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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 928092 |
Time | |
Date | 201101 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.ARTCC |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Electrical Wiring & Connectors |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150 Flight Crew Total 10500 Flight Crew Type 500 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
We diverted one hour into the fight with multiple failures. At cruise at FL340 we received numerous ECAM's in quick succession; in addition to a hydraulic blue system low pressure ECAM. With the first officer flying I declared an emergency with ATC and told them we were having electrical issues with the aircraft. The first officer continued to fly and he worked the radio as well; so I could run all the ECAM's/checklists/work with the cabin crew/dispatch; etc. We were close to ZZZ (we were both familiar with the airport; we were VFR and could see the ZZZ area) the first officer and I decided to divert to ZZZ based on the numerous failures that we currently had and additional failures that we were receiving; to include the blue system hydraulic failure. I sent an ACARS message to dispatch to say we declared an emergency; we were having electrical and hydraulic issues and we were diverting to ZZZ. I then continued to run the ECAM's. While running the presented ECAM's; both my screens (captain side) failed several times. The screens went blank for a few seconds; both came back and followed this pattern several times. In addition; the upper ECAM east/west screen failed several times with a white diagonal line across the screen. In reference to the bulletin regarding A319/320 electrical malfunctions; I immediately pulled up the electric page to both assess the electrical failures and determine what was causing the malfunctions. All indications on the electric page were normal; with no failures. In addition; during this time both the first officer and I could hear a clicking sound (like a generator coming on and off line) on my side of the aircraft for several minutes. We also had the following failures: air pack 1 regulator fault; anti-ice left windshield fault; anti-ice left window fault; nav GPWS fault; nav GPWS terr. Det fault; hyd B system lo pressure ECAM; pack 1 fault; hyd B elec pump lo pr; vent blower fault; captain pitot fault. The captain side airspeed tape was erratic after the screens had come back on the captain side. In addition; the flight attendant reported that the emergency exit lights came on above the exit doors and the lights in the cabin (overhead bin area) came on. I also lost electric power to my seat for a period of time. We were also unable to activate on the performance page for the arrival. The push button worked; but the airspeed bug would not move. This lasted for about 5 minutes. We were eventually able to get control of the airspeed indicator. We did find out after landing that the vent blower circuit breaker had popped. In addition to monitoring the electric ECAM page; we did monitor the hydraulic page for the blue system failure. We never received any ECAM's indicating a loss of a generator bus and/or any other electrical bus failures. All indications on the electric page remained within normal parameters. There was no galley power shed that would have occurred with a generator failure. We did begin the start for the APU for backup generator power if there was a loss of generator. We ran all the ECAM's; and additional ECAM's as presented. I gave the first officer a status brief on the failures while he flew; after all ECAM's were complete. I briefed the flight attendants; telling them we were diverting; we would be landing in about 15 minutes; and at the time I did not need them to prep the cabin. With all the failures; the aircraft was handling normally.if we had received or we started to receive any flight control malfunctions or handling issues a cabin advisory and/or prep would have been issued. I told them I would give an announcement to the passengers. I completed the announcement to the passengers letting them know we were having some minor electrical issues (as they could see the lights in the cabin) and a minor hydraulic issue and we would be landing as a precaution. I ran the over weight check list; the approach descent checklist and did the landing performance based on the failures. We did ask dispatch to run the numbers as well; unfortunately we were unable to get the data back as a check on our numbers. As the runway was almost 8;000 ft and dry; we were well within the landing performance data. These pieces of information would have been very helpful in reducing our workload; or any other information that could have been given to us to help with the diversion. Dispatch did ask our ETA; and while I understand that there is coordination going on; sending ACARS messages asking our ETA; when flight following is available to the dispatcher and asking us below 10;000 ft what landing numbers we came up with is difficult for the crew at best. I understand that there was not much information for the dispatcher to go with under this situation due to the multiple failures; and this is not for criticism; but pointed out as a learning tool as to the workload of the crew and what is reasonable for us to expect.during the descent; the ECAM's stopped and both screens on the captain side as well as the upper ECAM screen stabilized and were operational and a normal approach (with all the remaining failures presented) and landing were accomplished. Since the electrical malfunctions seemed to stabilize; we did not elect to deselect either generator; possibly causing further failures as verification of generator loss as opposed to arcing was not certain at the time with the information presented. The first officer did an excellent job flying while I coordinated all the checklists; communications; etc. He had the aircraft slowed and stabilized for the arrival. Due to the suspected arching issue; the situation stabilized; all the ECAM's and check lists completed; performance completed and cabin secured; we elected to continue the approach and not delay landing. In order to follow up and contact maintenance control we would have to delay landing and hold. Under the circumstances; we felt that could cause further risk of failure and continued arcing issues. We had an overweight landing; and touched down at 200 FPM (350 FPM max per the checklist) within the touchdown zone.in reference to the bulletin: airbus has alerted all operators of A320/A319 aircraft of two abnormal electrical conditions. The ECAM system may not annunciate the fault. Pilots are required to analyze and correct the malfunctions. The first malfunction is intermittent electrical power supply interruptions from gen 1 or gen 2. The cause can be idg connector feeder arcing or a malfunctioning generator. The cockpit indications include flashing or blank cockpit displays on the one side of the cockpit; a flashing mcdu screen; intermittent flight control law reversions and uncommanded rudder trim inputs. Pilot actions should be to identify and deselect the malfunctioning generator. These failures seem to follow the above description in reference to the intermittent electrical power supply interruptions from gen 1 or 2. We did have the blanking of both the captain screens and the upper ECAM screen. We did try to analyze the situation on the electrical ECAM page; but all indications were presenting normally; we also used all other information presented to include the fom. Without any indications on the electrical page of a malfunctioning generator and/or other electrical bus failures directing the pilot to identify and deselect the malfunction generator is lacking in information and or direction for the crew; while dealing with a large number of failures.having just gone through recurrent training on the airbus; the demonstration of AC 1 bus failure as presented is significantly different then the failure we experienced. Thus; there is seemingly no training for this type of failure. In addition; below is the supplemental information. We suspected arcing. The failures were consistent with gen 1; but not all the failures were present that a crew would expect to see or are listed on the gen 1 failure checklist. We did not get MCDU1 failure or adr 1 failure. While it can be suspected to be gen 1; the check list calls for positive identification. Either there are other issues (as some of the failures we experienced can also be found on the AC essential bus) or the check list should read under identifying the affected generator: any or all of these failures can occur; allowing for positive identification of the generator. In addition; what is sustained flickering? We experienced the flickering for several minutes; enough to get through many of the ECAM's; but the system then stabilized. At this point; as referenced in the explanation above; we determined the most conservative action consistent with our diversion was to keep the configuration as is; in a stable operation. What is the guidance when the flickering is not sustained; but momentary or lasting several minutes?electrical power supply interruption; electrical arcing in the idg feeder cable at the pylon/nacelle connector can occur; causing power supply interruption that affects one or more generator electrical phases. Maintenance has determined that corrosion leads to the breakdown of the gold plating on the connector contacts; which in turn leads to pin arcing. Due to these type failures and number of other reported electrical failures in the airbus fleet; will there be a required inspection on the idg connectors for the feeder; so these types of failures can be mitigated before they occur? We did have more than 50% loss of displays; [so it became an] NTSB reportable issue.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A320 Captain experiences electrical anomalies at FL340 and elects to divert. Anomalies included flickering flight displays on the Captain's side; along with the upper ECAM display. Numerous ECAM faults were displayed when the ECAM screen could be viewed.
Narrative: We diverted one hour into the fight with multiple failures. At cruise at FL340 we received numerous ECAM's in quick succession; in addition to a hydraulic blue system low pressure ECAM. With the First Officer flying I declared an emergency with ATC and told them we were having electrical issues with the aircraft. The First Officer continued to fly and he worked the radio as well; so I could run all the ECAM's/checklists/work with the cabin crew/Dispatch; etc. We were close to ZZZ (we were both familiar with the airport; we were VFR and could see the ZZZ area) the First Officer and I decided to divert to ZZZ based on the numerous failures that we currently had and additional failures that we were receiving; to include the Blue System Hydraulic failure. I sent an ACARS message to Dispatch to say we declared an emergency; we were having electrical and hydraulic issues and we were diverting to ZZZ. I then continued to run the ECAM's. While running the presented ECAM's; both my screens (Captain side) failed several times. The screens went blank for a few seconds; both came back and followed this pattern several times. In addition; the upper ECAM E/W screen failed several times with a white diagonal line across the screen. In reference to the bulletin regarding A319/320 electrical malfunctions; I immediately pulled up the electric page to both assess the electrical failures and determine what was causing the malfunctions. All indications on the electric page were normal; with no failures. In addition; during this time both the First Officer and I could hear a clicking sound (like a generator coming on and off line) on my side of the aircraft for several minutes. We also had the following failures: Air Pack 1 regulator fault; Anti-ice Left windshield fault; Anti-ice Left window fault; Nav GPWS fault; Nav GPWS Terr. DET fault; Hyd B System Lo Pressure ECAM; Pack 1 fault; Hyd B elec pump LO PR; Vent blower fault; Captain Pitot fault. The Captain side airspeed tape was erratic after the screens had come back on the Captain side. In addition; the Flight Attendant reported that the emergency exit lights came on above the exit doors and the lights in the cabin (overhead bin area) came on. I also lost electric power to my seat for a period of time. We were also unable to activate on the performance page for the arrival. The push button worked; but the airspeed bug would not move. This lasted for about 5 minutes. We were eventually able to get control of the airspeed indicator. We did find out after landing that the vent blower Circuit Breaker had popped. In addition to monitoring the electric ECAM page; we did monitor the HYD page for the blue system failure. We never received any ECAM's indicating a loss of a generator bus and/or any other electrical bus failures. All indications on the electric page remained within normal parameters. There was no galley power shed that would have occurred with a generator failure. We did begin the start for the APU for backup generator power if there was a loss of generator. We ran all the ECAM's; and additional ECAM's as presented. I gave the First Officer a status brief on the failures while he flew; after all ECAM's were complete. I briefed the flight attendants; telling them we were diverting; we would be landing in about 15 minutes; and at the time I did not need them to prep the cabin. With all the failures; the aircraft was handling normally.If we had received or we started to receive any flight control malfunctions or handling issues a cabin advisory and/or prep would have been issued. I told them I would give an announcement to the passengers. I completed the announcement to the passengers letting them know we were having some minor electrical issues (as they could see the lights in the cabin) and a minor hydraulic issue and we would be landing as a precaution. I ran the over weight check list; the approach descent checklist and did the landing performance based on the failures. We did ask Dispatch to run the numbers as well; unfortunately we were unable to get the data back as a check on our numbers. As the runway was almost 8;000 FT and dry; we were well within the landing performance data. These pieces of information would have been very helpful in reducing our workload; or any other information that could have been given to us to help with the diversion. Dispatch did ask our ETA; and while I understand that there is coordination going on; sending ACARS messages asking our ETA; when flight following is available to the Dispatcher and asking us below 10;000 FT what landing numbers we came up with is difficult for the crew at best. I understand that there was not much information for the Dispatcher to go with under this situation due to the multiple failures; and this is not for criticism; but pointed out as a learning tool as to the workload of the crew and what is reasonable for us to expect.During the descent; the ECAM's stopped and both screens on the Captain side as well as the upper ECAM screen stabilized and were operational and a normal approach (with all the remaining failures presented) and landing were accomplished. Since the electrical malfunctions seemed to stabilize; we did not elect to deselect either generator; possibly causing further failures as verification of generator loss as opposed to arcing was not certain at the time with the information presented. The First Officer did an excellent job flying while I coordinated all the checklists; communications; etc. He had the aircraft slowed and stabilized for the arrival. Due to the suspected arching issue; the situation stabilized; all the ECAM's and check lists completed; performance completed and cabin secured; we elected to continue the approach and not delay landing. In order to follow up and contact Maintenance Control we would have to delay landing and hold. Under the circumstances; we felt that could cause further risk of failure and continued arcing issues. We had an overweight landing; and touched down at 200 FPM (350 FPM max per the checklist) within the touchdown zone.In reference to the Bulletin: Airbus has alerted all operators of A320/A319 aircraft of two abnormal electrical conditions. The ECAM system may not annunciate the fault. Pilots are required to analyze and correct the malfunctions. The first malfunction is intermittent electrical power supply interruptions from Gen 1 or Gen 2. The cause can be IDG connector feeder arcing or a malfunctioning generator. The cockpit indications include flashing or blank cockpit displays on the one side of the cockpit; a flashing MCDU screen; intermittent flight control law reversions and uncommanded rudder trim inputs. Pilot actions should be to identify and deselect the malfunctioning generator. These failures seem to follow the above description in reference to the intermittent electrical power supply interruptions from Gen 1 or 2. We did have the blanking of both the Captain screens and the upper ECAM screen. We did try to analyze the situation on the electrical ECAM page; but all indications were presenting normally; we also used all other information presented to include the FOM. Without any indications on the electrical page of a malfunctioning generator and/or other electrical bus failures directing the pilot to identify and deselect the malfunction generator is lacking in information and or direction for the crew; while dealing with a large number of failures.Having just gone through recurrent training on the Airbus; the demonstration of AC 1 bus failure as presented is significantly different then the failure we experienced. Thus; there is seemingly no training for this type of failure. In addition; below is the supplemental information. We suspected arcing. The failures were consistent with Gen 1; but not all the failures were present that a crew would expect to see or are listed on the Gen 1 Failure Checklist. We did not get MCDU1 failure or ADR 1 failure. While it can be suspected to be Gen 1; the check list calls for positive identification. Either there are other issues (as some of the failures we experienced can also be found on the AC essential bus) or the check list should read under identifying the affected generator: any or all of these failures can occur; allowing for positive identification of the generator. In addition; what is sustained flickering? We experienced the flickering for several minutes; enough to get through many of the ECAM's; but the system then stabilized. At this point; as referenced in the explanation above; we determined the most conservative action consistent with our diversion was to keep the configuration as is; in a stable operation. What is the guidance when the flickering is not sustained; but momentary or lasting several minutes?Electrical power supply interruption; electrical arcing in the IDG feeder cable at the pylon/nacelle connector can occur; causing power supply interruption that affects one or more generator electrical phases. Maintenance has determined that corrosion leads to the breakdown of the gold plating on the connector contacts; which in turn leads to pin arcing. Due to these type failures and number of other reported electrical failures in the Airbus fleet; will there be a required inspection on the IDG connectors for the feeder; so these types of failures can be mitigated before they occur? We did have more than 50% loss of displays; [so it became an] NTSB reportable issue.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.