Narrative:

I was acting as the non-flying pilot. During the arrival we were assigned runway xx. While vectoring to runway xx; a regional jet reported a landing gear emergency and ATC granted them priority. The emergency aircraft reported an anticipated landing gear collapse and tower discussed a possible runway xx closure.because of continuous departures on the next longest runway; landings shifted to xxl. The multiple runways were not all available due to a recent severe snow storm and snow removal meant that not all runways or taxiways were available for use. ATC asked if we could accept runway xxl; which at 7;900 ft was shorter than runway xx's 13;000 ft. We accepted the runway assignment pending verification of performance by the onboard performance system. ATIS had no notices about braking action or slick runways.the approach was stable; configured; and on speed from well outside the glide slope intercept altitude final approach fix. The approach remained on autopilot until decision height; using standard calls and procedures; at which time the autopilot was disengaged and the remainder of the landing flown by hand. At decision height; the airplane was stable with the approach normal in land mode. Landing weight was nearly 620;000 pounds.at the time of autopilot disengagement; snow on the runway appeared blown; and the runway edges were undefined due to snow drift. The runway appeared cleared; with snow blown across it in places as large patches. Runway markings were partially obscured; and snow covered all surrounding terrain. It was late afternoon and solar glare reflected on snow. Snow on each runway; obscured runway markings; and made identification of the displaced threshold difficult.normal automated call-outs and cadence marked the final descent to the runway until touchdown when the flight engineer and I both called 'speed brake up.' the captain immediately applied reverse thrust. Shortly thereafter; both the flight engineer and I sensed that deceleration was inadequate for the runway remaining. The runway felt short; and we felt fast. We both reached for the auto brake dial at the same time; and I asked the captain if he preferred maximum auto brakes. The captain replied 'no' as he was already using maximum manual braking.the captain maintained reverse until the aircraft stopped. Max reverse was necessary and; had it not been used; I am convinced we would have been unable to stop within the runway boundary. Below 80 KTS; the tower controller reported that he saw smoke. I disregarded the report; as smoke from the tires was expected. As we stopped; I heard two brief pops and the flight engineer immediately shut down the number 2 engine. An attempt to stow the number 2 reverser was unsuccessful. I noted a temperature of 630 degrees on the number 2 egt gauge. We received no fire warnings.tower and one or more aircraft on the ground reported a fire. We had no cockpit fire indication. The captain responded that we had experienced a compressor stall. The tower asked if we could taxi clear and we responded yes; and did. We cleared the runway and crash fire rescue equipment responded to us at that location.the flight engineer motored the number 2 engine below 180 degrees while I established communication on a common frequency with ground and fire rescue. A fire unit in front of us said no fire was visible and no leaks or drips in sight. The captain confirmed brake temperatures and condition before we cautiously taxied to parking on the ramp; accompanied by crash fire rescue equipment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Required to land on a short runway due to a potentially disabled aircraft; a B747-200 flight crew was barely able to stop their heavy aircraft on the partially snow covered runway utilizing maximum manual braking and full reverse thrust to a complete stop. After coming to a stop; the number two engine was shut down due to compressor stalls during slow speed deceleration.

Narrative: I was acting as the non-flying pilot. During the arrival we were assigned Runway XX. While vectoring to Runway XX; a regional jet reported a landing gear emergency and ATC granted them priority. The emergency aircraft reported an anticipated landing gear collapse and Tower discussed a possible Runway XX closure.Because of continuous departures on the next longest runway; landings shifted to XXL. The multiple runways were not all available due to a recent severe snow storm and snow removal meant that not all runways or taxiways were available for use. ATC asked if we could accept Runway XXL; which at 7;900 FT was shorter than Runway XX's 13;000 FT. We accepted the runway assignment pending verification of performance by the onboard performance system. ATIS had no notices about braking action or slick runways.The approach was stable; configured; and on speed from well outside the glide slope intercept altitude final approach fix. The approach remained on autopilot until decision height; using standard calls and procedures; at which time the autopilot was disengaged and the remainder of the landing flown by hand. At decision height; the airplane was stable with the approach normal in land mode. Landing weight was nearly 620;000 LBS.At the time of autopilot disengagement; snow on the runway appeared blown; and the runway edges were undefined due to snow drift. The runway appeared cleared; with snow blown across it in places as large patches. Runway markings were partially obscured; and snow covered all surrounding terrain. It was late afternoon and solar glare reflected on snow. Snow on each runway; obscured runway markings; and made identification of the displaced threshold difficult.Normal automated call-outs and cadence marked the final descent to the runway until touchdown when the Flight Engineer and I both called 'speed brake up.' The Captain immediately applied reverse thrust. Shortly thereafter; both the Flight Engineer and I sensed that deceleration was inadequate for the runway remaining. The runway felt short; and we felt fast. We both reached for the auto brake dial at the same time; and I asked the Captain if he preferred maximum auto brakes. The Captain replied 'no' as he was already using maximum manual braking.The Captain maintained reverse until the aircraft stopped. Max reverse was necessary and; had it not been used; I am convinced we would have been unable to stop within the runway boundary. Below 80 KTS; the Tower Controller reported that he saw smoke. I disregarded the report; as smoke from the tires was expected. As we stopped; I heard two brief pops and the Flight Engineer immediately shut down the number 2 engine. An attempt to stow the number 2 reverser was unsuccessful. I noted a temperature of 630 degrees on the number 2 EGT gauge. We received no fire warnings.Tower and one or more aircraft on the ground reported a fire. We had no cockpit fire indication. The Captain responded that we had experienced a compressor stall. The Tower asked if we could taxi clear and we responded yes; and did. We cleared the runway and Crash Fire Rescue equipment responded to us at that location.The Flight Engineer motored the number 2 engine below 180 degrees while I established communication on a common frequency with Ground and Fire Rescue. A fire unit in front of us said no fire was visible and no leaks or drips in sight. The Captain confirmed brake temperatures and condition before we cautiously taxied to parking on the ramp; accompanied by crash fire rescue equipment.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.