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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 945661 |
Time | |
Date | 201104 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | FO |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B747-400 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240 Flight Crew Total 21500 Flight Crew Type 4500 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural FAR |
Narrative:
During the pre-flight planning process there were no color graphics printing device to print any of the commercially provided flight planning color charts and turbulence charts as outlined by the fom for international flight planning. Yakutat was listed as one of the decompression alternates even though it is a little airport. Yak was one of the three airports (yak; sya; and pdx) listed as critical fuel scenario requirements for decompression. Yak requires 24 hour notification. Other adequate airports listed on the commercially provided flight plan were pkc and kuh. The weather at pkc was forecast to be heavy snow; 200 overcast; 800 meters visibility; winds out of the southeast gusting to 20 KTS. There is no precision instrument approach to runway 16L; only a circling approach from runway 34R. Circling at night in a mountainous region is not a suitable alternate! The weather at kuh was forecast to be at 1;500 meters and winds out of the south at 10 KTS; there is no precision approach only a VOR approach to runway 17 and required 1;600 meters for the approach for our category of aircraft. The weather forecast at our destination required an alternate and none was designated; we had to request an alternate. The flights across the east yellow sea have been requiring FL250 until sadli for over 25 years. The commercially provided flight plan had us going up to FL310 then descend to FL250 for the crossing. We called dispatch and requested the corrections be made to the flight plan and release two was issued. We added nearly 7;000 pounds of fuel to cover what we determined to be inadequate airport facilities for the route of flight and the destination weather. The arrival forecast fuel burn from top of descent to touchdown was 3;200 pounds. The actual conditions on arrival were 800 overcast 2.5 miles and rain; with a quartering tailwind and the ILS to the runway with a delay vector was required to operate to our destination with engine anti-ice. Actual fuel burn from TOD to touchdown was 6;200 pounds at flaps 30. In our view during the preflight process; cts; cdb; anc; yvr; and sea were the most suitable primary diversion airports; none of which were on the commercially provided flight plan. The actual routing and airport selection for flight crew diversion criteria was never more than 138 minutes from any critical point. The primary reason these were our airports of choice is because they were the safest and best suitable due to the weather forecasts and facilities being fully operational above landing minima for every runway in use for the B747. The dispatchers for this flight did a very good job for planning the commercially provided flight plan based on the company policy; but did not satisfy the criteria for the safest and best course of action in the event a diversion was necessary.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B747-400 Captain detailed short comings in the flight planning tools provided by a commercial provided flight planning service.
Narrative: During the pre-flight planning process there were no color graphics printing device to print any of the commercially provided flight planning color charts and turbulence charts as outlined by the FOM for international flight planning. Yakutat was listed as one of the decompression alternates even though it is a little airport. YAK was one of the three airports (YAK; SYA; and PDX) listed as critical fuel scenario requirements for decompression. YAK requires 24 hour notification. Other adequate airports listed on the commercially provided flight plan were PKC and KUH. The weather at PKC was forecast to be heavy snow; 200 overcast; 800 meters visibility; winds out of the southeast gusting to 20 KTS. There is no precision instrument approach to Runway 16L; only a circling approach from Runway 34R. Circling at night in a mountainous region is not a suitable alternate! The weather at KUH was forecast to be at 1;500 meters and winds out of the south at 10 KTS; there is no precision approach only a VOR approach to Runway 17 and required 1;600 meters for the approach for our category of aircraft. The weather forecast at our destination required an alternate and none was designated; we had to request an alternate. The flights across the East Yellow Sea have been requiring FL250 until SADLI for over 25 years. The commercially provided flight plan had us going up to FL310 then descend to FL250 for the crossing. We called Dispatch and requested the corrections be made to the flight plan and release two was issued. We added nearly 7;000 LBS of fuel to cover what we determined to be inadequate airport facilities for the route of flight and the destination weather. The arrival forecast fuel burn from top of descent to touchdown was 3;200 LBS. The actual conditions on arrival were 800 overcast 2.5 miles and rain; with a quartering tailwind and the ILS to the runway with a delay vector was required to operate to our destination with engine anti-ice. Actual fuel burn from TOD to touchdown was 6;200 LBS at flaps 30. In our view during the preflight process; CTS; CDB; ANC; YVR; and SEA were the most suitable primary diversion airports; none of which were on the commercially provided flight plan. The actual routing and airport selection for flight crew diversion criteria was never more than 138 minutes from any critical point. The primary reason these were our airports of choice is because they were the safest and best suitable due to the weather forecasts and facilities being fully operational above landing minima for every runway in use for the B747. The Dispatchers for this flight did a very good job for planning the commercially provided flight plan based on the company policy; but did not satisfy the criteria for the safest and best course of action in the event a diversion was necessary.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.