Narrative:

We pushed our aircraft from the gate with deteriorating weather conditions present. We had landed an hour prior during increasing cloud cover; but still under visual conditions. Prior to push; the airport had been turned around (runway operation); with subsequent changes to our clearance; departure procedure; and initial routing. Upon calling for taxi; we were informed once again; that the airport would be turning around (back to the original runway) and to expect a delay. We reprogrammed the FMC and proceeded to hold in a vacant pad for approximately twenty minutes. We accomplished the dual engine shutdown checklists and notified dispatch of our delay. After approximately twenty minutes; we were cleared to taxi to the runway and advised again that there would be a short delay while waiting for traffic to land on the opposite end of that runway (four to five more arrivals). The tower reported the weather as [ceiling] 300FT and [visibility] 0.5SM while we waited in line. The tower made at least two remarks to all departing aircraft to be ready to move quickly; as their plan was to launch six airplanes in a short amount of time due to an impending opposite direction arrival bank. Upon reaching the runway hold short line; we ran the before takeoff checklist. Shortly after clearing the preceding airbus for takeoff; we were instructed; 'line up and wait; on the runway.' I cleared the final approach course prior to crossing the hold short line. The captain then maneuvered the aircraft to the right of the yellow taxi line; in an attempt to utilize all of the available runway. As we took the runway; I had a nagging feeling that I should once again verify the aircraft was configured; programmed; and setup for our correct departure as our plan had changed several times. We had very thoroughly briefed the changes; but I quickly glanced at my departure plate; legs page; and the MCP. The 'wait' portion of our clearance didn't materialize; and we were immediately cleared for takeoff prior to even becoming aligned with the centerline. After glancing at the chart/FMC/MCP; I looked up and immediately recognized that we were; in fact; not on the runway centerline. I verbalized that we were not in the correct position; as the captain made a swift and effective correction and placed the aircraft on the runway centerline. My recollection was that we were on the centerline prior to 90 KTS; and several hundred feet prior to the expiration of the displaced threshold. During the takeoff roll; we didn't hear anything abnormal or feel any abnormality. All engine gauges were solid; and all systems indicated our aircraft was in good physical condition. The climb; cruise; descent; and arrival into were uneventful. We were given a runway change approximately thirty miles to our arrival airport; responded accordingly; and landed the aircraft on the runway. The landing was smooth and gave no indication that we had an issue with the number one tire. After shutdown; one of the company ground personnel came to the cockpit and advised us that we had a main tire; which had blown. I finished my cockpit duties; and proceeded to carefully examine the exterior of the aircraft for signs of damage. It was then that I noticed the dent in the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer. I notified the mechanic who had already begun to work on the tire; about the horizontal stab issue. I also notified the captain. The mechanic quickly contacted the airport operations and arranged for a sweep of the runway for any FOD (foreign object debris) that could have been left. The captain also coordinated with dispatch as well to ensure a FOD inspection was completed in our departure city. The captain proceeded to make all required phone calls per the flight operations manual; and maintained a high level of professionalism. In retrospect; I think that a chain of factors caused this event. My critical error in the situation was not devoting 100 percent attention to the runway whilewe got into the position for takeoff. At the time; I felt that I had plenty of time to glance at the plate; legs page; and then sit on the runway for another few moments prior to receiving our takeoff clearance. The captain's critical error was deviating from the yellow lead-in line at the runway. Some additional factors that may have contributed to the events were as follows. As we approached the runway; we were advised that there was a 'time factor' and that they wanted us to depart without hesitation when cleared. Another factor was the time of day; and the fact that we were running an hour late on an already late evening. In the future; I will be much more vigilant and become more aware of distractions such as this. I also won't allow myself to become hurried; regardless of the situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 lined up on and began the takeoff roll over runway edge lights causing FOD damage to a tire and a horizontal stabilizer. The flight was operated late; at night; and in low visibility.

Narrative: We pushed our aircraft from the gate with deteriorating weather conditions present. We had landed an hour prior during increasing cloud cover; but still under visual conditions. Prior to push; the airport had been turned around (runway operation); with subsequent changes to our clearance; departure procedure; and initial routing. Upon calling for taxi; we were informed once again; that the airport would be turning around (back to the original runway) and to expect a delay. We reprogrammed the FMC and proceeded to hold in a vacant pad for approximately twenty minutes. We accomplished the Dual Engine Shutdown Checklists and notified Dispatch of our delay. After approximately twenty minutes; we were cleared to taxi to the runway and advised again that there would be a short delay while waiting for traffic to land on the opposite end of that runway (four to five more arrivals). The Tower reported the weather as [ceiling] 300FT and [visibility] 0.5SM while we waited in line. The Tower made at least two remarks to all departing aircraft to be ready to move quickly; as their plan was to launch six airplanes in a short amount of time due to an impending opposite direction arrival bank. Upon reaching the runway hold short line; we ran the Before Takeoff Checklist. Shortly after clearing the preceding Airbus for takeoff; we were instructed; 'Line up and wait; on the runway.' I cleared the final approach course prior to crossing the hold short line. The Captain then maneuvered the aircraft to the right of the yellow taxi line; in an attempt to utilize all of the available runway. As we took the runway; I had a nagging feeling that I should once again verify the aircraft was configured; programmed; and setup for our correct departure as our plan had changed several times. We had very thoroughly briefed the changes; but I quickly glanced at my departure plate; LEGS page; and the MCP. The 'wait' portion of our clearance didn't materialize; and we were immediately cleared for takeoff prior to even becoming aligned with the centerline. After glancing at the chart/FMC/MCP; I looked up and immediately recognized that we were; in fact; not on the runway centerline. I verbalized that we were not in the correct position; as the Captain made a swift and effective correction and placed the aircraft on the runway centerline. My recollection was that we were on the centerline prior to 90 KTS; and several hundred feet prior to the expiration of the displaced threshold. During the takeoff roll; we didn't hear anything abnormal or feel any abnormality. All engine gauges were solid; and all systems indicated our aircraft was in good physical condition. The climb; cruise; descent; and arrival into were uneventful. We were given a runway change approximately thirty miles to our arrival airport; responded accordingly; and landed the aircraft on the runway. The landing was smooth and gave no indication that we had an issue with the number one tire. After shutdown; one of the Company Ground Personnel came to the cockpit and advised us that we had a main tire; which had blown. I finished my cockpit duties; and proceeded to carefully examine the exterior of the aircraft for signs of damage. It was then that I noticed the dent in the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer. I notified the Mechanic who had already begun to work on the tire; about the horizontal stab issue. I also notified the Captain. The Mechanic quickly contacted the Airport Operations and arranged for a sweep of the runway for any FOD (Foreign Object Debris) that could have been left. The Captain also coordinated with Dispatch as well to ensure a FOD inspection was completed in our departure city. The Captain proceeded to make all required phone calls per the Flight Operations Manual; and maintained a high level of professionalism. In retrospect; I think that a chain of factors caused this event. My critical error in the situation was not devoting 100 percent attention to the runway whilewe got into the position for takeoff. At the time; I felt that I had plenty of time to glance at the plate; LEGS page; and then sit on the runway for another few moments prior to receiving our takeoff clearance. The Captain's critical error was deviating from the yellow lead-in line at the runway. Some additional factors that may have contributed to the events were as follows. As we approached the runway; we were advised that there was a 'time factor' and that they wanted us to depart without hesitation when cleared. Another factor was the time of day; and the fact that we were running an hour late on an already late evening. In the future; I will be much more vigilant and become more aware of distractions such as this. I also won't allow myself to become hurried; regardless of the situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.