Narrative:

When I initially viewed the flight plan; I found that the dispatcher had a planned landing weight at jac of 182.6. This included 2.2 hold fuel; 2.2 alternate fuel and 3.0 extra fuel. I realized immediately that the fuel was going to be excessive and attempted to call the dspatcher on my cell. After 20 plus rings with no response; I hung up and called the duty manager in order to stop the fueling process; this occurred 45 minutes prior to departure. I was assured that the fueler would be contacted. Eventually; I received a phone call back from the dispatcher and I asked him to explain his thoughts on the fuel load. Although an alternate was not required based on forecast weather; he had included an alternate because of concerns about snow in the area that might impact our arrival; hence a snow-covered runway. He also included hold fuel for traffic in the area and 3.0 extra for reasons that I still fail to understand. He was agreeable to removing the extra fuel which also reduced our required fuel. If he were intending to send the aircraft to jac with the possibility of a snow-covered runway; the planned landing weight per boeing numbers should never have exceeded 174.7. As a side note; aircraft was dispatched with the left pack inoperative. When I arrived at the gate I observed fueling in progress. I hurried to the fueler to stop him and asked if he had received any communication regarding a new fuel load. That communication promised by the duty manager never happened. Fortunately I was able to stop him and avoid a lengthy delay for defueling. I monitored the weather enroute and found jac deteriorating towards approach minimums of 3/4 mile. Approximately 150 nm from jac the weather dropped to 1/2 mile visibility. Multiple aircraft were put in holding or diverted. We entered holding briefly and I was in contact with the station and the tower for updates on weather and runway trends. At no time did we receive any information from dispatch as required for far. As you know as a 121 carrier; the company has the responsibility of operation control and flight monitoring for each of its flights specifically to address issues such as weather at destination below minimums; poor runway conditions; etc. This requirement was not met by our dispatcher and admitted to by the shift supervisor when I called from jac. We held briefly while monitoring the tower frequency. Visibility increased to 3/4 mile and I asked slc center for clearance for the ILS 19 approach. We followed a falcon to the airport that reported good braking action upon landing. At approximately 300 ft AGL we had the completely snow-covered runway in sight and landed. I reported the braking action as fair at best. There were approximately two more arrivals; the last being a king air 200 that reported the braking action fair to poor. At this point the runway was closed for snow removal. Jac weather was fluctuating above and below landing minimums and a takeoff alternate was required. In addition; deicing was necessary. Type 4 fluid had a holdover time of only 15 to 30 minutes due to the extreme cold temperature. I called the dispatcher supervisor to question why we had never received any flight following into the airport and were not receiving any of the input required by federal law by our dispatcher regarding runway conditions; extra fuel for deice; departure delays or the need for a takeoff alternate. I was told he would counsel the dispatcher at the end of the shift. We were able to depart within minutes of the expiration of our deice holdover time guideline. The airport closed less than 10 minutes after our departure due to poor runway conditions.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 Captain describes the lack of support from the Dispatch department during flights to and from JAC during a winter snow event.

Narrative: When I initially viewed the flight plan; I found that the dispatcher had a planned landing weight at JAC of 182.6. This included 2.2 hold fuel; 2.2 alternate fuel and 3.0 extra fuel. I realized immediately that the fuel was going to be excessive and attempted to call the Dspatcher on my cell. After 20 plus rings with no response; I hung up and called the Duty Manager in order to stop the fueling process; this occurred 45 minutes prior to departure. I was assured that the fueler would be contacted. Eventually; I received a phone call back from the Dispatcher and I asked him to explain his thoughts on the fuel load. Although an alternate was not required based on forecast weather; he had included an alternate because of concerns about snow in the area that might impact our arrival; hence a snow-covered runway. He also included hold fuel for traffic in the area and 3.0 extra for reasons that I still fail to understand. He was agreeable to removing the extra fuel which also reduced our required fuel. If he were intending to send the aircraft to JAC with the possibility of a snow-covered runway; the planned landing weight per Boeing numbers should never have exceeded 174.7. As a side note; aircraft was dispatched with the left pack inoperative. When I arrived at the gate I observed fueling in progress. I hurried to the fueler to stop him and asked if he had received any communication regarding a new fuel load. That communication promised by the Duty Manager never happened. Fortunately I was able to stop him and avoid a lengthy delay for defueling. I monitored the weather enroute and found JAC deteriorating towards approach minimums of 3/4 mile. Approximately 150 nm from JAC the weather dropped to 1/2 mile visibility. Multiple aircraft were put in holding or diverted. We entered holding briefly and I was in contact with the Station and the Tower for updates on weather and runway trends. At no time did we receive any information from Dispatch as required for FAR. As you know as a 121 carrier; the Company has the responsibility of operation control and flight monitoring for each of its flights specifically to address issues such as weather at destination below minimums; poor runway conditions; etc. This requirement was not met by our Dispatcher and admitted to by the Shift Supervisor when I called from JAC. We held briefly while monitoring the Tower frequency. Visibility increased to 3/4 mile and I asked SLC Center for clearance for the ILS 19 approach. We followed a Falcon to the airport that reported good braking action upon landing. At approximately 300 FT AGL we had the completely snow-covered runway in sight and landed. I reported the braking action as fair at best. There were approximately two more arrivals; the last being a King Air 200 that reported the braking action fair to poor. At this point the runway was closed for snow removal. JAC weather was fluctuating above and below landing minimums and a takeoff alternate was required. In addition; deicing was necessary. Type 4 fluid had a holdover time of only 15 to 30 minutes due to the extreme cold temperature. I called the Dispatcher Supervisor to question why we had never received any flight following into the airport and were not receiving any of the input required by Federal law by our Dispatcher regarding runway conditions; extra fuel for deice; departure delays or the need for a takeoff alternate. I was told he would counsel the Dispatcher at the end of the shift. We were able to depart within minutes of the expiration of our deice holdover time guideline. The airport closed less than 10 minutes after our departure due to poor runway conditions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.