic is slow; there is no need to rush through procedures. Let everyone speak as they should for proper phone call transmissions; and the process will reveal what is needed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.