Narrative:

Our dispatch release contained the following note in the remarks section: 'the O2 gen in each lav has been removed in accordance with FAA ad 2011-04-09 the lavs remain available for crew and passenger use with O2 system inoperative the lav O2 mask will not be briefed this information is sensitive security information.' prior to reading this on the release neither I nor the first officer had been notified by email; memo or any other communication of any security information related to this matter. I did not know why the oxygen generators were removed from the lavatories and in what way this was related to security. Furthermore the flight was planned to operate at FL350 which would normally not be allowed with oxygen deactivated.the note on the release left a lot of questions unanswered. I contacted the dispatcher who told me that this was in response to a security threat whereby terrorists could use the O2 generators to make a bomb. The dispatcher did not know why the flight was able to be dispatched above FL250 and he passed me on to a supervisor who stated that she thought the flight could be operated above 250 but had not read the ad. I asked to be put through to the duty chief pilot or assistant chief pilot. As this was [outside normal business hours] this took some time and eventually I was told to call back in 10 minutes. I attempted to brief the flight attendants on what I had found out; only to discover that the flight attendants had received an email on the matter. They were told to omit any mention of use of oxygen masks in the lavatories but had been given no guidance on what to do in the event of rapid decompression. I then called dispatch who was now able to put me through to an assistant chief pilot. The assistant chief seemed initially hostile to my inquiries and instructed me to just operate the flight. He told me that the pilot in command had not been notified because they didn't want 'everyone and his brother' to know about it; although he did later seem to see my point and apologized for not informing pilots of this ahead of time. In response to my question about rapid decompression he said that we could argue all day about the 'what if's' but that the FAA had determined it to be ok. I speculated that perhaps the FAA had determined the security risk to be higher than the risk of decompression? On time performance is of extreme importance to the company and therefore to me. I felt rushed and unprepared for my flight and the apparent hostility of the assistant chief added to my stress. I had already delegated some of my other duties to the first officer as I tried to find out what was going on; and to stay on time. There was only one gate agent operating my flight and he was busy with the inbound flight and had not had time to print the release until about 30 minutes prior to departure. Had I not viewed the release on the crew room computer before heading to the gate I would certainly have left late and would now be facing an unpleasant inquisition from the chief pilot's office as to why my flight was late.as PIC I am responsible [per company SOP] to perform a security information briefing prior to each leg. How can I do this if security information is withheld from me and if I have to struggle to get the information I need? If the flight attendants end up having to brief me on what is going on this undermines confidence and leaves me floundering and feeling unprepared. I managed to get through to a colleague at another airline. He told me that his company had informed its pilots in advance in the form of a memo. He also told me that their flight attendants had been given a procedure to follow in the event of rapid decompression with passengers in the lavatory. With no information forthcoming from our managers and having been given no advance notice in which to think about the situation; or any opportunity to read the ad; I briefed the flight attendants using the other airline's procedures. The PIC needs to have all information pertinent to the flight made available to him or her in order to operate safely and on time. In the future I would suggest that the PIC be informed of security and other information as it becomes available. Security information such this should be given on a need to know basis. The PIC needs to know. Currently the gom requires a security briefing prior to each leg. This seems excessive. Could the company please provide an example of how a security briefing should be given and perhaps only require one briefing per day if no new security information emerges especially when some days run as many as eight legs in some parts of our system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-900 Captain provided a well reasoned discourse on the problems associated with TSA Security Directives forcing flight crews to operate aircraft not in compliance with MEL requirements; specifically operating at altitude with deactivated lavatory oxygen generators. Particular attention was directed at management efforts to not provide flight crews with pertinent information because its dissemination is on a 'need to know' basis; apparently having determined the PIC is not on that list.

Narrative: Our dispatch release contained the following note in the remarks section: 'THE O2 GEN IN EACH LAV HAS BEEN REMOVED IAW FAA AD 2011-04-09 THE LAVS REMAIN AVAILABLE FOR CREW AND PAX USE WITH O2 SYS INOP THE LAV O2 MASK WILL NOT BE BRIEFED THIS INFORMATION IS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION.' Prior to reading this on the release neither I nor the First Officer had been notified by email; memo or any other communication of any security information related to this matter. I did not know why the Oxygen generators were removed from the lavatories and in what way this was related to security. Furthermore the flight was planned to operate at FL350 which would normally not be allowed with Oxygen deactivated.The note on the release left a lot of questions unanswered. I contacted the Dispatcher who told me that this was in response to a security threat whereby terrorists could use the O2 generators to make a bomb. The Dispatcher did not know why the flight was able to be dispatched above FL250 and he passed me on to a Supervisor who stated that she thought the flight could be operated above 250 but had not read the AD. I asked to be put through to the Duty Chief Pilot or Assistant Chief Pilot. As this was [outside normal business hours] this took some time and eventually I was told to call back in 10 minutes. I attempted to brief the flight attendants on what I had found out; only to discover that the flight attendants had received an email on the matter. They were told to omit any mention of use of oxygen masks in the lavatories but had been given no guidance on what to do in the event of rapid decompression. I then called Dispatch who was now able to put me through to an Assistant Chief Pilot. The Assistant Chief seemed initially hostile to my inquiries and instructed me to just operate the flight. He told me that the Pilot in Command had not been notified because they didn't want 'everyone and his brother' to know about it; although he did later seem to see my point and apologized for not informing pilots of this ahead of time. In response to my question about rapid decompression he said that we could argue all day about the 'what if's' but that the FAA had determined it to be OK. I speculated that perhaps the FAA had determined the security risk to be higher than the risk of decompression? On time performance is of extreme importance to the company and therefore to me. I felt rushed and unprepared for my flight and the apparent hostility of the Assistant Chief added to my stress. I had already delegated some of my other duties to the First Officer as I tried to find out what was going on; and to stay on time. There was only one gate agent operating my flight and he was busy with the inbound flight and had not had time to print the release until about 30 minutes prior to departure. Had I not viewed the release on the crew room computer before heading to the gate I would certainly have left late and would now be facing an unpleasant inquisition from the Chief Pilot's Office as to why my flight was late.As PIC I am responsible [per company SOP] to perform a Security Information Briefing prior to each leg. How can I do this if security information is withheld from me and if I have to struggle to get the information I need? If the flight attendants end up having to brief me on what is going on this undermines confidence and leaves me floundering and feeling unprepared. I managed to get through to a colleague at another airline. He told me that his company had informed its pilots in advance in the form of a memo. He also told me that their flight attendants had been given a procedure to follow in the event of rapid decompression with passengers in the lavatory. With no information forthcoming from our managers and having been given no advance notice in which to think about the situation; or any opportunity to read the AD; I briefed the flight attendants using the other airline's procedures. The PIC needs to have all information pertinent to the flight made available to him or her in order to operate safely and on time. In the future I would suggest that the PIC be informed of security and other information as it becomes available. Security information such this should be given on a need to know basis. The PIC needs to know. Currently the GOM requires a security briefing prior to each leg. This seems excessive. Could the company please provide an example of how a security briefing should be given and perhaps only require one briefing per day if no new security information emerges especially when some days run as many as eight legs in some parts of our system.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.