Narrative:

On power up EICAS indicated a brake fault. Called maintenance and coordinated two reset procedures: with and without the gpu; using the APU. Neither cleared the fault. Contract maintenance continued working. I looked at the logbook history and noticed three previous write-ups for the same issue dating back three weeks. I called maintenance control and expressed concern because this issue would cause degraded braking if the fault occurred in flight. I asked why the underlying problem had not been fixed. They stated that they will fix it once back in ZZZ. I discussed the issue with the crew and they became uncomfortable flying a plane with a known chronic brake issue being repeatedly reset rather than repaired. I called dispatch and we discussed the situation and I proposed some options if we could not get the problem fixed. A few options I came up with included a ferry flight to a maintenance base if it was safe to do so or possibly having the parts flown here for the repair. I did not feel it was safe or legal to fly passengers on an airplane with a known brake anomaly. The dispatcher acknowledged my concern and would coordinate with maintenance. A few minutes later maintenance control called and told me they are going to fax me a copy of a service bulletin explaining the anomaly. Meanwhile; contract maintenance cleared the message and it was then signed off; a/C ok for service. At this point I decided to call the chief pilot to get some guidance to help make an informed decision. I had scheduling patch me through to different managers with no answer. I then received the service bulletin regarding the brake control fault. The first thing I noticed was that this service bulletin was dated august 2006. While reading; the maintenance controller called and we discussed the service bulletin. He explained that this event is not a safety issue and they have the parts to fix it in ZZZ. When I asked about the date of the service bulletin and why this has not been addressed he agreed that it should have been fixed a while ago but since it was not a safety issue; they sometimes wait until these things break before fixing (i.e. Fixing through attrition). I found this a little unsettling considering this was a brake control issue and I will be flying this airplane to ZZZ with snow forecast. He did say that the airplane is airworthy and good to carry passengers. I thanked him for the information and said I would discuss it with the crew. I then sat down with the crew but received a call from chief pilot. Chief pilot asked what the issue was and I explained. I told him that we are open to options such as ferrying or having parts flown in but at this time we were not comfortable flying this aircraft with passengers. He stated that if I am willing to fly this airplane and put my life at risk then there is no reason not to carry passengers. In other words; it didn't make sense to him for us to be willing to ferry the aircraft but not take passengers. I tried to explain that this is exactly what a ferry flight is. Flying a plane that is safe but not necessarily legal to carry passengers. I thought this might be one of though cases. We do ferry flights all the time; but for some reason this logic did not make sense to him. I was just trying to process options to come to the safest possible solution. He insisted that the aircraft was good for service; been signed off; and we should go. He acknowledged I was in a tough spot but had to make a command decision and if the crew was uncomfortable that they would replace them. I didn't think this was necessary because I didn't want to put another crew at risk and at no time did I refuse this aircraft. I just needed to gather information to make a safe decision and then discuss it with the crew. I then began to discuss the information with the crew when we were interrupted by the station manager who asked what the problem was and why we were still there. I tried to explain but he said we were signed off and good to go. He did not care that we were trying to make a decision on safety; he just wanted us to go. This upset everyone in my crew. He was rude and annoying. I told him that we had not made a decision and would let him know when we did. At this point I decided to call safety because I was feeling a lot of pressure from maintenance to fly an aircraft with a known brake fault. I talked with a woman from safety who agreed that this did not seem to be a good situation and they would investigate it. She assured me that if the aircraft was signed off by maintenance control the aircraft was safe for flight but I should submit a safety report. However; the decision was up to me as a captain and there is nothing wrong with refusing an aircraft that I felt was unsafe. While the flight attendants were talking with their union reps I discussed all the information with the first officer and we felt that we were legal and could safely operate this flight but would submit safety reports. Once the flight attendants were done on the phone we began to discuss all the information I had when again we were interrupted by the station manager. I told him we just got off the phone with our supervisors and just needed a few more minutes. He just stood there. I asked him nicely to leave so we could continue our discussion. He refused and therefore I told him he needs to leave reiterating that I will let him know shortly our decision. He left. Finally I spoke with the in-flight supervisor at the request of the flight attendants. I explained to her the situation but her only response was when were we leaving for ZZZ with the passengers. I told her I would make that decision shortly. I then sat down with the crew and discussed the service bulletin explaining that the aircraft was safe; that company safety was aware of the situation and they agreed that this flight could be operated safely; and that the chief pilot and maintenance control have acknowledged that this is an ok airplane. I stated that I had no doubt that the aircraft could be operated safely and legally. They all agreed and we decided to fly the airplane to ZZZ with passengers. Upon sitting down in the flight deck I noticed a bleed 1; bleed 2; and a-i wing fail messages. I wrote that up; called maintenance again; and coordinated another power reset. This cleared the messages and after filling out the logbook we were on our way. Total delay two hours and one minute. 3 key issue cause me concern with this event: 1. Maintenance continuing to use reset procedures or deferrals instead of fixing underlying problems. In other words; how many times does something have to fail before it is replaced? 2. Manager and supervisor pressure to fly passengers when there is a legitimate safety concern. These same people send out e-mails and give speeches during training reiterating safety. Yet; when a real line scenario happens there is no support and they just want to get the airplane to the destination. 3. Outstation mangers and gate agent un-professionalism during a maintenance issue. The more they interfere; the longer the delay. The decision to determine if a flight is safe is with the crew not the agents and they need to let us make those decisions. My bottom line is: fix faulty parts; avoid repeated resets; supervisors need to support crews during safety related incidents; pressuring crews is not helpful and suggesting to replace crew members if they are uncomfortable with a faulty aircraft is unprofessional. Gate agents and managers need to let us do our job and be professional.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A ERJ-170 Captain's reluctance to accept yet another reset of a chronic brake fault anomaly was met with intransigence and hints of discipline on the part of Maintenance; Flight Operations; and Station Management.

Narrative: On power up EICAS indicated a brake fault. Called Maintenance and coordinated two reset procedures: with and without the GPU; using the APU. Neither cleared the fault. Contract maintenance continued working. I looked at the logbook history and noticed three previous write-ups for the same issue dating back three weeks. I called Maintenance Control and expressed concern because this issue would cause degraded braking if the fault occurred in flight. I asked why the underlying problem had not been fixed. They stated that they will fix it once back in ZZZ. I discussed the issue with the crew and they became uncomfortable flying a plane with a known chronic brake issue being repeatedly reset rather than repaired. I called dispatch and we discussed the situation and I proposed some options if we could not get the problem fixed. A few options I came up with included a ferry flight to a Maintenance base if it was safe to do so or possibly having the parts flown here for the repair. I did not feel it was safe or legal to fly passengers on an airplane with a known brake anomaly. The dispatcher acknowledged my concern and would coordinate with Maintenance. A few minutes later Maintenance Control called and told me they are going to fax me a copy of a service bulletin explaining the anomaly. Meanwhile; Contract Maintenance cleared the message and it was then signed off; A/C OK for service. At this point I decided to call the chief pilot to get some guidance to help make an informed decision. I had scheduling patch me through to different managers with no answer. I then received the service bulletin regarding the Brake Control fault. The first thing I noticed was that this service bulletin was dated August 2006. While reading; the Maintenance Controller called and we discussed the service bulletin. He explained that this event is not a safety issue and they have the parts to fix it in ZZZ. When I asked about the date of the service bulletin and why this has not been addressed he agreed that it should have been fixed a while ago but since it was not a safety issue; they sometimes wait until these things break before fixing (i.e. fixing through attrition). I found this a little unsettling considering this was a brake control issue and I will be flying this airplane to ZZZ with snow forecast. He did say that the airplane is airworthy and good to carry passengers. I thanked him for the information and said I would discuss it with the crew. I then sat down with the crew but received a call from chief pilot. Chief Pilot asked what the issue was and I explained. I told him that we are open to options such as ferrying or having parts flown in but at this time we were not comfortable flying this aircraft with passengers. He stated that if I am willing to fly this airplane and put my life at risk then there is no reason not to carry passengers. In other words; it didn't make sense to him for us to be willing to ferry the aircraft but not take passengers. I tried to explain that this is exactly what a ferry flight is. Flying a plane that is safe but not necessarily legal to carry passengers. I thought this might be one of though cases. We do ferry flights all the time; but for some reason this logic did not make sense to him. I was just trying to process options to come to the safest possible solution. He insisted that the aircraft was good for service; been signed off; and we should go. He acknowledged I was in a tough spot but had to make a Command decision and if the crew was uncomfortable that they would replace them. I didn't think this was necessary because I didn't want to put another crew at risk and at no time did I refuse this aircraft. I just needed to gather information to make a safe decision and then discuss it with the crew. I then began to discuss the information with the crew when we were interrupted by the station manager who asked what the problem was and why we were still there. I tried to explain but he said we were signed off and good to go. He did not care that we were trying to make a decision on safety; he just wanted us to go. This upset everyone in my crew. He was rude and annoying. I told him that we had not made a decision and would let him know when we did. At this point I decided to call safety because I was feeling a lot of pressure from Maintenance to fly an aircraft with a known brake fault. I talked with a woman from safety who agreed that this did not seem to be a good situation and they would investigate it. She assured me that if the aircraft was signed off by Maintenance Control the aircraft was safe for flight but I should submit a safety report. However; the decision was up to me as a Captain and there is nothing wrong with refusing an aircraft that I felt was unsafe. While the flight attendants were talking with their Union reps I discussed all the information with the First Officer and we felt that we were legal and could safely operate this flight but would submit safety reports. Once the flight attendants were done on the phone we began to discuss all the information I had when again we were interrupted by the station manager. I told him we just got off the phone with our supervisors and just needed a few more minutes. He just stood there. I asked him nicely to leave so we could continue our discussion. He refused and therefore I told him he needs to leave reiterating that I will let him know shortly our decision. He left. Finally I spoke with the in-flight supervisor at the request of the flight attendants. I explained to her the situation but her only response was when were we leaving for ZZZ with the passengers. I told her I would make that decision shortly. I then sat down with the crew and discussed the service bulletin explaining that the aircraft was safe; that company safety was aware of the situation and they agreed that this flight could be operated safely; and that the Chief Pilot and Maintenance Control have acknowledged that this is an ok airplane. I stated that I had no doubt that the aircraft could be operated safely and legally. They all agreed and we decided to fly the airplane to ZZZ with passengers. Upon sitting down in the flight deck I noticed a Bleed 1; Bleed 2; and A-I wing fail messages. I wrote that up; called Maintenance again; and coordinated another power reset. This cleared the messages and after filling out the logbook we were on our way. Total delay two hours and one minute. 3 key issue cause me concern with this event: 1. Maintenance continuing to use reset procedures or deferrals instead of fixing underlying problems. In other words; how many times does something have to fail before it is replaced? 2. Manager and supervisor pressure to fly passengers when there is a legitimate safety concern. These same people send out e-mails and give speeches during training reiterating safety. Yet; when a real line scenario happens there is no support and they just want to get the airplane to the destination. 3. Outstation mangers and gate agent un-professionalism during a maintenance issue. The more they interfere; the longer the delay. The decision to determine if a flight is safe is with the crew not the agents and they need to let us make those decisions. My bottom line is: Fix faulty parts; Avoid repeated resets; Supervisors need to support crews during safety related incidents; Pressuring crews is not helpful and suggesting to replace crew members if they are uncomfortable with a faulty aircraft is unprofessional. Gate agents and managers need to let us do our job and be professional.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.