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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 93259 |
Time | |
Date | 198808 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lax |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff ground : preflight ground other : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : second officer |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 177 flight time total : 3400 |
ASRS Report | 93259 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight attendant : on duty |
Qualification | other other : other |
ASRS Report | 93287 |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted none taken : unable |
Consequence | faa : investigated |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
This incident involves pre-departure procedures. Specifically, the cabin crew was unable to complete the required passenger safety briefing prior to the takeoff roll. Although the taxi from the gate to active runway was relatively short, ample time was available for a normal course of events. The problem arose when a F/a other than the senior F/a advised the cockpit crew that the cabin was secure for pushback. This resulted in cabin attendants completing the task during the taxi. The cockpit crew was unaware of the situation. Prior to turning onto the runway the cockpit announcement, signaling the impending takeoff, was completed. Cockpit checklists were completed and a normal takeoff ensued. Some time after takeoff a cabin attendant advised the cockpit crew that the pre-departure briefing had been incomplete. It appears that lack of coordination between the cabin attendants allowed a premature pushback. In addition, the cabin attendants did not exercise their authority to prevent the takeoff. A factor affecting the cabin crew performance was that the senior F/a has less than 6 months of line service. Supplemental information from acn 93287: as 'a' F/a, I came across a blind passenger whose cane was just slightly protruding into the aisle. I asked her if I could push it in just a little. She refused. While I was talking to her the plane was moving (pushback). I said to the 'C' F/a, why are we pushing back? I'm not ready to go. She then said that she was sorry and that she had told them we were ready to go. The 'B' F/a told me that aviation safety inspector wanted to see me. He then informed me that he would need to speak with myself and the captain at the end of the flight. Though he was not officially chkriding us, he would have to report what had happened. FAA inspector showed me his identification when he came on board. Expect to hear from air carrier inspector, same office. At the request of the captain I asked if he was chkriding us and he said no.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR LGT MADE TKOF BEFORE PASSENGER BRIEFING WAS COMPLETED.
Narrative: THIS INCIDENT INVOLVES PRE-DEP PROCS. SPECIFICALLY, THE CABIN CREW WAS UNABLE TO COMPLETE THE REQUIRED PAX SAFETY BRIEFING PRIOR TO THE TKOF ROLL. ALTHOUGH THE TAXI FROM THE GATE TO ACTIVE RWY WAS RELATIVELY SHORT, AMPLE TIME WAS AVAILABLE FOR A NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS. THE PROB AROSE WHEN A F/A OTHER THAN THE SENIOR F/A ADVISED THE COCKPIT CREW THAT THE CABIN WAS SECURE FOR PUSHBACK. THIS RESULTED IN CABIN ATTENDANTS COMPLETING THE TASK DURING THE TAXI. THE COCKPIT CREW WAS UNAWARE OF THE SITUATION. PRIOR TO TURNING ONTO THE RWY THE COCKPIT ANNOUNCEMENT, SIGNALING THE IMPENDING TKOF, WAS COMPLETED. COCKPIT CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED AND A NORMAL TKOF ENSUED. SOME TIME AFTER TKOF A CABIN ATTENDANT ADVISED THE COCKPIT CREW THAT THE PRE-DEP BRIEFING HAD BEEN INCOMPLETE. IT APPEARS THAT LACK OF COORD BTWN THE CABIN ATTENDANTS ALLOWED A PREMATURE PUSHBACK. IN ADDITION, THE CABIN ATTENDANTS DID NOT EXERCISE THEIR AUTHORITY TO PREVENT THE TKOF. A FACTOR AFFECTING THE CABIN CREW PERFORMANCE WAS THAT THE SENIOR F/A HAS LESS THAN 6 MONTHS OF LINE SVC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 93287: AS 'A' F/A, I CAME ACROSS A BLIND PAX WHOSE CANE WAS JUST SLIGHTLY PROTRUDING INTO THE AISLE. I ASKED HER IF I COULD PUSH IT IN JUST A LITTLE. SHE REFUSED. WHILE I WAS TALKING TO HER THE PLANE WAS MOVING (PUSHBACK). I SAID TO THE 'C' F/A, WHY ARE WE PUSHING BACK? I'M NOT READY TO GO. SHE THEN SAID THAT SHE WAS SORRY AND THAT SHE HAD TOLD THEM WE WERE READY TO GO. THE 'B' F/A TOLD ME THAT AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR WANTED TO SEE ME. HE THEN INFORMED ME THAT HE WOULD NEED TO SPEAK WITH MYSELF AND THE CAPT AT THE END OF THE FLT. THOUGH HE WAS NOT OFFICIALLY CHKRIDING US, HE WOULD HAVE TO RPT WHAT HAD HAPPENED. FAA INSPECTOR SHOWED ME HIS ID WHEN HE CAME ON BOARD. EXPECT TO HEAR FROM ACR INSPECTOR, SAME OFFICE. AT THE REQUEST OF THE CAPT I ASKED IF HE WAS CHKRIDING US AND HE SAID NO.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.