Narrative:

I finished a 4-day pairing in which I blocked 26:40. This trip ended very late in the evening. The next day I was off. I reported the following morning for a dead head to a 2 day ground school. The following day at ground school; return to base in the evening; followed with a day off; then a one day junior man pairing; with an early morning duty. Then a 5-day pairing begins 10 hours 25 minute duty followed by 11 hours 47 minutes ron. Day 2 10 hours 52 minute duty followed by 9 hours ron (reduced rest). Duty ends very late in the evening. Day 3 duty on early in the morning for a duty day of 10 hours 51 minutes followed by 12 hour 50 minute ron (compensatory rest that I asked to be served at hotel). Day 4 [was] 11 hour 42 minute duty followed by 10 hour 54 minute ron (initially scheduled to be a 9 hour 2 minute ron). Day 5 was a 13 hour 3 minute *duty scheduled* pre-empted by a fatigue call. Note all ron's include waits and commute to/from hotel; meals when necessary and what is left; for sleep and preparing for the next day's duty. An 11 hour ron in no way equals 11 hours of rest). Before I called in fatigue; this 6-day sequence had a projected credit of 36:22. Total block in 7 days was projected at 29:08. Essentially; I was working through my last legal workday per the far's; into my last contractually legal hour; and into my last far legal block hour. For my first day of reserve; I was initially issued a late morning show-time; with an early finish that evening followed by an early show scheduled for day 2. On the night before I went to bed early to prepare myself for early shows and woke at an early hour for day 1. Two hours before my scheduled time began that morning I received a call from crew scheduling assigning me a (3 hour) later check-in; which resulted in a very late finish that evening. That night I then received 11 hours 47 minutes rest; followed by a late morning start time; duty time of 10 hours 52 minutes and a finish late in the evening. Then on the night of day 2; we were given a reduced rest overnight into a circadian rhythm swap; starting my day 3 after 9 hours ron. More-so; on the night of 4/3; after 10 hours 51 minutes of duty I was scheduled the minimum rest legally required of 12 hours. Because this was at an airport with customs clearance and a longer hotel taxi time; I asked for those 12 compensatory hours to be given at the hotel. For this to happen I was required to speak to a flight manager. The manager accommodated without any argument; but stressed our need to do our best to get back on schedule the next day. That night; upon arrival at the hotel; I was required to contact crew scheduling at which point I was also given additional flying for the next day with the next night's overnight- after one night of reduced rest and one night of compensatory rest- was scheduled for 9 hours 2 minutes. When this was issued; I expressed that I didn't believe I would be able to fulfill the schedule and that this paring was increasingly difficult for me to work and wearing me down. I asked if they could work on changing my schedule to something that would afford me more rest on the next night's overnight. This; however; did not become an issue because on day 4 I experienced numerous maintenance issues and delays; and after 11 hours 14 minutes of time on duty I was cancelled on my last leg and sent to the hotel 'early.' the next and final day; coincidentally the same day a severe weather front was passing through the northeast; I began my day early in the morning with a scheduled turn and a dead head back to domicile. After checking in that morning; crew scheduling called to add an additional turn which would bring my 7 day block total to just over 29 hours in 6 days. I told the crew scheduler that I did not believe I would be able to complete that task. The crew scheduler requested that I keep them informed. I returned after my first turn; and with a 2 hour sit; my first thought was 'good; I can take a nap inthis break.' the moment I digested this thought; I determined it was absolutely necessary that I make the fatigue call. I was appalled I let myself get to that point. This was my 6th consecutive day of work. It was also the 12th day of work out of the last 14 days. In the last 6 years of work; I have handled numerous aircraft maintenance issues. I have worked through severe weather systems. I have completed this with minimum rest to meet the requirements of the far's; and I have been scheduled to the maximum amount of block hours in a 7 day period. In the last 6 days; I have accepted; reviewed and operated 10 aircraft; many of which had maintenance issues; and have run over 200 checklists. Again; I was scheduled to work my last far legally consecutive day; into my last contractually legal hour; into my last far legal block hour. As a pilot; fatigue can be difficult to assess; its effects can be very subtle. They begin with oversight which; by its nature; a pilot is not aware of until after the fact and reassessing one's duties. That is where fatigue begins and where I believe policies should be in place to prevent such a thing. Unfortunately; fatigue is not often identified by the pilot until it is compounded by making small mistakes which could occur while the pilot is operating an aircraft. Mixing fatigue with the 'get it done' nature of pilots is a recipe for an incident. I believe the company's short-staffing issues and the policies toward work assignments for reserve pilots; compromises the pilot's better judgment between the needs of keeping schedules on time for the betterment of the company and their own physical needs for the delivery of a high quality product. Great and grave responsibility should be held by the company to prevent this from ever taking place. When fatiguing schedules are administered; as I experienced this week highlighted by me asking for more rest on an overnight; the company should take this more seriously. In my experience this week; I believe the company's short-staffing issues and my role as a 'reserve' pilot attempted to usurp my better judgment when I asked for more rest on my overnights. Although the flight manager was accommodating and did not argue my fatigue call or my demand for 12 hours of compensatory rest to be served at the hotel; I believe the problem of fatigue is too far in motion when I have to have this discussion. Two times in one week; it was necessary that I speak to a manager over my issue of fatigue. The second call should have never been necessary. It is my opinion that the company's staffing issues and scheduling policies are such that our legal limitations as pilots are being pushed to the extreme limit. I do not believe that this practice is in the spirit of maintaining well-rested pilots responsible for performing their duties. I understand the great constraints under which crew scheduling operates; and inherently; I do not believe they are responsible for this issue. Though my schedule is handed down from them; I believe this stems from staffing choices and the over-utilization of reserve pilots that is currently in place. It's been listed by a federal safety administration that for a car driver there are 4 major components to fatigue: circadian rhythm effects; sleep deprivation; cumulative fatigue effects; and industrial or 'time-on-task' fatigue. I believe this is directly transferable to pilots; and I think that my schedule over this last week highlighted and underlined each of these 4 points. Our company should be held responsible to avoid any single one of these factors from identifiably entering a schedule. As a reserve pilot; let it also be noted that I have no possible means to anticipate which shift I will be working. I believe fatigue is poorly addressed by this company; and holds the pilot entirely responsible. I recently had a management employee state to myself and others that fatigue is difficult to identify and therefore difficult to avoid whenmaking schedules. I believe that this is a negligent mindset that is being maintained. I don't think that it is difficult to look at the schedule I have just worked and identify fatigue. Fatigue is something that should be avoided fore it happens. The fatigue call that a pilot makes; and I believe this to be true for myself ending my sequence; is usually made 1 leg after it is truly needed. I am looking forward to discussions that this may open about current staffing levels; the current stop-loss role of reserve pilots; and ways that we can move forward towards making safer schedules. Until such a time and as learned from this experience; I must rely on my judgment; and err on a much greater side of caution when making fatigue calls.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier Captain detailed repeated deprivation of necessary rest over the period of a four day flight sequence.

Narrative: I finished a 4-day pairing in which I blocked 26:40. This trip ended very late in the evening. The next day I was off. I reported the following morning for a dead head to a 2 day ground school. The following day at ground school; return to base in the evening; followed with a day off; then a one day junior man pairing; with an early morning duty. Then a 5-day pairing begins 10 hours 25 minute duty followed by 11 hours 47 minutes RON. Day 2 10 hours 52 minute duty followed by 9 hours RON (reduced rest). Duty ends very late in the evening. Day 3 duty on early in the morning for a duty day of 10 hours 51 minutes followed by 12 hour 50 minute RON (compensatory rest that I asked to be served at hotel). Day 4 [was] 11 hour 42 minute duty followed by 10 hour 54 minute RON (Initially scheduled to be a 9 hour 2 minute RON). Day 5 was a 13 hour 3 minute *duty scheduled* pre-empted by a fatigue call. Note all RON's include waits and commute to/from hotel; meals when necessary and what is left; for sleep and preparing for the next day's duty. An 11 hour RON in no way equals 11 hours of rest). Before I called in fatigue; this 6-day sequence had a projected credit of 36:22. Total block in 7 days was projected at 29:08. Essentially; I was working through my last legal workday per the FAR's; into my last contractually legal hour; and into my last FAR legal block hour. For my first day of reserve; I was initially issued a late morning show-time; with an early finish that evening followed by an early show scheduled for day 2. On the night before I went to bed early to prepare myself for early shows and woke at an early hour for Day 1. Two hours before my scheduled time began that morning I received a call from crew scheduling assigning me a (3 hour) later check-in; which resulted in a very late finish that evening. That night I then received 11 hours 47 minutes rest; followed by a late morning start time; duty time of 10 hours 52 minutes and a finish late in the evening. Then on the night of day 2; we were given a reduced rest overnight into a circadian rhythm swap; starting my day 3 after 9 hours RON. More-so; on the night of 4/3; after 10 hours 51 minutes of duty I was scheduled the minimum rest legally required of 12 hours. Because this was at an airport with customs clearance and a longer hotel taxi time; I asked for those 12 compensatory hours to be given at the hotel. For this to happen I was required to speak to a Flight Manager. The Manager accommodated without any argument; but stressed our need to do our best to get back on schedule the next day. That night; upon arrival at the hotel; I was required to contact Crew Scheduling at which point I was also given additional flying for the next day with the next night's overnight- after one night of reduced rest and one night of compensatory rest- was scheduled for 9 hours 2 minutes. When this was issued; I expressed that I didn't believe I would be able to fulfill the schedule and that this paring was increasingly difficult for me to work and wearing me down. I asked if they could work on changing my schedule to something that would afford me more rest on the next night's overnight. This; however; did not become an issue because on day 4 I experienced numerous maintenance issues and delays; and after 11 hours 14 minutes of time on duty I was cancelled on my last leg and sent to the hotel 'early.' The next and final day; coincidentally the same day a severe weather front was passing through the northeast; I began my day early in the morning with a scheduled turn and a dead head back to domicile. After checking in that morning; Crew Scheduling called to add an additional turn which would bring my 7 day block total to just over 29 hours in 6 days. I told the Crew Scheduler that I did not believe I would be able to complete that task. The Crew Scheduler requested that I keep them informed. I returned after my first turn; and with a 2 hour sit; my first thought was 'good; I can take a nap inthis break.' The moment I digested this thought; I determined it was absolutely necessary that I make the fatigue call. I was appalled I let myself get to that point. This was my 6th consecutive day of work. It was also the 12th day of work out of the last 14 days. In the last 6 years of work; I have handled numerous aircraft maintenance issues. I have worked through severe weather systems. I have completed this with minimum rest to meet the requirements of the FAR's; and I have been scheduled to the maximum amount of block hours in a 7 day period. In the last 6 days; I have accepted; reviewed and operated 10 aircraft; many of which had maintenance issues; and have run over 200 checklists. Again; I was scheduled to work my last FAR legally consecutive day; into my last contractually legal hour; into my last FAR legal block hour. As a pilot; fatigue can be difficult to assess; its effects can be very subtle. They begin with oversight which; by its nature; a pilot is not aware of until after the fact and reassessing one's duties. That is where fatigue begins and where I believe policies should be in place to prevent such a thing. Unfortunately; fatigue is not often identified by the pilot until it is compounded by making small mistakes which could occur while the pilot is operating an aircraft. Mixing fatigue with the 'get it done' nature of pilots is a recipe for an incident. I believe the company's short-staffing issues and the policies toward work assignments for reserve pilots; compromises the pilot's better judgment between the needs of keeping schedules on time for the betterment of the company and their own physical needs for the delivery of a high quality product. Great and grave responsibility should be held by the company to prevent this from ever taking place. When fatiguing schedules are administered; as I experienced this week highlighted by me asking for more rest on an overnight; the company should take this more seriously. In my experience this week; I believe the company's short-staffing issues and my role as a 'reserve' pilot attempted to usurp my better judgment when I asked for more rest on my overnights. Although the Flight Manager was accommodating and did not argue my fatigue call or my demand for 12 hours of compensatory rest to be served at the hotel; I believe the problem of fatigue is too far in motion when I have to have this discussion. Two times in one week; it was necessary that I speak to a manager over my issue of fatigue. The second call should have never been necessary. It is my opinion that the company's staffing issues and scheduling policies are such that our legal limitations as pilots are being pushed to the extreme limit. I do not believe that this practice is in the spirit of maintaining well-rested pilots responsible for performing their duties. I understand the great constraints under which Crew Scheduling operates; and inherently; I do not believe they are responsible for this issue. Though my schedule is handed down from them; I believe this stems from staffing choices and the over-utilization of reserve pilots that is currently in place. It's been listed by a federal safety administration that for a car driver there are 4 major components to fatigue: circadian rhythm effects; sleep deprivation; cumulative fatigue effects; and industrial or 'time-on-task' fatigue. I believe this is directly transferable to pilots; and I think that my schedule over this last week highlighted and underlined each of these 4 points. Our company should be held responsible to avoid any single one of these factors from identifiably entering a schedule. As a reserve pilot; let it also be noted that I have no possible means to anticipate which shift I will be working. I believe fatigue is poorly addressed by this company; and holds the pilot entirely responsible. I recently had a management employee state to myself and others that fatigue is difficult to identify and therefore difficult to avoid whenmaking schedules. I believe that this is a negligent mindset that is being maintained. I don't think that it is difficult to look at the schedule I have just worked and identify fatigue. Fatigue is something that should be avoided fore it happens. The fatigue call that a pilot makes; and I believe this to be true for myself ending my sequence; is usually made 1 leg after it is truly needed. I am looking forward to discussions that this may open about current staffing levels; the current stop-loss role of reserve pilots; and ways that we can move forward towards making safer schedules. Until such a time and as learned from this experience; I must rely on my judgment; and err on a much greater side of caution when making fatigue calls.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.