Narrative:

I was training a d-side on D12. Aircraft X came on our frequency from approach. He said he had an electrical problem; but he wanted to continue on to ZZZ. The r-side asked if he had a handheld radio and he said he did; but the batteries were low. He said he might not have power much longer; but wanted to continue on to ZZZ. I had my d-side trainee look up the weather for [nearby airports] and they were all report ovc at 012 to 008 with 6 SM or less visibility and HZ or br. We asked the pilot and he said he thought it was clearing over at ZZZ; but from looking at the weather west of ZZZ and the satellite on the overhead displays; it did not look like it was improving fast. Of course; we also did not have access to tafs or any forecast products; so we did not know if the weather would improve to visual conditions if he lost his battery. I had the r-side query the pilot about doing and instrument approach at ZZZ1 instead of waiting and he agreed. I had my trainee get control from approach and we diverted the aircraft on a heading to ZZZ1 for the ILS to runway 4. After listening to the pilot; I had a feeling he did not have instrument approach charts; so I had the r-side ask the pilot and he said no. We already had the plate pulled up. The r-side gave the pilot the ATIS frequency and told him to get delta. He came back with it and I then told the r-side to give him the final approach course heading; intercept altitude; and minimums. We had a jet to vector in front of the aircraft and got him on the ILS; then turned aircraft X on behind him. I watched as the aircraft flew through the localizer and informed the r-side. The r-side informed the aircraft of his deviation and he issued a 010 heading to join. The aircraft was responsive and took the heading; but I asked the r-side to see if he is receiving a localizer indication. The pilot said he was not. I called the tower and informed ZZZ1 tower what was going on when they gave me the down time on the jet. The tower told me the jet broke out at 700 ft and the visibility under the clouds was unlimited. I informed the r-side and he was setting up the scope at R13; with quick look to give us a closer view of the localizer and put it on a 25 mile range. The r-side gave the aircraft a 044 heading; which is the final approach course as he was joining the localizer from the south. The pilot started to descend and the r-side asked him again if he was receiving the localizer. We did not get a chance to ask if he was receiving the glide slope. He started down and when I saw him out of 1;600 ft; I called the tower and asked if we could bring the aircraft inside the class D. He said approved. I went over to the R13 scope and drew an extended final line to the runway. We depict the runways for this airport and our radar is certified to 300 ft off the end of the runway and our transmitter is on the airport. I saw the wind was pushing the aircraft to the south; and told the r-side to give him a 030 heading. That heading seemed to put him right on center line and aimed at the end of the runway 4. I told the r-side to inform the pilot he could descend to the minimums for the localizer of 600 ft. Our mia in the area is 2;000 ft; but we are allowed to vector departures out of 800 because we depict the 635 ft tower northeast of the field. I know this was illegal to assign 600 ft; but he was on center line; with power failing; and instrumentation not working; I did not want to see if another approach would work. He was descending on his own anyway. When the aircraft was out of 1;000 ft I asked the r-side if I could talk to the pilot. I am a CFI and current with flying ASR and PAR approaches. He said go a head. I told the aircraft he was 4 miles from touchdown; 1/4 miles south of the localizer; tracking towards the end of the runway. At that point he broke out [at] 700 ft and said he had the airport in sight. I called the tower and asked if he wanted us to clear the aircraft to land; not wanting to loose the pilot in a frequency change close to the ground; and the tower approved. I told the radar controller to relay the landing clearance and switch him to tower. He did and the pilot had a hard time getting the frequency correct. We watched him on short final and then go around at 400 ft; 150 ft above the runway. The tower called and said that he was going around to make sure his gear was down. We watched him circle and then land safely. The tower called and reported the airport was VFR. We did not know what the ceiling was; but around 1;100 ft. I went back later to train on the d-side again and saw the pilot depart for ZZZ. I spoke to him and he said he had a broken wire on the alternator and ran out of power on short final; which is why he went around the pattern to make sure it was down. I asked if he ever got the localizer or glide slope and he said he did only a couple miles out after we got him down to get the airport insight. He was appreciative. Recommendation; I am working with the facility to develop approach control training. I spoke to the pilot when he departed later and he said he lost power on short final. If the pilot would have continued on; I would be very afraid to know what would have happened if he lost power while stuck at 7;000 ft on top of a solid overcast and thunderstorms around; with no navigation equipment to get down. I think our action to divert the aircraft was correct and timely. I know we should have declared the emergency to the supervisor; but it was tough knowing when he would run out of power. The safest and most procedurally correct course of action would have been a missed approach. Not knowing how much power he had left and the report of unlimited visibility under the clouds lead me to make the decision to get him in on a modified ASR. Luckily; we have the extra scope that we can setup to monitor the approaches on a close range. I think our team work helped change a possibly dangerous situation into a favorable outcome.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Enroute Controller described a hastily arranged ASR type approach to an airport for an aircraft with electrical problems; the reporter indicating all applicable rules may not have been followed during this event but the outcome was successful.

Narrative: I was training a D-side on D12. Aircraft X came on our frequency from Approach. He said he had an electrical problem; but he wanted to continue on to ZZZ. The R-side asked if he had a handheld radio and he said he did; but the batteries were low. He said he might not have power much longer; but wanted to continue on to ZZZ. I had my D-side trainee look up the weather for [nearby airports] and they were all report OVC at 012 to 008 with 6 SM or less visibility and HZ or BR. We asked the pilot and he said he thought it was clearing over at ZZZ; but from looking at the weather west of ZZZ and the satellite on the overhead displays; it did not look like it was improving fast. Of course; we also did not have access to TAFs or any forecast products; so we did not know if the weather would improve to visual conditions if he lost his battery. I had the R-side query the pilot about doing and instrument approach at ZZZ1 instead of waiting and he agreed. I had my trainee get control from Approach and we diverted the aircraft on a heading to ZZZ1 for the ILS to Runway 4. After listening to the pilot; I had a feeling he did not have instrument approach charts; so I had the R-side ask the pilot and he said no. We already had the plate pulled up. The R-side gave the pilot the ATIS frequency and told him to get Delta. He came back with it and I then told the R-side to give him the final approach course heading; intercept altitude; and minimums. We had a jet to vector in front of the aircraft and got him on the ILS; then turned aircraft X on behind him. I watched as the aircraft flew through the localizer and informed the R-side. The R-side informed the aircraft of his deviation and he issued a 010 heading to join. The aircraft was responsive and took the heading; but I asked the R-side to see if he is receiving a localizer indication. The pilot said he was not. I called the Tower and informed ZZZ1 Tower what was going on when they gave me the down time on the jet. The Tower told me the jet broke out at 700 FT and the visibility under the clouds was unlimited. I informed the R-side and he was setting up the scope at R13; with quick look to give us a closer view of the localizer and put it on a 25 mile range. The R-side gave the aircraft a 044 heading; which is the final approach course as he was joining the LOC from the south. The pilot started to descend and the R-Side asked him again if he was receiving the localizer. We did not get a chance to ask if he was receiving the glide slope. He started down and when I saw him out of 1;600 FT; I called the Tower and asked if we could bring the aircraft inside the class D. He said approved. I went over to the R13 scope and drew an extended final line to the runway. We depict the runways for this airport and our RADAR is certified to 300 FT off the end of the runway and our transmitter is on the airport. I saw the wind was pushing the aircraft to the south; and told the R-side to give him a 030 heading. That heading seemed to put him right on center line and aimed at the end of the Runway 4. I told the R-side to inform the pilot he could descend to the minimums for the localizer of 600 FT. Our MIA in the area is 2;000 FT; but we are allowed to vector departures out of 800 because we depict the 635 FT tower northeast of the field. I know this was illegal to assign 600 FT; but he was on center line; with power failing; and instrumentation not working; I did not want to see if another approach would work. He was descending on his own anyway. When the aircraft was out of 1;000 FT I asked the R-Side if I could talk to the pilot. I am a CFI and current with flying ASR and PAR approaches. He said go a head. I told the aircraft he was 4 miles from touchdown; 1/4 miles south of the localizer; tracking towards the end of the runway. At that point he broke out [at] 700 FT and said he had the airport in sight. I called the Tower and asked if he wanted us to clear the aircraft to land; not wanting to loose the pilot in a frequency change close to the ground; and the Tower approved. I told the RADAR Controller to relay the landing clearance and switch him to Tower. He did and the pilot had a hard time getting the frequency correct. We watched him on short final and then go around at 400 FT; 150 FT above the runway. The Tower called and said that he was going around to make sure his gear was down. We watched him circle and then land safely. The Tower called and reported the airport was VFR. We did not know what the ceiling was; but around 1;100 FT. I went back later to train on the D-side again and saw the pilot depart for ZZZ. I spoke to him and he said he had a broken wire on the alternator and ran out of power on short final; which is why he went around the pattern to make sure it was down. I asked if he ever got the localizer or glide slope and he said he did only a couple miles out after we got him down to get the airport insight. He was appreciative. Recommendation; I am working with the facility to develop Approach Control training. I spoke to the pilot when he departed later and he said he lost power on short final. If the pilot would have continued on; I would be very afraid to know what would have happened if he lost power while stuck at 7;000 FT on top of a solid overcast and thunderstorms around; with no navigation equipment to get down. I think our action to divert the aircraft was correct and timely. I know we should have declared the emergency to the Supervisor; but it was tough knowing when he would run out of power. The safest and most procedurally correct course of action would have been a missed approach. Not knowing how much power he had left and the report of unlimited visibility under the clouds lead me to make the decision to get him in on a modified ASR. Luckily; we have the extra scope that we can setup to monitor the approaches on a close range. I think our team work helped change a possibly dangerous situation into a favorable outcome.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.