Narrative:

I was present in area 7 having just been relieved from the area 7 low sectors. The controller working the area 7 high sectors was handling a FA20 landing hpn; direct to dny at FL410. The pilot was requesting for something more direct on his current route of flight because he was concerned with his fuel 'situation'. The area 7 high controller called ZNY elmira sector to see if he could get the aircraft more of a shortcut; the ZNY elmira controller approved direct ign but gave a restriction to cross the ZNY boundary at FL330. The area 7 high controller at ZOB acknowledged and then relayed to the FA20 that he could expect to cross 150 miles from ign at FL330. After a brief period of time the pilot relayed to ZOB that if he was to comply with the restriction he was going to be 'tight' on his fuel and it may not be possible. The ZOB controller called the ZNY elmira controller back and explained the situation with what the FA20 relayed. The ZNY controller stated; 'unless he's declaring minimum or emergency fuel have him at the boundary at FL330'. The area 7 high controller relayed the message to me and immediately went down to the omic desk to advise them of the developing safety situation. I gave the omic the aircraft's flight strip and asked him if he could call the omic at ZNY to see if we can coordinate the aircraft at FL410 because of his fuel situation. The omic acknowledged me and said he would get back to me in a little bit. I went back down to the area to see if situation with ZNY had changed at all or if any compromise was found. Unfortunately; the ZNY controller was still demanding the aircraft to be level at FL330 at the boundary. I waited approximately 5 minutes and then returned to the omic desk to see if there was any headway made. Upon arriving at the omic desk; I asked the manager where we were at with ZNY. He responded that ZNY 'took note' of the situation and said nothing else. I reiterated to the omic the urgency of the situation because of the phrases that the pilot was stating on the frequency. I stated that there was still time to get something done because the aircraft was still at FL410 in ZOB's airspace. The omic maintained a look of confusion stating that he thought the aircraft was already handed off to ZNY and in ZNY's airspace. I urged the omic to make another attempt at communicating with ZNY and try to convince them of the seriousness of the safety situation. The omic called the ZNY omic again but was unsuccessful at getting the aircraft anything higher. As the phone conversation was taking place; I observed the aircraft via the 'see all' function from the omic radar display and watched the aircraft descend to FL330. Recommendation; a new safety culture is attempting to rise above previous and outdated methods. However; it is still hindered because of lack of participation; awareness and plain old stubbornness. We are still showing that the system is reactive instead of being proactive. What should have been done differently? What could we do to prevent this from happening the next time? Well before I give the obvious answer of having the ZNY controller accept the hand off on an aircraft at FL410 because of his fuel situation I have to recognize the ZNY sector at the time of the incident. Shortly after the incident I asked the omic for a snap shot of the sector and asked for a paper print out of it. I have the printout; but do not have the resources of attaching it to this report. The controller at ZNY (sector 34) had three aircraft in his sector according to the falcon snap shot and they were all at FL230 or below. So why couldn't the ZNY controller accommodate the pilot's request? Was it the next sector (ZBW) on the aircraft's route of flight not willing to take the aircraft at a higher than normal altitude? The ZNY controller's airspace extended 100+ miles to the east of ZOB but he still refused to accept the aircraft at anything but FL330. There was no traffic at FL340 or above; there was no traffic conflicting with the FA20 at all. So why was the altitude necessary? It has been my experience from working with this particular ZNY area that certain controllers are set in their ways; period. The book says this; the LOA says that; I've never taken an aircraft that high before; he can't go direct to that fix; etc. Sometimes the above statements are warranted due to traffic volume; complexity and other situations affecting the sector. However this does not appear to be the case; the aircraft stated that he had a fuel 'situation'; he stated again that the restriction was going to make him 'tight' on fuel. While it is true that the pilot did not declare minimum or emergency fuel on the frequency; does he really have to state these words to receive priority assistance from the air traffic system? Recommendations- interview the ZNY controller and find out why he thought it was good judgment to force the pilot in more hazardous situation with his fuel. Why was it necessary to have the pilot actually declare minimum or emergency fuel instead of providing assistance to the pilot? Personally; a pilot mentions anything about their fuel and I will immediately notify the supervisor and try to get the aircraft any type of direct that will help them out. I'm not going to wait and see what happens and then react; that's not being safe. Being safe is doing something before the situation gets out of hand; being safe is not forcing the pilot into an unsafe situation just because the book states they have to say some key words.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZOB Controller described a fuel 'situation' event claiming a ZNY Controller refused to provide an amended altitude crossing clearance because the aircraft in question did not use published low fuel phraseology.

Narrative: I was present in Area 7 having just been relieved from the Area 7 Low Sectors. The Controller working the Area 7 High Sectors was handling a FA20 landing HPN; direct to DNY at FL410. The pilot was requesting for something more direct on his current route of flight because he was concerned with his fuel 'situation'. The Area 7 High Controller called ZNY Elmira Sector to see if he could get the aircraft more of a shortcut; the ZNY Elmira Controller approved direct IGN but gave a restriction to cross the ZNY boundary at FL330. The Area 7 High Controller at ZOB acknowledged and then relayed to the FA20 that he could expect to cross 150 miles from IGN at FL330. After a brief period of time the pilot relayed to ZOB that if he was to comply with the restriction he was going to be 'tight' on his fuel and it may not be possible. The ZOB Controller called the ZNY Elmira Controller back and explained the situation with what the FA20 relayed. The ZNY Controller stated; 'Unless he's declaring minimum or emergency fuel have him at the boundary at FL330'. The Area 7 High Controller relayed the message to me and immediately went down to the OMIC desk to advise them of the developing safety situation. I gave the OMIC the aircraft's flight strip and asked him if he could call the OMIC at ZNY to see if we can coordinate the aircraft at FL410 because of his fuel situation. The OMIC acknowledged me and said he would get back to me in a little bit. I went back down to the area to see if situation with ZNY had changed at all or if any compromise was found. Unfortunately; the ZNY Controller was still demanding the aircraft to be level at FL330 at the boundary. I waited approximately 5 minutes and then returned to the OMIC desk to see if there was any headway made. Upon arriving at the OMIC desk; I asked the manager where we were at with ZNY. He responded that ZNY 'took note' of the situation and said nothing else. I reiterated to the OMIC the urgency of the situation because of the phrases that the pilot was stating on the frequency. I stated that there was still time to get something done because the aircraft was still at FL410 in ZOB's airspace. The OMIC maintained a look of confusion stating that he thought the aircraft was already handed off to ZNY and in ZNY's airspace. I urged the OMIC to make another attempt at communicating with ZNY and try to convince them of the seriousness of the safety situation. The OMIC called the ZNY OMIC again but was unsuccessful at getting the aircraft anything higher. As the phone conversation was taking place; I observed the aircraft via the 'see all' function from the OMIC RADAR display and watched the aircraft descend to FL330. Recommendation; a new safety culture is attempting to rise above previous and outdated methods. However; it is still hindered because of lack of participation; awareness and plain old stubbornness. We are still showing that the system is reactive instead of being proactive. What should have been done differently? What could we do to prevent this from happening the next time? Well before I give the obvious answer of having the ZNY Controller accept the hand off on an aircraft at FL410 because of his fuel situation I have to recognize the ZNY Sector at the time of the incident. Shortly after the incident I asked the OMIC for a snap shot of the sector and asked for a paper print out of it. I have the printout; but do not have the resources of attaching it to this report. The Controller at ZNY (Sector 34) had three aircraft in his sector according to the FALCON snap shot and they were all at FL230 or below. So why couldn't the ZNY Controller accommodate the pilot's request? Was it the next sector (ZBW) on the aircraft's route of flight not willing to take the aircraft at a higher than normal altitude? The ZNY Controller's airspace extended 100+ miles to the east of ZOB but he still refused to accept the aircraft at anything but FL330. There was no traffic at FL340 or above; there was no traffic conflicting with the FA20 at all. So why was the altitude necessary? It has been my experience from working with this particular ZNY area that certain controllers are set in their ways; period. The book says this; the LOA says that; I've never taken an aircraft that high before; he can't go direct to that fix; etc. Sometimes the above statements are warranted due to traffic volume; complexity and other situations affecting the sector. However this does not appear to be the case; the aircraft stated that he had a fuel 'situation'; he stated again that the restriction was going to make him 'tight' on fuel. While it is true that the pilot did not declare minimum or emergency fuel on the frequency; does he really have to state these words to receive priority assistance from the air traffic system? Recommendations- Interview the ZNY Controller and find out why he thought it was good judgment to force the pilot in more hazardous situation with his fuel. Why was it necessary to have the pilot actually declare minimum or emergency fuel instead of providing assistance to the pilot? Personally; a pilot mentions anything about their fuel and I will immediately notify the supervisor and try to get the aircraft any type of direct that will help them out. I'm not going to wait and see what happens and then react; that's not being safe. Being safe is doing something before the situation gets out of hand; being safe is not forcing the pilot into an unsafe situation just because the book states they have to say some key words.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.