Narrative:

Weather was freezing drizzle which turned into light snow by the end of the event. Boarded the flight on time and proceeded with de-icing procedure. De-ice at iad occurs at the gate and; to my understanding; is conducted by the contract ramp crew supervisors. Just prior to commencing the de-ice procedure we requested ground power; we were told by a ramp agent they did not have ground power. We thus agreed to do the de-icing process with the APU running. During the de-ice process the de-ice crew snuffed out the APU. After this the process stopped so the de-icer could come talk to the crew via the interphone on the aircraft. It was then discovered they did have access to ground power from another carrier. They plugged it in successfully and the procedure continued. The de-icing process restarted and the de-icing crew continually failed to remove the residual ice from the leading edge of the wings and the propeller spinner despite frequent notices from the flight crew. After 100 minutes; including a de-ice truck failing to spray type 4 fluid; the de-ice crew finally followed the repeated crew instructions and sprayed directly on the leading edge of the wings and the prop spinners. The flight continued with out further incident. During the event the flight crew contacted dispatch to discover these de-ice crews had similar problems the week prior.these events occurred because there was no direct communication with the de-ice truck. It took numerous attempts to communicate which part of the aircraft needed to be sprayed directly. Communication was made to the truck via a contract ramp agent who sat in a push back tug and used the interphone connection to the aircraft. When a message needed to be passed to the truck; the ramp agent needed to physically leave the tug; walk to the truck and relay the message. This ramp agent had no knowledge of aircraft parts or areas; spoke little english; and had no knowledge of the aircraft. It took numerous attempts to communicate which part of the aircraft needed to be sprayed. He was unfamiliar with the terms leading edge and prop spinner. It took a very long time to describe to him what they were and where they were located on the aircraft. This hampered efforts to tell the de-ice crew exactly what part of the aircraft needed to be sprayed. The contract crew was unfamiliar with our company's de-ice procedures. When told we needed ground power they claimed they didn't have one. But when the APU was extinguished during de-ice procedures; they suddenly had access to several. During the de-ice procedure the de-ice crew only sprayed from the rear of the aircraft. This missed the residual ice on the leading edges and propeller spinners; mostly due to the fact that the sprayer could not visually see this part of the aircraft. Ground crew appeared to have no understanding of the clean aircraft concept. Flight crew did everything possible to assure the residual snow was removed. The solution to the problem is adequate training of personnel responsible for safety of flight procedures. I do not believe any of the ground or de-ice crew personnel should be reprimanded in any way. The reason this event occurred was due purely to lack of training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DHC-8 Flight Crew detailed a particularly deficient de-icing effort by contract ground personnel.

Narrative: Weather was freezing drizzle which turned into light snow by the end of the event. Boarded the flight on time and proceeded with de-icing procedure. De-ice at IAD occurs at the gate and; to my understanding; is conducted by the contract ramp crew supervisors. Just prior to commencing the de-ice procedure we requested ground power; we were told by a ramp agent they did not have ground power. We thus agreed to do the de-icing process with the APU running. During the de-ice process the de-ice crew snuffed out the APU. After this the process stopped so the de-icer could come talk to the crew via the interphone on the aircraft. It was then discovered they did have access to ground power from another carrier. They plugged it in successfully and the procedure continued. The de-icing process restarted and the de-icing crew continually failed to remove the residual ice from the leading edge of the wings and the propeller spinner despite frequent notices from the flight crew. After 100 minutes; including a de-ice truck failing to spray type 4 fluid; the de-ice crew finally followed the repeated crew instructions and sprayed directly on the leading edge of the wings and the prop spinners. The flight continued with out further incident. During the event the flight crew contacted dispatch to discover these de-ice crews had similar problems the week prior.These events occurred because there was no direct communication with the de-ice truck. It took numerous attempts to communicate which part of the aircraft needed to be sprayed directly. Communication was made to the truck via a contract ramp agent who sat in a push back tug and used the interphone connection to the aircraft. When a message needed to be passed to the truck; the ramp agent needed to physically leave the tug; walk to the truck and relay the message. This ramp agent had no knowledge of aircraft parts or areas; spoke little English; and had no knowledge of the aircraft. It took numerous attempts to communicate which part of the aircraft needed to be sprayed. He was unfamiliar with the terms leading edge and prop spinner. It took a very long time to describe to him what they were and where they were located on the aircraft. This hampered efforts to tell the De-ice crew exactly what part of the aircraft needed to be sprayed. The contract crew was unfamiliar with our company's de-ice procedures. When told we needed ground power they claimed they didn't have one. But when the APU was extinguished during de-ice procedures; they suddenly had access to several. During the de-ice procedure the de-ice crew only sprayed from the rear of the aircraft. This missed the residual ice on the leading edges and propeller spinners; mostly due to the fact that the sprayer could not visually see this part of the aircraft. Ground crew appeared to have no understanding of the clean aircraft concept. Flight crew did everything possible to assure the residual snow was removed. The solution to the problem is adequate training of personnel responsible for safety of flight procedures. I do not believe any of the ground or de-ice crew personnel should be reprimanded in any way. The reason this event occurred was due purely to lack of training.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.