Narrative:

Both engines started very hot--the left 905-910 degrees and the right 890-900 degrees C. The right engine was started using a gpu and the left was a cross generator start. The other only factor that was abnormal was the crossover valve ran the right engine into the 900 degree range and made the crossvalve unusable. The temperature west/O the crossover valve was less than 820 degrees. Takeoff roll V1-vr was normal. Captain rotated the aircraft to a positive attitude and called 'positive rate, gear up.' I moved the gear handle to the up position and called 'gear up selected.' while gear was in transit, a red engine overheat light illuminated for the left engine. I reported to the captain, 'we've got an overheat on the left side.' while reaching to reduce power to that engine, a loud bang was heard and resulted in a yaw to the left. I said, 'we lost the left one,' and the captain responded 'yeah, we did, we lost it.' the gear was confirmed up as were the flaps and an immediate request for runway 17L was made to tower along with notification of a failed engine. We were given free authority to deviate as required. Left turn was initiated for the downwind leg and confirmation made that we didn't have an engine fire. The captain called to feather the left propeller. I confirmed with him and retarded the left power lever to idle. I then confirmed with him and moved the left condition lever to feather. Propeller feathered normally and the captain said, 'run the checklist.' while I ran the climb check and failed engine continued flight checklist, the captain made a decision to affect a landing on runway 31R, as the aircraft was on a good left base for that runway. At that point I discontinued running the climb checklists in order to focus my attns on items that the captain would call for in landing. The aircraft was cleared to land on runway 31R by the tower. The captain called for gear down and a no flap landing. I selected gear down and reported 3 green lights when they appeared and placed the GPWS in flap override. At approximately 200', I called 160 KTS, crossing the numbers I called 150 KTS and as I called 140 KTS the wheels touched. Immediately upon T/D the antiskid inoperative light illuminated. I reported to the captain 'anti skid inoperative light.' the light immediately extinguished. I reported to the captain, 'lights out,' at which point he applied maximum braking. We taxied clear of the runway and stopped the aircraft as the emergency equipment rolled up. The crew chief of the rescue squad reported we had a left outboard tire flat. We ran the after landing and parking checklists. The captain left the flight deck to inspect the aircraft leaving me at the controls since we had the right engine running to provide air conditioning to the passenger. The captain reported to me that both left main tires were flat at which point I called operations on company frequency to notify them to send busses for the passenger. I then notified dfw ground control that the aircraft would not be able to taxi and that busses were on the way for our passenger. Notes: the takeoff clearance received from the tower was for an immediate takeoff with no delay, traffic on final. As it was a very short taxi from our parking spot to the runway, we were still running before takeoff checklists when the takeoff clearance was received. This interrupted my normal flow of procedures for scanning of instruments during initial stabilization of the takeoff roll. Shortly after initiation of the turn for downwind an air carrier aircraft reported to the tower, 'you got a grass fire over here off runway 17L that may have something to do with light transport.' this caused concern on both our parts as to whether we did in fact have a fire or not. A passenger reported to the captain that he heard 3 pops with related puffs of smoke and then a louder bang just before the engine quit. (Reported to captain after landing.) the autocoarsen functioned normally but the aircraft performance appeared to improve after the propeller was manually feathered. The captain and I later discussed that the thought, 'will the other engine continue to run?', crossed both our minds. Our company operates 16 light transport aircraft, the oldest aircraft having been on the line for 15 months at the time of this incident. In that time we have changed 31 engines and the pilot group as a whole has little confidence in this engine. The light transport aircraft is equipped with a takeoff inhibit function. This feature is designed to prevent what the manufacturer calls, 'non emergency failure lights' from being displayed to the cockpit crew. With the takeoff inhibit function activated, the only warnings that will illuminate on the cockpit warning system are low oil pressure (engine or propeller), engine fire, tail pipe overheat, avionics smoke, lav smoke, cargo smoke, propeller brake, or confign. This means that during takeoff roll any failures of electrical, hydraulics, or pressurization system will not activate the visual and aural warning systems and probably go unnoticed until the takeoff inhibit disengages automatically with your retraction. The aircraft is also equipped with a red engine overheat light for each engine. These lights illuminate should the engine temperature go above 934 degrees C. In 3/88 we were informed by maintenance that the overheat lights are also disabled by the takeoff inhibit function. This deprives the flight crew of a readily visible warning system during what is possibly the most critical phase of flight. We are required by our company and by the FAA approved checklist to use the takeoff inhibit function for every departure. If the flight data recorder (which was pulled from the aircraft after the incident) shows that the engine overtemped before V1, the red overheat light would have immediately drawn our attention to a problem with the left engine which would have resulted in an immediate aborted takeoff. My recommendation with regard to this system is that it be readjusted so that the overheat lights function normally during the takeoff with takeoff inhibit selected or the takeoff inhibit function not be used so that any failure of any system or component would activate the visual and aural warnings of the cockpit warning system alerting the crew to the failure. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: company recently completed conference call with engine and aircraft manufacturer and they are still resolving cause of failure, but at present time appears caused by bearing failure and high temperature was probably result of failure not the cause. The term autocoarsen is european term for autofeather where propeller seeks best position rather than to full feather immediately in case partial power being supplied. Determined reason tires deflated was landing immediately after takeoff with no time to cool after long takeoff run. Added heat from braking melted fuse plugs. Nothing wrong with antiskid. Company has had only 2 or 3 actual failures of engines. Rest are precautionary removals due to high temperatures. Engine manufacturer working on problem actively with operators and manufacturer. Reporter feels takeoff inhibit should not be on engine overtemp light. Supplemental information from acn 92567: item of note, as the condition lever was moved to the feathered position an additional yaw was felt and the aircraft performance improved approximately 20%. The first officer reported seeing 1300 degrees on the itt after the engine failure. The aircraft had a history of high temperatures but it wasn't included on the aircraft log. This is a direct failure by the pilot group to write up informational only grips on the yellow sheets (logs). It's only because of the state of the art equipment, the autocoarsen (autofeather) feature that I am here writing this report. The failure came as a complete surprise and actual flight time, less than 2 mins, was filled with many thoughts and actions as the report states.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LTT ENGINE FAILURE ON LIFT OFF. EMERGENCY DECLARED. RETURN AND LAND.

Narrative: BOTH ENGS STARTED VERY HOT--THE LEFT 905-910 DEGS AND THE RIGHT 890-900 DEGS C. THE RIGHT ENG WAS STARTED USING A GPU AND THE LEFT WAS A CROSS GENERATOR START. THE OTHER ONLY FACTOR THAT WAS ABNORMAL WAS THE CROSSOVER VALVE RAN THE RIGHT ENG INTO THE 900 DEG RANGE AND MADE THE CROSSVALVE UNUSABLE. THE TEMP W/O THE CROSSOVER VALVE WAS LESS THAN 820 DEGS. TKOF ROLL V1-VR WAS NORMAL. CAPT ROTATED THE ACFT TO A POSITIVE ATTITUDE AND CALLED 'POSITIVE RATE, GEAR UP.' I MOVED THE GEAR HANDLE TO THE UP POS AND CALLED 'GEAR UP SELECTED.' WHILE GEAR WAS IN TRANSIT, A RED ENG OVERHEAT LIGHT ILLUMINATED FOR THE LEFT ENG. I RPTED TO THE CAPT, 'WE'VE GOT AN OVERHEAT ON THE LEFT SIDE.' WHILE REACHING TO REDUCE PWR TO THAT ENG, A LOUD BANG WAS HEARD AND RESULTED IN A YAW TO THE LEFT. I SAID, 'WE LOST THE LEFT ONE,' AND THE CAPT RESPONDED 'YEAH, WE DID, WE LOST IT.' THE GEAR WAS CONFIRMED UP AS WERE THE FLAPS AND AN IMMEDIATE REQUEST FOR RWY 17L WAS MADE TO TWR ALONG WITH NOTIFICATION OF A FAILED ENG. WE WERE GIVEN FREE AUTHORITY TO DEVIATE AS REQUIRED. LEFT TURN WAS INITIATED FOR THE DOWNWIND LEG AND CONFIRMATION MADE THAT WE DIDN'T HAVE AN ENG FIRE. THE CAPT CALLED TO FEATHER THE LEFT PROP. I CONFIRMED WITH HIM AND RETARDED THE LEFT PWR LEVER TO IDLE. I THEN CONFIRMED WITH HIM AND MOVED THE LEFT CONDITION LEVER TO FEATHER. PROP FEATHERED NORMALLY AND THE CAPT SAID, 'RUN THE CHKLIST.' WHILE I RAN THE CLB CHK AND FAILED ENG CONTINUED FLT CHKLIST, THE CAPT MADE A DECISION TO AFFECT A LNDG ON RWY 31R, AS THE ACFT WAS ON A GOOD LEFT BASE FOR THAT RWY. AT THAT POINT I DISCONTINUED RUNNING THE CLB CHKLISTS IN ORDER TO FOCUS MY ATTNS ON ITEMS THAT THE CAPT WOULD CALL FOR IN LNDG. THE ACFT WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 31R BY THE TWR. THE CAPT CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN AND A NO FLAP LNDG. I SELECTED GEAR DOWN AND RPTED 3 GREEN LIGHTS WHEN THEY APPEARED AND PLACED THE GPWS IN FLAP OVERRIDE. AT APPROX 200', I CALLED 160 KTS, XING THE NUMBERS I CALLED 150 KTS AND AS I CALLED 140 KTS THE WHEELS TOUCHED. IMMEDIATELY UPON T/D THE ANTISKID INOP LIGHT ILLUMINATED. I RPTED TO THE CAPT 'ANTI SKID INOP LIGHT.' THE LIGHT IMMEDIATELY EXTINGUISHED. I RPTED TO THE CAPT, 'LIGHTS OUT,' AT WHICH POINT HE APPLIED MAX BRAKING. WE TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY AND STOPPED THE ACFT AS THE EMER EQUIP ROLLED UP. THE CREW CHIEF OF THE RESCUE SQUAD RPTED WE HAD A LEFT OUTBOARD TIRE FLAT. WE RAN THE AFTER LNDG AND PARKING CHKLISTS. THE CAPT LEFT THE FLT DECK TO INSPECT THE ACFT LEAVING ME AT THE CTLS SINCE WE HAD THE RIGHT ENG RUNNING TO PROVIDE AIR CONDITIONING TO THE PAX. THE CAPT RPTED TO ME THAT BOTH LEFT MAIN TIRES WERE FLAT AT WHICH POINT I CALLED OPS ON COMPANY FREQ TO NOTIFY THEM TO SEND BUSSES FOR THE PAX. I THEN NOTIFIED DFW GND CTL THAT THE ACFT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAXI AND THAT BUSSES WERE ON THE WAY FOR OUR PAX. NOTES: THE TKOF CLRNC RECEIVED FROM THE TWR WAS FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF WITH NO DELAY, TFC ON FINAL. AS IT WAS A VERY SHORT TAXI FROM OUR PARKING SPOT TO THE RWY, WE WERE STILL RUNNING BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS WHEN THE TKOF CLRNC WAS RECEIVED. THIS INTERRUPTED MY NORMAL FLOW OF PROCS FOR SCANNING OF INSTRUMENTS DURING INITIAL STABILIZATION OF THE TKOF ROLL. SHORTLY AFTER INITIATION OF THE TURN FOR DOWNWIND AN ACR ACFT RPTED TO THE TWR, 'YOU GOT A GRASS FIRE OVER HERE OFF RWY 17L THAT MAY HAVE SOMETHING TO DO WITH LTT.' THIS CAUSED CONCERN ON BOTH OUR PARTS AS TO WHETHER WE DID IN FACT HAVE A FIRE OR NOT. A PAX RPTED TO THE CAPT THAT HE HEARD 3 POPS WITH RELATED PUFFS OF SMOKE AND THEN A LOUDER BANG JUST BEFORE THE ENG QUIT. (RPTED TO CAPT AFTER LNDG.) THE AUTOCOARSEN FUNCTIONED NORMALLY BUT THE ACFT PERFORMANCE APPEARED TO IMPROVE AFTER THE PROP WAS MANUALLY FEATHERED. THE CAPT AND I LATER DISCUSSED THAT THE THOUGHT, 'WILL THE OTHER ENG CONTINUE TO RUN?', CROSSED BOTH OUR MINDS. OUR COMPANY OPERATES 16 LTT ACFT, THE OLDEST ACFT HAVING BEEN ON THE LINE FOR 15 MONTHS AT THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT. IN THAT TIME WE HAVE CHANGED 31 ENGS AND THE PLT GROUP AS A WHOLE HAS LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN THIS ENG. THE LTT ACFT IS EQUIPPED WITH A TKOF INHIBIT FUNCTION. THIS FEATURE IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT WHAT THE MANUFACTURER CALLS, 'NON EMER FAILURE LIGHTS' FROM BEING DISPLAYED TO THE COCKPIT CREW. WITH THE TKOF INHIBIT FUNCTION ACTIVATED, THE ONLY WARNINGS THAT WILL ILLUMINATE ON THE COCKPIT WARNING SYS ARE LOW OIL PRESSURE (ENG OR PROP), ENG FIRE, TAIL PIPE OVERHEAT, AVIONICS SMOKE, LAV SMOKE, CARGO SMOKE, PROP BRAKE, OR CONFIGN. THIS MEANS THAT DURING TKOF ROLL ANY FAILURES OF ELECTRICAL, HYDS, OR PRESSURIZATION SYS WILL NOT ACTIVATE THE VISUAL AND AURAL WARNING SYSTEMS AND PROBABLY GO UNNOTICED UNTIL THE TKOF INHIBIT DISENGAGES AUTOMATICALLY WITH YOUR RETRACTION. THE ACFT IS ALSO EQUIPPED WITH A RED ENG OVERHEAT LIGHT FOR EACH ENG. THESE LIGHTS ILLUMINATE SHOULD THE ENG TEMP GO ABOVE 934 DEGS C. IN 3/88 WE WERE INFORMED BY MAINT THAT THE OVERHEAT LIGHTS ARE ALSO DISABLED BY THE TKOF INHIBIT FUNCTION. THIS DEPRIVES THE FLT CREW OF A READILY VISIBLE WARNING SYS DURING WHAT IS POSSIBLY THE MOST CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. WE ARE REQUIRED BY OUR COMPANY AND BY THE FAA APPROVED CHKLIST TO USE THE TKOF INHIBIT FUNCTION FOR EVERY DEP. IF THE FLT DATA RECORDER (WHICH WAS PULLED FROM THE ACFT AFTER THE INCIDENT) SHOWS THAT THE ENG OVERTEMPED BEFORE V1, THE RED OVERHEAT LIGHT WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY DRAWN OUR ATTN TO A PROB WITH THE LEFT ENG WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN AN IMMEDIATE ABORTED TKOF. MY RECOMMENDATION WITH REGARD TO THIS SYS IS THAT IT BE READJUSTED SO THAT THE OVERHEAT LIGHTS FUNCTION NORMALLY DURING THE TKOF WITH TKOF INHIBIT SELECTED OR THE TKOF INHIBIT FUNCTION NOT BE USED SO THAT ANY FAILURE OF ANY SYS OR COMPONENT WOULD ACTIVATE THE VISUAL AND AURAL WARNINGS OF THE COCKPIT WARNING SYS ALERTING THE CREW TO THE FAILURE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: COMPANY RECENTLY COMPLETED CONFERENCE CALL WITH ENG AND ACFT MANUFACTURER AND THEY ARE STILL RESOLVING CAUSE OF FAILURE, BUT AT PRESENT TIME APPEARS CAUSED BY BEARING FAILURE AND HIGH TEMP WAS PROBABLY RESULT OF FAILURE NOT THE CAUSE. THE TERM AUTOCOARSEN IS EUROPEAN TERM FOR AUTOFEATHER WHERE PROP SEEKS BEST POS RATHER THAN TO FULL FEATHER IMMEDIATELY IN CASE PARTIAL PWR BEING SUPPLIED. DETERMINED REASON TIRES DEFLATED WAS LNDG IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF WITH NO TIME TO COOL AFTER LONG TKOF RUN. ADDED HEAT FROM BRAKING MELTED FUSE PLUGS. NOTHING WRONG WITH ANTISKID. COMPANY HAS HAD ONLY 2 OR 3 ACTUAL FAILURES OF ENGS. REST ARE PRECAUTIONARY REMOVALS DUE TO HIGH TEMPS. ENG MANUFACTURER WORKING ON PROB ACTIVELY WITH OPERATORS AND MANUFACTURER. RPTR FEELS TKOF INHIBIT SHOULD NOT BE ON ENG OVERTEMP LIGHT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 92567: ITEM OF NOTE, AS THE CONDITION LEVER WAS MOVED TO THE FEATHERED POS AN ADDITIONAL YAW WAS FELT AND THE ACFT PERFORMANCE IMPROVED APPROX 20%. THE F/O RPTED SEEING 1300 DEGS ON THE ITT AFTER THE ENG FAILURE. THE ACFT HAD A HISTORY OF HIGH TEMPS BUT IT WASN'T INCLUDED ON THE ACFT LOG. THIS IS A DIRECT FAILURE BY THE PLT GROUP TO WRITE UP INFORMATIONAL ONLY GRIPS ON THE YELLOW SHEETS (LOGS). IT'S ONLY BECAUSE OF THE STATE OF THE ART EQUIP, THE AUTOCOARSEN (AUTOFEATHER) FEATURE THAT I AM HERE WRITING THIS RPT. THE FAILURE CAME AS A COMPLETE SURPRISE AND ACTUAL FLT TIME, LESS THAN 2 MINS, WAS FILLED WITH MANY THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS AS THE RPT STATES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.