Narrative:

A tbm [pilot] checked in on tower frequency ready to depart VFR. I issued hold short instructions to the pilot for landing traffic; to which he read back; 'hold short.' a C206 was turning short final from a left base entry followed in the left downwind by a BE40 that was an IFR arrival from the south. As the C206 was on short final I advised the pilot of the BE40 that traffic would be holding in position and departing prior to his arrival; a tbm. The BE40 pilot acknowledged as the 206 was crossing the landing threshold. I then instructed the tbm to 'line up and wait on runway 21;' asked his direction of departure; and gave him the BE40 traffic in the left downwind.at the time of the transmission; I thought I heard the tbm pilot read back the luaw instruction before he told me that he would be a straight-out departure. However; after reviewing the tapes; I realized he only told me his direction of departure and did not read back the luaw instructions. Upon further review of the tapes I also noticed he did not use his call sign when acknowledging his hold short instructions after initial contact.as the C206 exited the runway I observed the tbm taxi onto the runway and then begin his departure roll just as the cessna had cleared the runway without a takeoff clearance. I immediately informed the tbm pilot that he was not cleared for takeoff; but since the cessna was clear of the runway; he was cleared for takeoff now. The pilot responded with an apology and acknowledged his takeoff instructions and continued his departure straight-out. I then cleared the BE40; which was still on the left downwind for runway 21; to land.once the tbm was airborne I informed him that although the cessna was clear of the runway he had not been cleared to begin his takeoff roll. The pilot again apologized and I then gave him a southeast departure approval and a frequency change approval for flight following if needed. At that time; the controller in charge on duty began the process for a formal pilot deviation report.I would recommend critical listening training for both the controller and the pilot of the tbm. As I realized after reviewing the tapes; I missed both the call sign read back for the hold short instruction and the luaw confirmation from the pilot. Although I was busy during this particular event; it is critical to ensure proper read backs from the pilots to ensure the message was received as intended. Concurrently; the pilot of the tbm should receive similar critical listening training regarding instructions given by the controller and proper read back of the instructions.additional factors include situational awareness on the pilot's behalf knowing that a cessna had just landed and needed to exit the runway before he could depart; along with the fact the BE40 was told that a tbm would hold in position and depart prior to his arrival. These two factors should have provided the pilot with the information that he would luaw prior to his departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: After being cleared to LUAW behind a landing aircraft; a TBM pilot proceeded to takeoff without a clearance when the landing aircraft cleared the runway. Poor communication protocol on the part of both the pilot and the Local Controller contributed to the event.

Narrative: A TBM [pilot] checked in on Tower frequency ready to depart VFR. I issued hold short instructions to the pilot for landing traffic; to which he read back; 'Hold short.' A C206 was turning short final from a left base entry followed in the left downwind by a BE40 that was an IFR arrival from the south. As the C206 was on short final I advised the pilot of the BE40 that traffic would be holding in position and departing prior to his arrival; a TBM. The BE40 pilot acknowledged as the 206 was crossing the landing threshold. I then instructed the TBM to 'Line Up And Wait on Runway 21;' asked his direction of departure; and gave him the BE40 traffic in the left downwind.At the time of the transmission; I thought I heard the TBM pilot read back the LUAW instruction before he told me that he would be a straight-out departure. However; after reviewing the tapes; I realized he only told me his direction of departure and did not read back the LUAW instructions. Upon further review of the tapes I also noticed he did not use his call sign when acknowledging his hold short instructions after initial contact.As the C206 exited the runway I observed the TBM taxi onto the runway and then begin his departure roll just as the Cessna had cleared the runway without a takeoff clearance. I immediately informed the TBM pilot that he was not cleared for takeoff; but since the Cessna was clear of the runway; he was cleared for takeoff now. The pilot responded with an apology and acknowledged his takeoff instructions and continued his departure straight-out. I then cleared the BE40; which was still on the left downwind for Runway 21; to land.Once the TBM was airborne I informed him that although the Cessna was clear of the runway he had not been cleared to begin his takeoff roll. The pilot again apologized and I then gave him a southeast departure approval and a frequency change approval for Flight Following if needed. At that time; the CIC on duty began the process for a formal pilot deviation report.I would recommend critical listening training for both the Controller and the pilot of the TBM. As I realized after reviewing the tapes; I missed both the call sign read back for the hold short instruction and the LUAW confirmation from the pilot. Although I was busy during this particular event; it is critical to ensure proper read backs from the pilots to ensure the message was received as intended. Concurrently; the pilot of the TBM should receive similar critical listening training regarding instructions given by the Controller and proper read back of the instructions.Additional factors include situational awareness on the pilot's behalf knowing that a Cessna had just landed and needed to exit the runway before he could depart; along with the fact the BE40 was told that a TBM would hold in position and depart prior to his arrival. These two factors should have provided the pilot with the information that he would LUAW prior to his departure.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.