Narrative:

I was pilot flying. An emergency developed when the cabin duct temperature gauge went in to the red and cabin duct hot and flight compartment duct hot caution messages displayed. We became very busy during this emergency. We ran our emergency checklists and worked with ATC to descend to 10;000 because it became necessary to shut the bleed air off as no other checklist methods worked to cool the rapidly rising cabin duct temperature. At some point after leveling at 14;000 ft the first officer noted an over-torque condition on the torque meters. He immediately pulled back the power levers to within limitations. He notified me of the situation as he corrected it. My only explanation is that during the intense workload of handling many aspects of the emergency I allowed the torque setting to exceed limitations. Upon landing my first officer and I promptly wrote up the over-torque condition as safety obviously dictated.factors I feel that may have contributed to this mistake: being new to the aircraft may have contributed: although I am well trained; certainly proficient on the dash 8; and will never make this mistake again; I theorize that because the previous aircraft which I flew for nearly 7 years was fully fadec equipped; my muscle memory may still desire to push the power levers to the detent; especially during high task saturation events. I was intently monitoring cabin pressure as my first officer performed the following pilot not flying duties: he ran checklists; spoke with the flight attendant (she called repeatedly to inform us that the cabin was becoming excessively hot); attempted unsuccessfully to contact dispatch; worked with ATC for lower altitude; declared the emergency; checked the weather at our alternate; briefed the passengers; among other things. During all of this it also became necessary to don our oxygen masks. We were extremely busy in the physical sense but were also heavily tasked mentally trying to make good decisions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Dash8 flight crew experiences uncontrollably hot pack output temperatures necessitating pack shut down and descent due to loss of pressurization. After completing the QRH procedures and coordinating the diversion; the First Officer notes that engine torque is over the limit and pulls the power levers back.

Narrative: I was pilot flying. An emergency developed when the cabin duct temperature gauge went in to the red and Cabin Duct Hot and Flight Compartment Duct Hot caution messages displayed. We became very busy during this emergency. We ran our emergency checklists and worked with ATC to descend to 10;000 because it became necessary to shut the bleed air off as no other checklist methods worked to cool the rapidly rising cabin duct temperature. At some point after leveling at 14;000 FT the First Officer noted an over-torque condition on the torque meters. He immediately pulled back the power levers to within limitations. He notified me of the situation as he corrected it. My only explanation is that during the intense workload of handling many aspects of the emergency I allowed the torque setting to exceed limitations. Upon landing my First Officer and I promptly wrote up the over-torque condition as safety obviously dictated.Factors I feel that may have contributed to this mistake: Being new to the aircraft may have contributed: Although I am well trained; certainly proficient on the DASH 8; and will NEVER make this mistake again; I theorize that because the previous aircraft which I flew for nearly 7 years was fully FADEC equipped; my muscle memory may still desire to push the power levers to the detent; especially during high task saturation events. I was intently monitoring Cabin Pressure as my First Officer performed the following pilot not flying duties: he ran checklists; spoke with the Flight Attendant (she called repeatedly to inform us that the cabin was becoming excessively hot); attempted unsuccessfully to contact Dispatch; worked with ATC for lower altitude; declared the emergency; checked the weather at our alternate; briefed the passengers; among other things. During all of this it also became necessary to don our oxygen masks. We were extremely busy in the physical sense but were also heavily tasked mentally trying to make good decisions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.