Narrative:

During climb [at] approximately 15;000 ft we received an EICAS for the 'right pri hydraulic ovht.' while the flying first officer pulled out the FM checklist; the captain and I discussed how we had noted that this was a repeat item that we had seen on the preflight paperwork. After performing the checklist items; it was determined that I should continue to the back on my normal break period; and if I was needed further on the flight deck; that I would be recalled. I proceeded to the back to prepare the bunk and have my dinner. Shortly after dinner; I was notified by the purser that I was needed on the flight deck; that we had lost 'all' hydraulics and that we were proceeding to [nearest suitable airport]. I reassured her that we had most likely not lost 'all' hydraulics; but that we had lost the 'right' system hydraulics. After securing the bunk area; I advised the purser that I would go up to the cockpit; and after being briefed by the flying crew; I would call her and brief her further on exactly what had transpired. After I entered the cockpit; I was briefed by the captain and the flying first officer that after I had left on break; they had contacted dispatch and maintenance about the hydraulic issue. Then; after turning off the right primary pump; it had cooled; and it was decided that we could continue to [our international destination]. Shortly thereafter; they had received more ECAM messages that indicated a loss of right hydraulic system quantity. After looking at the status page of ECAM; it was noted that the right system quantity was now at .03RF. They continued by performing the checklist items from the flight manual; and contacted dispatch and maintenance again. It was discussed; and determined that we should divert to [nearest suitable airport]. At this time; the purser called the cockpit and advised the captain that many of the first and business class passengers were nervous; and requested an announcement from the cockpit since they had observed me cleaning up the bunk area. The captain made an announcement to the passengers that we had lost the right side hydraulic system; and that we were proceeding to [nearest suitable airport] and planning a normal landing there in approximately 45 minutes. We determined that we would most likely be performing an overweight landing [at the diverting airport]. To mitigate this; we requested and received progressively lower altitudes from ATC; as well as slowing to approach speed and configuring the aircraft for landing while on downwind. Throughout the arrival; I assisted the captain and flying first officer with arrival duties such as weather; landing data; and advising the flight attendants and passengers on where we were and how long until landing. We ended up touching down at approximately 322;000 pounds; only 2;000 pounds overweight; at a descent rate of approximately 150 FPM. The captain used left thrust reverser only; and started using the brakes at approximately 110 KTS. We were able to taxi off the runway and taxi to gate normally. After performing our normal after landing and shutdown procedures at the gate; I decided to proceed outside to the right engine area to see if I could observe any hydraulic fluid leakage. When arriving near the back of the right engine; I observed a trail of hydraulic fluid leading to the aircraft and a small puddle of fluid under the right engine near the back center portion of the reverser shroud area. I feel that the cockpit crew; as well as the flight attendant crew worked well together to keep the passengers informed of what was going to transpire; as well as keep everyone calm.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 flight crew experienced loss of right hydraulic system early in an international flight. They declared an emergency and diverted to the nearest suitable domestic airport.

Narrative: During climb [at] approximately 15;000 FT we received an EICAS for the 'R PRI HYD OVHT.' While the flying First Officer pulled out the FM checklist; the Captain and I discussed how we had noted that this was a repeat item that we had seen on the preflight paperwork. After performing the checklist items; it was determined that I should continue to the back on my normal break period; and if I was needed further on the flight deck; that I would be recalled. I proceeded to the back to prepare the bunk and have my dinner. Shortly after dinner; I was notified by the Purser that I was needed on the flight deck; that we had lost 'all' hydraulics and that we were proceeding to [nearest suitable airport]. I reassured her that we had most likely not lost 'all' hydraulics; but that we had lost the 'right' system hydraulics. After securing the bunk area; I advised the Purser that I would go up to the cockpit; and after being briefed by the flying crew; I would call her and brief her further on exactly what had transpired. After I entered the cockpit; I was briefed by the Captain and the flying First Officer that after I had left on break; they had contacted Dispatch and Maintenance about the hydraulic issue. Then; after turning off the right primary pump; it had cooled; and it was decided that we could continue to [our international destination]. Shortly thereafter; they had received more ECAM messages that indicated a loss of right hydraulic system quantity. After looking at the status page of ECAM; it was noted that the right system quantity was now at .03RF. They continued by performing the checklist items from the flight manual; and contacted Dispatch and Maintenance again. It was discussed; and determined that we should divert to [nearest suitable airport]. At this time; the Purser called the cockpit and advised the Captain that many of the first and business class passengers were nervous; and requested an announcement from the cockpit since they had observed me cleaning up the bunk area. The Captain made an announcement to the passengers that we had lost the right side hydraulic system; and that we were proceeding to [nearest suitable airport] and planning a normal landing there in approximately 45 minutes. We determined that we would most likely be performing an overweight landing [at the diverting airport]. To mitigate this; we requested and received progressively lower altitudes from ATC; as well as slowing to approach speed and configuring the aircraft for landing while on downwind. Throughout the arrival; I assisted the Captain and flying First Officer with arrival duties such as weather; landing data; and advising the flight attendants and passengers on where we were and how long until landing. We ended up touching down at approximately 322;000 pounds; only 2;000 pounds overweight; at a descent rate of approximately 150 FPM. The Captain used left thrust reverser only; and started using the brakes at approximately 110 KTS. We were able to taxi off the runway and taxi to gate normally. After performing our normal after landing and shutdown procedures at the gate; I decided to proceed outside to the right engine area to see if I could observe any hydraulic fluid leakage. When arriving near the back of the right engine; I observed a trail of hydraulic fluid leading to the aircraft and a small puddle of fluid under the right engine near the back center portion of the reverser shroud area. I feel that the cockpit crew; as well as the flight attendant crew worked well together to keep the passengers informed of what was going to transpire; as well as keep everyone calm.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.