Narrative:

When arriving from the south at wilmington, oh, a privately owned and operated airport (by an airfreight company) which does not have a control tower, all if inbnds are controled by dayton approach, which instructed us to slow our speed as we would be following other traffic to the airport, which we learned later was a company flight. The company had advised us of the WX and that runway 22 was in use, which is done on a unicom frequency for nonctled airports. About 6 mi south of the airport, while heading to it, dayton approach gave us a left turn to put us on a right base for runway 4 and told us to slow further as a company was landing runway 22, and requested we report the airport in sight. We reported the aircraft in sight and were told to look out for a company aircraft that just landed, cleared for a visual to runway 4 and 'let me know of cancellation.' I cancelled IFR shortly afterwards and was told I might want to slow as much as possible and be on the lookout as the aircraft landing on runway 22 may still be on the runway. We turned final and I reported this to unicom as being 4 mi on final for runway 4, and we observed an aircraft rolling down runway 22 approximately 3000' from the end, which was the only turn off left for it to use. We continued the approach and the traffic reported clear of the runway, but that looked questionable to us so the PF maintained 200' AGL, giving up the normal glidepath, until the traffic was well down the taxiway, then re-initiated the descent and touched down about the 2300' point and decelerated sharply to make a midfield turn off several thousand feet from the end of the runway. The worst aspect of this seems to be the unsettling effect to the crew of the aircraft on the runway due to their perspective. However, I think a review and some thought should be given to dayton approach control's action of changing runways, controling traffic predicated on where they thing they are rather than where they know they are, and clearing traffic for an approach to a runway as #2 while no longer having sight or control of the #1 aircraft. As always, the captain should use whatever means necessary to stear clear of potentially hazardous situations, but having a high workload at that time and never having thought through a situation like that, I accepted it. A go around by the aircraft on the runway, which would trigger a go around of the aircraft in the air, could lead to disaster as left traffic is used for runway 22 and right traffic is used for runway 4, and when coupled with high deck angles, forward visibility would be 0.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG LANDED VERY SHORTLY AFTER ANOTHER ACR JET LNDG ON OPPOSITE RWY HAD CLEARED RWY. THIS RESULTED IN A CONFLICT.

Narrative: WHEN ARRIVING FROM THE S AT WILMINGTON, OH, A PRIVATELY OWNED AND OPERATED ARPT (BY AN AIRFREIGHT COMPANY) WHICH DOES NOT HAVE A CTL TWR, ALL IF INBNDS ARE CTLED BY DAYTON APCH, WHICH INSTRUCTED US TO SLOW OUR SPD AS WE WOULD BE FOLLOWING OTHER TFC TO THE ARPT, WHICH WE LEARNED LATER WAS A COMPANY FLT. THE COMPANY HAD ADVISED US OF THE WX AND THAT RWY 22 WAS IN USE, WHICH IS DONE ON A UNICOM FREQ FOR NONCTLED ARPTS. ABOUT 6 MI S OF THE ARPT, WHILE HEADING TO IT, DAYTON APCH GAVE US A LEFT TURN TO PUT US ON A RIGHT BASE FOR RWY 4 AND TOLD US TO SLOW FURTHER AS A COMPANY WAS LNDG RWY 22, AND REQUESTED WE RPT THE ARPT IN SIGHT. WE RPTED THE ACFT IN SIGHT AND WERE TOLD TO LOOK OUT FOR A COMPANY ACFT THAT JUST LANDED, CLRED FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 4 AND 'LET ME KNOW OF CANCELLATION.' I CANCELLED IFR SHORTLY AFTERWARDS AND WAS TOLD I MIGHT WANT TO SLOW AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND BE ON THE LOOKOUT AS THE ACFT LNDG ON RWY 22 MAY STILL BE ON THE RWY. WE TURNED FINAL AND I RPTED THIS TO UNICOM AS BEING 4 MI ON FINAL FOR RWY 4, AND WE OBSERVED AN ACFT ROLLING DOWN RWY 22 APPROX 3000' FROM THE END, WHICH WAS THE ONLY TURN OFF LEFT FOR IT TO USE. WE CONTINUED THE APCH AND THE TFC RPTED CLR OF THE RWY, BUT THAT LOOKED QUESTIONABLE TO US SO THE PF MAINTAINED 200' AGL, GIVING UP THE NORMAL GLIDEPATH, UNTIL THE TFC WAS WELL DOWN THE TXWY, THEN RE-INITIATED THE DSCNT AND TOUCHED DOWN ABOUT THE 2300' POINT AND DECELERATED SHARPLY TO MAKE A MIDFIELD TURN OFF SEVERAL THOUSAND FEET FROM THE END OF THE RWY. THE WORST ASPECT OF THIS SEEMS TO BE THE UNSETTLING EFFECT TO THE CREW OF THE ACFT ON THE RWY DUE TO THEIR PERSPECTIVE. HOWEVER, I THINK A REVIEW AND SOME THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DAYTON APCH CTL'S ACTION OF CHANGING RWYS, CTLING TFC PREDICATED ON WHERE THEY THING THEY ARE RATHER THAN WHERE THEY KNOW THEY ARE, AND CLRING TFC FOR AN APCH TO A RWY AS #2 WHILE NO LONGER HAVING SIGHT OR CTL OF THE #1 ACFT. AS ALWAYS, THE CAPT SHOULD USE WHATEVER MEANS NECESSARY TO STEAR CLR OF POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS SITUATIONS, BUT HAVING A HIGH WORKLOAD AT THAT TIME AND NEVER HAVING THOUGHT THROUGH A SITUATION LIKE THAT, I ACCEPTED IT. A GO AROUND BY THE ACFT ON THE RWY, WHICH WOULD TRIGGER A GO AROUND OF THE ACFT IN THE AIR, COULD LEAD TO DISASTER AS LEFT TFC IS USED FOR RWY 22 AND RIGHT TFC IS USED FOR RWY 4, AND WHEN COUPLED WITH HIGH DECK ANGLES, FORWARD VIS WOULD BE 0.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.