Narrative:

I was the captain on the flight. When I arrived at the aircraft the first officer informed me that there was snow and ice on the aircraft; and we needed to be de-iced. We notified ramp control thirty minutes prior to departure. Ten minutes prior to departure we again called ramp; and were informed that the de-icing crew was working on another aircraft. At fifteen minutes past departure we called again and were told they were still busy. When the de-icing crew finally arrived they immediately went into their office. I then asked to speak to the manager on duty. He informed me that there was only one certified deicing specialist on duty and that he and his crew had been out in the cold for over an hour and needed a break. When they finally came out to de-ice the aircraft I informed them that the aircraft had been sitting out all day; and we agreed that since it was not snowing type one would be sufficient. The aircraft was made ready and they proceeded to de-ice the aircraft. At one point they went back to re-do the flaps. When the de-icing was completed the supervisor came on the intercom and informed me that the aircraft had been de-ice with type one de-icing fluid; the aircraft was clear of ice and snow and we were clear to start engines. I confirmed his statement that aircraft was clear if ice and snow and we were clear to start engines. Both engines were started normally; I elected to taxi with engine anti ice on. During the taxi both engines were run up to approximately 50% N2 for 10-15 seconds. When we reached the end of taxiway D (30L) we informed the tower that we wanted to wait two minutes to bring the oil up operating temperature. The takeoff was with standard power; engine anti ice was off. Both engines easily came up to a stabilized power setting. At approximately 90 KTS we heard a compressor stall on the right engine and we discontinued the take off. With the exception of the pop of the compressor stall the only indication was a slight EPR fluctuation on the right engine. We did not declare an emergency. After we cleared the runway I made an announcement to the passengers; and returned to the gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MD80 remained in snow conditions for a night and throughout the following day. The aircraft was de-iced with Type I fluid prior to taxi. After an engine run up; the takeoff was begun and at 90 KTS two right engine compressor stalls were heard so the Captain rejected the takeoff. Snow or ice in the inlet damaged the engine.

Narrative: I was the Captain on the flight. When I arrived at the aircraft the First Officer informed me that there was snow and ice on the aircraft; and we needed to be de-iced. We notified Ramp Control thirty minutes prior to departure. Ten minutes prior to departure we again called Ramp; and were informed that the de-icing crew was working on another aircraft. At fifteen minutes past departure we called again and were told they were still busy. When the de-icing crew finally arrived they immediately went into their office. I then asked to speak to the Manager on Duty. He informed me that there was only one certified deicing specialist on duty and that he and his crew had been out in the cold for over an hour and needed a break. When they finally came out to de-ice the aircraft I informed them that the aircraft had been sitting out all day; and we agreed that since it was not snowing type one would be sufficient. The aircraft was made ready and they proceeded to de-ice the aircraft. At one point they went back to re-do the flaps. When the de-icing was completed the Supervisor came on the intercom and informed me that the aircraft had been de-ice with type one de-icing fluid; the aircraft was clear of ice and snow and we were clear to start engines. I confirmed his statement that aircraft was clear if ice and snow and we were clear to start engines. Both engines were started normally; I elected to taxi with engine anti ice on. During the taxi both engines were run up to approximately 50% N2 for 10-15 seconds. When we reached the end of Taxiway D (30L) we informed the Tower that we wanted to wait two minutes to bring the oil up operating temperature. The takeoff was with standard power; engine anti ice was off. Both engines easily came up to a stabilized power setting. At approximately 90 KTS we heard a compressor stall on the right engine and we discontinued the take off. With the exception of the pop of the compressor stall the only indication was a slight EPR fluctuation on the right engine. We did not declare an emergency. After we cleared the runway I made an announcement to the passengers; and returned to the gate.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.