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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 925414 |
Time | |
Date | 201012 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZGSZ.Airport |
State Reference | FO |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Route In Use | Other Controlled |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Clearance Ground Incursion Taxiway |
Narrative:
At night; while taxiing north on taxiway H (hotel) for takeoff; we noticed that our gross weight would exceed our maximum legal takeoff weight. Realizing that we would need a few minutes to burn off fuel; and wishing to be clear of traffic behind us on taxiway H; we requested from the tower controller a right turn from taxiway hotel into the northern portion of the ramp area. This being a non-standard request; confusion ensued on the controller's part as to what it was we intended to do; and as to why we wanted to do it. After a few transmissions; we seemed to have communicated properly our situation. We were cleared to turn right from taxiway hotel; enter the ramp; make a left turn; taxi through the ramp area; then make a left turn onto a ramp-exiting taxiway; and then rejoin taxiway H. Entering the ramp; both the captain and I noticed green taxiway lights to our immediate left. The captain asked if this was the taxiway through the ramp area that we had been instructed to use. I referred to my commercial airport chart and responded 'yes'. We turned left; following the green taxiway lights onto this taxiway. As we finished this turn; the controller said 'hold position.' not liking what I heard; I again referred to my commercial airport chart. My suspicions were confirmed. We had turned onto an incorrect ramp taxiway. I; for some reason; had misread the chart. There were several aircraft parked to our right. It became apparent that the controller was concerned with the clearance we had between our wingtip and these aircraft. We assured him that we had more than enough room to maneuver. He politely explained that; in the future; we were not to use that taxiway. By this time; we had burned enough fuel to allow us to take off. We were given clearance to continue our taxi; turn left; and then rejoin taxiway hotel. The remainder of the taxi; takeoff and departure were without incident. Subsequent to this event; I had to ask myself why/how could I have misread the commercial airport ground chart? The chart was quite clear; and I had read back the proper instructions. My conclusion is simple: fatigue. Yes; we were just beginning the first flight of our duty day; but our trip schedule had already 'flipped' our circadian rhythm three times; four times if a 19 hour 41 minute layover is considered to be a flip. This was not four flips over two weeks; this was four consecutive flips. Four layovers; four flips. The scheduled layovers were as follows: 19:41 followed by 21:05; 29:00; and 23:50. I was already a mess; and just beginning a new duty day.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A fatigued B767 Captain taxied into a congested ZGSZ ramp area at night to delay takeoff for weight reasons and inadvertently entered an incorrect ramp which alarmed the Controller. Fatigue and language were the main issues.
Narrative: At night; while taxiing north on Taxiway H (Hotel) for takeoff; we noticed that our gross weight would exceed our maximum legal takeoff weight. Realizing that we would need a few minutes to burn off fuel; and wishing to be clear of traffic behind us on Taxiway H; we requested from the Tower Controller a right turn from Taxiway Hotel into the northern portion of the ramp area. This being a non-standard request; confusion ensued on the Controller's part as to what it was we intended to do; and as to why we wanted to do it. After a few transmissions; we seemed to have communicated properly our situation. We were cleared to turn right from Taxiway Hotel; enter the ramp; make a left turn; taxi through the ramp area; then make a left turn onto a ramp-exiting taxiway; and then rejoin Taxiway H. Entering the ramp; both the Captain and I noticed green taxiway lights to our immediate left. The Captain asked if this was the taxiway through the ramp area that we had been instructed to use. I referred to my commercial airport chart and responded 'Yes'. We turned left; following the green taxiway lights onto this taxiway. As we finished this turn; the Controller said 'hold position.' Not liking what I heard; I again referred to my commercial airport chart. My suspicions were confirmed. We had turned onto an incorrect ramp taxiway. I; for some reason; had misread the chart. There were several aircraft parked to our right. It became apparent that the Controller was concerned with the clearance we had between our wingtip and these aircraft. We assured him that we had more than enough room to maneuver. He politely explained that; in the future; we were not to use that taxiway. By this time; we had burned enough fuel to allow us to take off. We were given clearance to continue our taxi; turn left; and then rejoin Taxiway Hotel. The remainder of the taxi; takeoff and departure were without incident. Subsequent to this event; I had to ask myself why/how could I have misread the commercial airport ground chart? The chart was quite clear; and I had read back the proper instructions. My conclusion is simple: fatigue. Yes; we were just beginning the first flight of our duty day; but our trip schedule had already 'flipped' our circadian rhythm three times; four times if a 19 hour 41 minute layover is considered to be a flip. This was not four flips over two weeks; this was four consecutive flips. Four layovers; four flips. The scheduled layovers were as follows: 19:41 followed by 21:05; 29:00; and 23:50. I was already a mess; and just beginning a new duty day.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.