Narrative:

Captain and myself acting as the PIC arrived at the company hangar at xa:50 to prepare for a cross country flight. Upon arrival at the hangar; we completed the preflight on our airplane while it was in the hangar. Preflight and preparation included restocking water; ice; brewing and filling coffee containers as well as externally checking the aircraft and the logbook for airworthiness. No discrepancies were noted and the aircraft was prepared by xb:20. At that time; we began the process of opening the hangar doors and removing the pc-12 from the hangar so that our aircraft could be moved to the ramp. As we were hooking up the tug to the pc-12; a maintenance technician arrived to assist in the aircraft movement. It was still dark and the ramp had ½ inch of snow; however; it was not snowing and there was no wind. Our aircraft was moved to the ramp and I (as the monitoring pilot) immediately began the preflight checklist to include going through the pre-start checklist to get the APU on-line and completing the checklist. The others proceeded to move the pc-12 back into the hangar; park the tug and close the hangar door. I received the current ATIS; programmed the FMS; received the ATC clearance and confirmed the computer flight plan agreed with the ATC clearance. No discrepancies were noted and I completed setting up the cabin for the passengers. At that time (xb:40) I noticed that the initial passengers had arrived so I exited the aircraft to assist in loading the luggage. Passengers continued to arrive at several minute intervals until all passengers had arrived and their luggage had been stowed. I noted that the luggage was not nearly as heavy as I had anticipated and mentally noted that we were 300 pounds lighter in luggage than planned. We escorted the passengers to the aircraft at xc:00 and I noted that instead of the manifested 7 passengers; we had 8 passengers. I contacted the on-call scheduler; to get the manifest updated and run a new no-fly list and then amended our flight plan to add the additional passenger. I closed the passenger door at about xc:05 and captain (as the flying pilot) started the aircraft and we began the taxi from the hangar to the runway at xc:10. After a slow taxi; we were cleared for takeoff at xc:16. Shortly after takeoff (at positive rate); gear retraction was initiated and our problem was apparent. Neither us had removed the gear pins. We advised tower that we would have to come back and land and that we did not need assistance. Tower cleared us to enter a right downwind for a visual. The weather in the vicinity of the airport had deteriorated to an approximate 800 ft scattered to broken ceiling with 10 SM visibility; so we advised tower that we needed an ILS approach. Tower acknowledged and handed us off to approach for vectors for the approach. As I was configuring the FMS for the approach; I noticed the aircraft weight indicated above maximum landing weight. Based upon my assessment of lighter baggage coupled with an estimate of fuel to be burned during the vectoring and approach in landing configuration; I determined that we would be at or below maximum landing weight at landing. The aircraft was successfully landed and we taxied to the hangar. Upon arrival; the other captain removed the gear pins and I completed required checklists; re-filed and received our ATC clearance and compared fuel remaining with fuel required to determine that we did not need to refuel. At xc:45 we again taxied to the runway and completed an uneventful takeoff at xc:48. Upon passing FL180; I recalculated all the weights and realized that we had landed on the return to base event at 500 pounds above maximum certificated weight. Upon arrival; I contacted the director of operations to advise him of the gear pin event and to inform him of the overweight landing. The aircraft was immediately scheduled for the required overweight landing inspection. This inspection was accomplished by bombardier mechanics. The inspection revealed no discrepancies or abnormalities. Lessons learned/remedial action to prevent recurrence: 1) given the requirement to remove the pc-12 from the hangar prior to removing our aircraft and then replacing the pc-12; coupled with the early arrival of passengers; the crew's normal functions (to include removal of the gear pins) was interrupted and we; the crew; failed to remove and place the gear pins on the entry steps. Therefore; both crewmembers thought that the other crewmember had removed the pins and both failed to confirm that they had been removed and stowed. Corrective action: regardless which crewmember removes the gear pins; they must be placed on the entry steps so the other crewmember can confirm their removal. This procedure will ensure that each crewmember confirms that the gear pins have been removed. If and/or when circumstances cause interruptions in the normal completion of crew duties/responsibilities; especially during conditions of darkness; lack of wind to cause the pin flags to flutter or inclement weather; the lack of pins on the steps will ensure the other crewmember confirms their removal. 2) the miscalculation of the landing weight for the initial landing was the result of estimation and arithmetic errors. I knew the actual luggage weight was less than originally planned. I then estimated the fuel burn during the vectoring and approach. This over-estimate and a subsequent subtraction error caused the overweight condition which I did not recognize until after we were airborne on the second leg. When dealing with a landing shortly after takeoff; crews must methodically recalculate the aircraft weight especially whenever the initial takeoff is accomplished at a weight above maximum certificated landing weight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Two corporate CL30 pilots failed to remove the landing gear pins before takeoff because of distractions and so after takeoff returned to the airport where they unknowingly made an overweight landing.

Narrative: Captain and myself acting as the PIC arrived at the company hangar at XA:50 to prepare for a cross country flight. Upon arrival at the hangar; we completed the preflight on our airplane while it was in the hangar. Preflight and preparation included restocking water; ice; brewing and filling coffee containers as well as externally checking the aircraft and the logbook for airworthiness. No discrepancies were noted and the aircraft was prepared by XB:20. At that time; we began the process of opening the hangar doors and removing the PC-12 from the hangar so that our aircraft could be moved to the ramp. As we were hooking up the tug to the PC-12; a Maintenance Technician arrived to assist in the aircraft movement. It was still dark and the ramp had ½ inch of snow; however; it was not snowing and there was no wind. Our aircraft was moved to the ramp and I (as the monitoring pilot) immediately began the preflight checklist to include going through the pre-start checklist to get the APU on-line and completing the checklist. The others proceeded to move the PC-12 back into the hangar; park the tug and close the hangar door. I received the current ATIS; programmed the FMS; received the ATC clearance and confirmed the computer flight plan agreed with the ATC clearance. No discrepancies were noted and I completed setting up the cabin for the passengers. At that time (XB:40) I noticed that the initial passengers had arrived so I exited the aircraft to assist in loading the luggage. Passengers continued to arrive at several minute intervals until all passengers had arrived and their luggage had been stowed. I noted that the luggage was not nearly as heavy as I had anticipated and mentally noted that we were 300 pounds lighter in luggage than planned. We escorted the passengers to the aircraft at XC:00 and I noted that instead of the manifested 7 passengers; we had 8 passengers. I contacted the on-call scheduler; to get the manifest updated and run a new no-fly list and then amended our flight plan to add the additional passenger. I closed the passenger door at about XC:05 and Captain (as the flying pilot) started the aircraft and we began the taxi from the hangar to the runway at XC:10. After a slow taxi; we were cleared for takeoff at XC:16. Shortly after takeoff (at positive rate); gear retraction was initiated and our problem was apparent. Neither us had removed the gear pins. We advised Tower that we would have to come back and land and that we did not need assistance. Tower cleared us to enter a right downwind for a visual. The weather in the vicinity of the airport had deteriorated to an approximate 800 FT scattered to broken ceiling with 10 SM visibility; so we advised Tower that we needed an ILS approach. Tower acknowledged and handed us off to Approach for vectors for the approach. As I was configuring the FMS for the approach; I noticed the aircraft weight indicated above maximum landing weight. Based upon my assessment of lighter baggage coupled with an estimate of fuel to be burned during the vectoring and approach in landing configuration; I determined that we would be at or below maximum landing weight at landing. The aircraft was successfully landed and we taxied to the hangar. Upon arrival; the other Captain removed the gear pins and I completed required checklists; re-filed and received our ATC clearance and compared fuel remaining with fuel required to determine that we did not need to refuel. At XC:45 we again taxied to the runway and completed an uneventful takeoff at XC:48. Upon passing FL180; I recalculated all the weights and realized that we had landed on the return to base event at 500 pounds above maximum certificated weight. Upon arrival; I contacted the Director of Operations to advise him of the gear pin event and to inform him of the overweight landing. The aircraft was immediately scheduled for the required overweight landing inspection. This inspection was accomplished by Bombardier mechanics. The inspection revealed no discrepancies or abnormalities. Lessons learned/remedial action to prevent recurrence: 1) Given the requirement to remove the PC-12 from the hangar prior to removing our aircraft and then replacing the PC-12; coupled with the early arrival of passengers; the crew's normal functions (to include removal of the gear pins) was interrupted and we; the crew; failed to remove and place the gear pins on the entry steps. Therefore; both crewmembers thought that the other crewmember had removed the pins and both failed to confirm that they had been removed and stowed. Corrective action: Regardless which crewmember removes the gear pins; they must be placed on the entry steps so the other crewmember can confirm their removal. This procedure will ensure that each crewmember confirms that the gear pins have been removed. If and/or when circumstances cause interruptions in the normal completion of crew duties/responsibilities; especially during conditions of darkness; lack of wind to cause the pin flags to flutter or inclement weather; the lack of pins on the steps will ensure the other crewmember confirms their removal. 2) The miscalculation of the landing weight for the initial landing was the result of estimation and arithmetic errors. I knew the actual luggage weight was less than originally planned. I then estimated the fuel burn during the vectoring and approach. This over-estimate and a subsequent subtraction error caused the overweight condition which I did not recognize until after we were airborne on the second leg. When dealing with a landing shortly after takeoff; crews must methodically recalculate the aircraft weight especially whenever the initial takeoff is accomplished at a weight above maximum certificated landing weight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.