Narrative:

We had been cross-referencing the QRH on each leg for takeoff thrust settings to have a second and independent thrust setting written down in case we forgot to have the ACARS data available when setting takeoff power (my version of an N1 caret). On each leg we requested and set full thrust settings from ACARS; because I felt like being conservative in a non-standard; non-FMS situation. The ACARS data was sent without removing the flex default. Consequently; in setting full thrust of 90.3%; our takeoff roll was less than if we used the flaps 20 flex setting. We departed using the full length of the runway (7;500 ft). I had been rescheduled to fly the remainder of day 4 of my trip with this crew; so this was my sixth consecutive work day. The event occurred on our third leg together. Scheduling had elected to assign me for [a flight] that was already running late by an hour and a half. I was told there were no reserves available to cover these two round trips; so they could run on time. I was deadheaded to the airplane with the deadhead flight delayed an hour and twenty-five minutes waiting for me to arrive from my one-time inbound flight. Consequently we ran over an hour late for our subsequent 3 legs together. The reserve first officer was in his fifth consecutive day of flying with 5 legs assigned for day 5.we recognized the need to make efficient use of our turn times and not add to the delays to which the passengers had been subjected. The gate and ramp agents were keen to let us know that they were anxious to get us turned as soon as possible; as we progressed throughout the day. This aircraft had a deferred FMS. My first officer had never experienced a deferred FMS before (i.e. Where there is no information available on the CDU or pfd/mfd). Additionally; on the inbound leg we noticed that DME 2 information was erratic once or twice. (On this final leg DME 2 information became unavailable). The first officer was familiar with the CRJ200 from his last job; but was off of IOE in just a month. He had not encountered true green needle flying in some time (nor had I for that matter). Task load was somewhat higher than normal prior to departure as we discussed our routing and set-up our frequencies for green needle flying. With low ceilings in the hub all day; ground delay programming was in effect with delays averaging 30 minutes at outstations. When we arrived I went to the gate to retrieve the release. When I checked to see if everything was set to begin boarding; the first officer was completing his walk around and told me that he believed that we had suffered a bird strike. I examined the area and confirmed that it appeared to be blood and no damage so I elected to begin boarding after I had contacted maintenance to ask them to come perform an inspection. As this was in progress the ramp agent gave us the release. He mentioned that he remembered seeing some company material by the bag loader and he would check to see if it was something we had brought in or if it needed to go with us. The first officer entered the release data into the FMS and while we were waiting for the takeoff data to come through; the mechanic came on board and handed me the logbook. She said the bird strike inspection was complete and signed-off. When the door closed was when I remembered that ground had asked for a 5 minute prior to push call for coordination of our wheels-up time from the traffic management unit. I told the first officer to make the call and the same ramp agent came on the headset and said that they had loaded the company material and that it was 5 pounds in weight. I re-sent for landing data with the additional company material weight and as the engine start check to the line was being performed; ground informed us our wheels-up time was six minutes hence. I told the ramp agent that we were ready for push back and told the first officer to start both engines. I was distracted long enough with all of this that I didn't realize that I had not setthe takeoff speeds. As the first officer was starting the second engine I paged through to the speed page of the takeoff data and set the speeds quickly. I selected legs page after that out of habit; too quickly to notice a flaps 20 takeoff indicated. In being conscious of the short amount of time available I let myself be distracted. Flaps 8 takeoffs at this airport are most common in my experience; so I let past experience; being late; and not wanting to suffer even more delays overrule making sure that I had cross-checked everything. I called for flaps 8 and the first officer selected them to 8 degrees. On the after start checklist I said flaps 8 and we verified that 8 degrees was selected. The first officer performed the departure brief and then made the departure PA. I switched us to the tower so we were monitoring the frequency and after the flight attendant responded; we were half way through the takeoff check; and the tower cleared us for takeoff. We accepted the takeoff clearance as we were still 100 yards or so from the hold line. We finished the before takeoff checklist prior to crossing the hold-short line. As we reached 100 KIAS the first officer as pilot flying make a remark on the intercom. I said; 'what?' and he paused and then said; 'I think this is a flaps 20 takeoff.' I glanced down at the ACARS; which I had selected to takeoff data prior to being cleared for takeoff (with the FMS deferred and unavailable I had been doing this on the previous legs to have something relevant on the CDU) and sure enough he was correct. I saw we were passing the 5;000 ft remaining sign; but were now in excess of 120 KIAS. I made the decision to continue the takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 flight crew reports taking off with an incorrect flap setting due to a deferred FMS and the time pressures of operating a delayed flight segment. The error is detected at 100 KTS by the First Officer and the Captain elected to continue with sufficient runway remaining.

Narrative: We had been cross-referencing the QRH on each leg for takeoff thrust settings to have a second and independent thrust setting written down in case we forgot to have the ACARS data available when setting takeoff power (my version of an N1 caret). On each leg we requested and set full thrust settings from ACARS; because I felt like being conservative in a non-standard; non-FMS situation. The ACARS data was sent without removing the flex default. Consequently; in setting full thrust of 90.3%; our takeoff roll was less than if we used the flaps 20 flex setting. We departed using the full length of the runway (7;500 FT). I had been rescheduled to fly the remainder of day 4 of my trip with this crew; so this was my sixth consecutive work day. The event occurred on our third leg together. Scheduling had elected to assign me for [a flight] that was already running late by an hour and a half. I was told there were no reserves available to cover these two round trips; so they could run on time. I was deadheaded to the airplane with the deadhead flight delayed an hour and twenty-five minutes waiting for me to arrive from my one-time inbound flight. Consequently we ran over an hour late for our subsequent 3 legs together. The reserve First Officer was in his fifth consecutive day of flying with 5 legs assigned for day 5.We recognized the need to make efficient use of our turn times and not add to the delays to which the passengers had been subjected. The gate and ramp agents were keen to let us know that they were anxious to get us turned ASAP; as we progressed throughout the day. This aircraft had a deferred FMS. My First Officer had never experienced a deferred FMS before (i.e. where there is no information available on the CDU or PFD/MFD). Additionally; on the inbound leg we noticed that DME 2 information was erratic once or twice. (On this final leg DME 2 information became unavailable). The First Officer was familiar with the CRJ200 from his last job; but was off of IOE in just a month. He had not encountered true green needle flying in some time (nor had I for that matter). Task load was somewhat higher than normal prior to departure as we discussed our routing and set-up our frequencies for green needle flying. With low ceilings in the hub all day; ground delay programming was in effect with delays averaging 30 minutes at outstations. When we arrived I went to the gate to retrieve the release. When I checked to see if everything was set to begin boarding; the First Officer was completing his walk around and told me that he believed that we had suffered a bird strike. I examined the area and confirmed that it appeared to be blood and no damage so I elected to begin boarding after I had contacted Maintenance to ask them to come perform an inspection. As this was in progress the Ramp Agent gave us the release. He mentioned that he remembered seeing some company material by the bag loader and he would check to see if it was something we had brought in or if it needed to go with us. The First Officer entered the release data into the FMS and while we were waiting for the takeoff data to come through; the Mechanic came on board and handed me the logbook. She said the bird strike inspection was complete and signed-off. When the door closed was when I remembered that Ground had asked for a 5 minute prior to push call for coordination of our wheels-up time from the traffic management unit. I told the First Officer to make the call and the same Ramp Agent came on the headset and said that they had loaded the company material and that it was 5 LBS in weight. I re-sent for landing data with the additional company material weight and as the engine start check to the line was being performed; Ground informed us our wheels-up time was six minutes hence. I told the Ramp Agent that we were ready for push back and told the First Officer to start both engines. I was distracted long enough with all of this that I didn't realize that I had not setthe takeoff speeds. As the First Officer was starting the second engine I paged through to the speed page of the takeoff data and set the speeds quickly. I selected legs page after that out of habit; too quickly to notice a flaps 20 takeoff indicated. In being conscious of the short amount of time available I let myself be distracted. Flaps 8 takeoffs at this airport are most common in my experience; so I let past experience; being late; and not wanting to suffer even more delays overrule making sure that I had cross-checked everything. I called for flaps 8 and the First Officer selected them to 8 degrees. On the after start checklist I said flaps 8 and we verified that 8 degrees was selected. The First Officer performed the departure brief and then made the departure PA. I switched us to the Tower so we were monitoring the frequency and after the Flight Attendant responded; we were half way through the takeoff check; and the Tower cleared us for takeoff. We accepted the takeoff clearance as we were still 100 yards or so from the hold line. We finished the before takeoff checklist prior to crossing the hold-short line. As we reached 100 KIAS the First Officer as pilot flying make a remark on the intercom. I said; 'What?' and he paused and then said; 'I think this is a flaps 20 takeoff.' I glanced down at the ACARS; which I had selected to takeoff data prior to being cleared for takeoff (with the FMS deferred and unavailable I had been doing this on the previous legs to have something relevant on the CDU) and sure enough he was correct. I saw we were passing the 5;000 FT remaining sign; but were now in excess of 120 KIAS. I made the decision to continue the takeoff.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.