37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 940501 |
Time | |
Date | 201103 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | EBLG.Airport |
State Reference | FO |
Environment | |
Light | Dawn |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B747-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Flight Instructor Flight Crew Flight Engineer |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120 Flight Crew Total 7700 Flight Crew Type 1500 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Altitude Overshoot Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Track / Heading All Types |
Narrative:
While flying an arrival to eblg; we were assigned direct to rudix waypoint; a name that we didn't recognize. We weren't sure of the spelling and had trouble understanding the controller. I couldn't find the waypoint on the low altitude or the high altitude enroute. I didn't see it on the arrival or on the approach procedure we were told to anticipate. I asked the controller several times for a spelling. He tried; but was unable due to his accent. We were told to fly present heading. The captain; who was flying; became busy looking for the fix name and tried various spellings of the fix name in the FMS. During this time we were given a clearance to descend and maintain 3;000 ft. The captain set up a descent but made several more attempts to locate the fix in the FMS; finally locating it on a different arrival. He asked me to ask ATC if we should still proceed to the fix. I made the call; while finding the other arrival on my electronic flight bag chart display. I glanced up to see that we were passing through 3;000 ft and descending. The altitude sel feature of the autopilot was not engaged. I called the captain's attention to the deviation and he seemed confused about the clearance. I told him our clearance was three thousand feet. He slowed the descent; and stopped it by 2;200 ft; a full 800 ft below our clearance. ATC notified us of the altitude deviation; and then told us to maintain 2;000. The captain maintained 2;200. We were cleared the approach and told to maintain 2;000; but at this point we were very close to the course. I called the localizer alive; and the captain began to turn the heading bug; but the ILS was not armed. We passed through the course. I advised the captain that the ILS wasn't armed and armed it. He seemed confused and went between the altitude hold and the ILS selector. I glanced down to see airspeed bleeding off; now twenty knots below our minimum approach speed. I pushed the power up while calling 'airspeed!' and the captain said 'push it up.' he did not push the power up. I applied enough power to recover speed and the captain took over. ATC called to advise we were well right of course. I acknowledged; and advised we were correcting. We were subsequently re-cleared to land.the captain became involved in trying to locate the waypoint when he was acting as the flying pilot. That was not his job. By allowing his attention to be diverted he missed setting the altitude select and wasn't monitoring his altitude; despite making a change in altitude and approaching the ILS localizer. He became fixated on the altitude deviation and missed selecting the ILS navigation mode when cleared for the approach and followed the flight director through the approach course. When notified of the omission the captain focused on that and lost airspeed awareness. When notified of the airspeed loss he didn't respond immediately by pushing up the power; as I was already doing it for him. His response wasn't the company standard 'correcting;' but 'push it up.' the landing was uneventful. I should have monitored more closely to prevent the chain of events from occurring and should have more aggressively interrupted the chain of events. The captain didn't respond with standard calls; specifically a 'correcting' call; to each of my deviation calls. That should have been an important indication that more vigilance was required on my part. I should never have allowed the airspeed to bleed off; or to be distracted by the captain's actions. The captain was new; recently having completed his captain check ride; and I should have taken that into account when supporting him on the arrival and approach. Prior to arriving in europe; reports that the destination and alternates were going below minimums had concerned him; and his level of concern should also have alerted me to be more vigilant.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Speed; altitude and track control suffered when the distraction of finding an unfamiliar way point entered into the mix during an approach to EBGL. The reporting non flying pilot questioned his own performance in backing up the flying pilot.
Narrative: While flying an arrival to EBLG; we were assigned direct to RUDIX waypoint; a name that we didn't recognize. We weren't sure of the spelling and had trouble understanding the Controller. I couldn't find the waypoint on the low altitude or the high altitude enroute. I didn't see it on the arrival or on the approach procedure we were told to anticipate. I asked the Controller several times for a spelling. He tried; but was unable due to his accent. We were told to fly present heading. The Captain; who was flying; became busy looking for the fix name and tried various spellings of the fix name in the FMS. During this time we were given a clearance to descend and maintain 3;000 FT. The Captain set up a descent but made several more attempts to locate the fix in the FMS; finally locating it on a different arrival. He asked me to ask ATC if we should still proceed to the fix. I made the call; while finding the other arrival on my electronic flight bag chart display. I glanced up to see that we were passing through 3;000 FT and descending. The ALT SEL feature of the autopilot was not engaged. I called the Captain's attention to the deviation and he seemed confused about the clearance. I told him our clearance was three thousand feet. He slowed the descent; and stopped it by 2;200 FT; a full 800 FT below our clearance. ATC notified us of the altitude deviation; and then told us to maintain 2;000. The Captain maintained 2;200. We were cleared the approach and told to maintain 2;000; but at this point we were very close to the course. I called the localizer alive; and the Captain began to turn the heading bug; but the ILS was not armed. We passed through the course. I advised the Captain that the ILS wasn't armed and armed it. He seemed confused and went between the altitude hold and the ILS selector. I glanced down to see airspeed bleeding off; now twenty knots below our minimum approach speed. I pushed the power up while calling 'Airspeed!' and the Captain said 'push it up.' He did not push the power up. I applied enough power to recover speed and the Captain took over. ATC called to advise we were well right of course. I acknowledged; and advised we were correcting. We were subsequently re-cleared to land.The Captain became involved in trying to locate the waypoint when he was acting as the flying pilot. That was not his job. By allowing his attention to be diverted he missed setting the Altitude Select and wasn't monitoring his altitude; despite making a change in altitude and approaching the ILS localizer. He became fixated on the altitude deviation and missed selecting the ILS NAV mode when cleared for the approach and followed the flight director through the approach course. When notified of the omission the Captain focused on that and lost airspeed awareness. When notified of the airspeed loss he didn't respond immediately by pushing up the power; as I was already doing it for him. His response wasn't the company standard 'correcting;' but 'push it up.' The landing was uneventful. I should have monitored more closely to prevent the chain of events from occurring and should have more aggressively interrupted the chain of events. The Captain didn't respond with standard calls; specifically a 'correcting' call; to each of my deviation calls. That should have been an important indication that more vigilance was required on my part. I should never have allowed the airspeed to bleed off; or to be distracted by the Captain's actions. The Captain was new; recently having completed his captain check ride; and I should have taken that into account when supporting him on the arrival and approach. Prior to arriving in Europe; reports that the destination and alternates were going below minimums had concerned him; and his level of concern should also have alerted me to be more vigilant.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.