Narrative:

After a delay from both late arrival of equipment and ATC delay due to snow at destination; we departed. On takeoff roll the right engine N3 vibration monitor showed 2.2 at 1.58 EPR; oil 21 qty. After takeoff and clean up; between 2;000 and 3;000 ft starting a turn to 360 degrees; the right engine N3 vibration spiked to 3.8 several times and then settled down to 2.2-2.3 N3. We continued our climb to FL390 and were given a direct [clearance] by center; now feet wet. At FL390 we encountered continuous light chop; and I asked to descend to FL370. At this time the left engine oil quantity went from 21 to 15 and decreasing steadily. At 13 qty I asked for a turn back to land from ATC; the left engine oil quantity continued to decrease at 10 qt; [and] we had the QRH out for 'engine oil quantity low'. At left engine oil qty 9 and decreasing I declared an emergency with a divert to ZZZ. Once the oil quantity went to 0 in the left engine; a few seconds later the 'left engine oil press' EICAS and pressure light came on left engine oil qty; red - left engine oil press; red. The QRH led us to the 'engine failure or shutdown checklist'. We followed the QRH procedure and shut down the left engine. Meanwhile the right engine vibrations now at 2.3 with continuous spikes to above 2.8 N3; had lost oil from 21 qty to 17. The vibrations could be felt in the right throttle and airframe and followed the throttle movement. Several event record selections were made. ATC was informed of our left engine shut down and our engine vibrations on the right engine. Our descent continued and we requested and set up for the ILS with arff to meet us upon landing. The right engine continued to vibrate and N3 spike above the 2.4 limits; from downwind to landing the right engine lost another quart of oil to now qty 16 down from 21 at this point. Gear and flaps 20 were selected per the QRH procedure and a normal touchdown with less than 100 FPM on vsi at approximately 150 KTS. Auto brakes 3 were selected prior to landing and the right engine reverser deployed; as did the ground spoilers. We came to a stop on the center line with more than 3;500 ft of runway left; it was a smooth deceleration. Fire command indicated to us that the brakes were indicating over 500 degrees F. Fans were applied to cool the brakes below 200 degrees F. Operations was called and a tug was requested to tow us into the gate.during this time dispatch was sending us text messages via ACARS asking whether we were going to continue to fly on another aircraft to our original destination. This would have put the crew awake for more than 21 hours after an emergency landing. We found oil dripping from the left engine cowl inside and on the ground below. Once the cowl was opened the left oil quantity gage showed zero. It seemed from the calls from all parties; the magnitude of the situation may have been misunderstood and that we were handling several items that required priority. Common sense may have been missing when we were asked to fly on another aircraft to our original destination after one engine shut down and the other running very sick. This needs to be addressed further before a crew may be pushed into an unsafe condition of taking a flight after an emergency.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 flight crew experiences high N3 vibration in right engine shortly after takeoff which soon returns to the normal range. Upon leveling at FL390 left engine oil quantity is noted to be low and decreasing. An emergency is declared with a divert to the nearest suitable airport. The left engine is shut down when oil pressure drops to zero and the right engine has occasional excursions outside the N3 vibration limits during descent and approach. A single engine landing ensues and the crew declines an offer to continue to destination in another aircraft.

Narrative: After a delay from both late arrival of equipment and ATC delay due to snow at destination; we departed. On takeoff roll the right engine N3 vibration monitor showed 2.2 at 1.58 EPR; oil 21 QTY. After takeoff and clean up; between 2;000 and 3;000 FT starting a turn to 360 degrees; the right engine N3 vibration spiked to 3.8 several times and then settled down to 2.2-2.3 N3. We continued our climb to FL390 and were given a direct [clearance] by Center; now Feet Wet. At FL390 we encountered continuous light chop; and I asked to descend to FL370. At this time the left engine oil quantity went from 21 to 15 and decreasing steadily. At 13 QTY I asked for a turn back to land from ATC; the left engine oil quantity continued to decrease at 10 QT; [and] we had the QRH out for 'Engine Oil Quantity Low'. At left engine oil QTY 9 and decreasing I declared an emergency with a divert to ZZZ. Once the oil quantity went to 0 in the left engine; a few seconds later the 'L ENG OIL PRESS' EICAS and pressure light came on LEFT ENG OIL QTY; RED - LEFT ENG OIL PRESS; RED. The QRH led us to the 'ENGINE FAILURE OR SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST'. We followed the QRH procedure and shut down the left engine. Meanwhile the right engine vibrations now at 2.3 with continuous spikes to above 2.8 N3; had lost oil from 21 QTY to 17. The vibrations could be felt in the right throttle and airframe and followed the throttle movement. Several Event Record selections were made. ATC was informed of our left engine shut down and our engine vibrations on the right engine. Our descent continued and we requested and set up for the ILS with ARFF to meet us upon landing. The right engine continued to vibrate and N3 spike above the 2.4 limits; from downwind to landing the right engine lost another quart of oil to now QTY 16 down from 21 at this point. Gear and flaps 20 were selected per the QRH procedure and a normal touchdown with less than 100 FPM on VSI at approximately 150 KTS. Auto brakes 3 were selected prior to landing and the right engine reverser deployed; as did the ground spoilers. We came to a stop on the center line with more than 3;500 FT of runway left; it was a smooth deceleration. Fire Command indicated to us that the brakes were indicating over 500 degrees F. Fans were applied to cool the brakes below 200 degrees F. Operations was called and a tug was requested to tow us into the gate.During this time Dispatch was sending us text messages via ACARS asking whether we were going to continue to fly on another aircraft to our original destination. This would have put the crew awake for more than 21 hours after an emergency landing. We found oil dripping from the left engine cowl inside and on the ground below. Once the cowl was opened the left oil quantity gage showed zero. It seemed from the calls from all parties; the magnitude of the situation may have been misunderstood and that we were handling several items that required priority. Common sense may have been missing when we were asked to fly on another aircraft to our original destination after one engine shut down and the other running very sick. This needs to be addressed further before a crew may be pushed into an unsafe condition of taking a flight after an emergency.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.