Narrative:

Flying the teb 6 departure off of runway 1 at teb; the procedure calls for a turn from a 040 degree heading to a 280 degree heading at 2.3 DME from the teb VOR. Due to distraction we inadvertently failed to turn left until about 4 DME. Due to an SOP change and the resultant habit pattern disruption; we had failed to turn our transponder prior to departure. The confusion resulting from ATC asking us to 'ident' then 'check our transponder -- on;' resulted in distraction at the exact moment when we should have been turning left. The aforementioned SOP change was one contributing factor. Additionally we had intentionally chosen to not use the FMS automation on the departure. Had we used the FMS we would not have missed the turn. The reason we chose not to use the FMS was that we are extremely familiar with this departure and past experience shows that using the FMS usually complicates things because ATC invariably issues vectors immediately upon radar contact. This vector results in having to un-do the automation at a high work load moment. After the aforementioned discussion with ATC regarding the transponder; when ATC said; 'radar contact -- 4 north of teb airport;' I immediately realized that I had missed the turn and immediately began the left turn. The new SOP change regarding transponder operation places 'transponder -- on' in two spots in order to try to facilitate operations at airports which require 'transponder -- on' for taxi. From now on I will turn the transponder 'on' at the first opportunity presented by the checklist. Also; I will hence-forth always use the FMS to navigate the departure because the FMS would not have been 'distracted' by the ATC conversation and would have commanded the left turn. I believe no airspace of traffic separation issues resulted from this event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE560XL Captain departing Runway 1 on the TEB 6 departure is distracted by ATC due to the transponder not being on for takeoff. The turn to a heading of 280 degrees occurs late. A revised checklist may have resulted in the transponder remaining off for takeoff.

Narrative: Flying the TEB 6 Departure off of Runway 1 at TEB; the procedure calls for a turn from a 040 degree heading to a 280 degree heading at 2.3 DME from the TEB VOR. Due to distraction we inadvertently failed to turn left until about 4 DME. Due to an SOP change and the resultant habit pattern disruption; we had failed to turn our transponder prior to departure. The confusion resulting from ATC asking us to 'ident' then 'check our transponder -- on;' resulted in distraction at the exact moment when we should have been turning left. The aforementioned SOP change was one contributing factor. Additionally we had intentionally chosen to not use the FMS automation on the departure. Had we used the FMS we would not have missed the turn. The reason we chose not to use the FMS was that we are extremely familiar with this departure and past experience shows that using the FMS usually complicates things because ATC invariably issues vectors immediately upon radar contact. This vector results in having to un-do the automation at a high work load moment. After the aforementioned discussion with ATC regarding the transponder; when ATC said; 'radar contact -- 4 north of TEB airport;' I immediately realized that I had missed the turn and immediately began the left turn. The new SOP change regarding transponder operation places 'transponder -- on' in two spots in order to try to facilitate operations at airports which require 'transponder -- on' for taxi. From now on I will turn the transponder 'on' at the first opportunity presented by the checklist. Also; I will hence-forth always use the FMS to navigate the departure because the FMS would not have been 'distracted' by the ATC conversation and would have commanded the left turn. I believe no airspace of traffic separation issues resulted from this event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.