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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 941756 |
Time | |
Date | 201104 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZMA.ARTCC |
State Reference | FL |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Route In Use | None |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Enroute |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
I began my session as the line of severe weather was beginning to substantially impact operations. Aircraft were all deviating and many were reporting rough rides. A boeing was working northeasterly in the vicinity; south of pbi; paralleling the line in an effort to find a gap and proceed north westbound to mco. The pilot was extremely reluctant to turn north; but eventually found a gap and made it through; reporting moderate turbulence. A twin cessna to the daytona beach area; reported severe turbulence and gained 600 ft causing a loss of separation between that aircraft and another who nearly simultaneously reported severe turbulence at 150.I informed the supervisor immediately of the situation. From the reports from other aircraft that were being made to go through the area; the rides got better with altitude. I suggested immediately that no aircraft be put through the line in that area and instead be re-routed at high altitude to the southeast where there was little weather. The supervisor relayed my information to tmu. Nothing was done and we still continued to receive hand offs through the same area. The r-side controller; in an effort to keep the aircraft away from the rough rides; left them at higher altitudes. An airbus was one of the aircraft left at a higher altitude and as he passed through the line; he reported that they had taken a lighting strike to the radome and that their weather radar had been rendered inoperable. I told the supervisor that we must not take any more hand offs on aircraft transitioning to lower altitudes through this area; he relayed this message to tmu immediately.I also spoke directly with a tmu specialist who was in the area and informed him that every indication led me to believe that this was a line of extraordinarily severe weather and that it would be extremely hazardous to continue to place aircraft in that area. I have never felt so strongly that aircraft should not be placed through a specific area and I relayed this reaction as well. Unbelievably we received yet another hand off on a boeing inbound to mia destined straight through the areas that we had just explained contained extremely hazardous weather. This pilot; after being advised of the ride reports and lighting strike; refused to go through the area. He advised further that; in his words; 'I will use the emergency-word if I have to; but I'm not going into that area.' this resulted in the aircraft deviating to the west directly into the flow of departures from miami approach who were also deviating west of the anney fix; creating yet another completely unnecessary situation.another boeing bound for fll began to flash from high side. I told the supervisor that the sector 20 team would not take the hand off. He informed us to accept the hand off and place the aircraft into holding and not to allow any other aircraft to proceed through the area; which was perfectly appropriate and we did so. I have never seen such gross mismanagement by tmu. I understand that it can be difficult to predict the presence and intensity of weather; but after several reports of severe turbulence and a lightning strike; immediate action should have been taken to ensure that no further aircraft were placed in the same unsafe situation. There were other alternatives; that both I and the supervisor in the area at the time; expressed to tmu and none of our suggestions were adopted in anything resembling a timely fashion. It took an aircraft threatening to declare an emergency before something was done to reroute aircraft to other places. This is completely unacceptable. We had plenty of indications that this line of weather was particularly severe. The routes should have least been tested before allowing aircraft to fly through en-mass. There were plenty of other options to keep aircraft up high and send them to the southeast; but instead tmu continued to force aircraft through areas of known hazardous and significant weather. There is nosuggestion that I can make other than that reaction to reports of things like severe icing; severe/extreme turbulence and lightning strikes be immediate keys to reroute aircraft; and not by starting the reroutes with the aircraft 100's of miles away; but rather starting with the aircraft closest to entering the areas. As controllers; we did everything in our power to advise the aircraft of the weather and provide them with as many options as possible. Our assistance is limited to the confines of our airspace and big-picture action was necessary here. This is florida; and it is unacceptable for the folks in tmu to be unable to compile versatile plans for rapidly changing weather.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZMA Controller voiced concern regarding the TMU's inaction for re-route requests during a severe weather period; noting that regardless of frequent requests; TMU personnel simply failed to respond.
Narrative: I began my session as the line of severe weather was beginning to substantially impact operations. Aircraft were all deviating and many were reporting rough rides. A Boeing was working northeasterly in the vicinity; south of PBI; paralleling the line in an effort to find a gap and proceed north westbound to MCO. The pilot was extremely reluctant to turn north; but eventually found a gap and made it through; reporting moderate turbulence. A twin Cessna to the Daytona Beach area; reported severe turbulence and gained 600 FT causing a loss of separation between that aircraft and another who nearly simultaneously reported severe turbulence at 150.I informed the Supervisor immediately of the situation. From the reports from other aircraft that were being made to go through the area; the rides got better with altitude. I suggested immediately that no aircraft be put through the line in that area and instead be re-routed at high altitude to the southeast where there was little weather. The Supervisor relayed my information to TMU. Nothing was done and we still continued to receive hand offs through the same area. The R-Side Controller; in an effort to keep the aircraft away from the rough rides; left them at higher altitudes. An Airbus was one of the aircraft left at a higher altitude and as he passed through the line; he reported that they had taken a lighting strike to the radome and that their weather RADAR had been rendered inoperable. I told the Supervisor that we must not take any more hand offs on aircraft transitioning to lower altitudes through this area; he relayed this message to TMU immediately.I also spoke directly with a TMU Specialist who was in the area and informed him that every indication led me to believe that this was a line of extraordinarily severe weather and that it would be extremely hazardous to continue to place aircraft in that area. I have never felt so strongly that aircraft should not be placed through a specific area and I relayed this reaction as well. Unbelievably we received yet another hand off on a Boeing inbound to MIA destined straight through the areas that we had just explained contained extremely hazardous weather. This pilot; after being advised of the ride reports and lighting strike; refused to go through the area. He advised further that; in his words; 'I will use the Emergency-word if I have to; but I'm not going into that area.' This resulted in the aircraft deviating to the west directly into the flow of departures from Miami Approach who were also deviating west of the ANNEY fix; creating yet another completely unnecessary situation.Another Boeing bound for FLL began to flash from high side. I told the Supervisor that the Sector 20 team would not take the hand off. He informed us to accept the hand off and place the aircraft into holding and not to allow any other aircraft to proceed through the area; which was perfectly appropriate and we did so. I have never seen such gross mismanagement by TMU. I understand that it can be difficult to predict the presence and intensity of weather; but after several reports of severe turbulence and a lightning strike; immediate action should have been taken to ensure that no further aircraft were placed in the same unsafe situation. There were other alternatives; that both I and the Supervisor in the area at the time; expressed to TMU and none of our suggestions were adopted in anything resembling a timely fashion. It took an aircraft threatening to declare an emergency before something was done to reroute aircraft to other places. This is completely unacceptable. We had plenty of indications that this line of weather was particularly severe. The routes should have least been tested before allowing aircraft to fly through en-mass. There were plenty of other options to keep aircraft up high and send them to the southeast; but instead TMU continued to force aircraft through areas of known hazardous and significant weather. There is nosuggestion that I can make other than that reaction to reports of things like severe icing; severe/extreme turbulence and lightning strikes be immediate keys to reroute aircraft; and not by starting the reroutes with the aircraft 100's of miles away; but rather starting with the aircraft closest to entering the areas. As controllers; we did everything in our power to advise the aircraft of the weather and provide them with as many options as possible. Our assistance is limited to the confines of our airspace and big-picture action was necessary here. This is Florida; and it is unacceptable for the folks in TMU to be unable to compile versatile plans for rapidly changing weather.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.