Narrative:

This aircraft had just arrived. Prior to getting on the airplane I spoke with the previous captain who explained all of the MEL's. On the release; there were MEL's for 22-10-02 flight director mode; 22-10-01 autopilot system; 22-00-0 CAT 2; and 34-00-0 rvsm. The captain explained that the flight director mode that was inoperative was the heading mode. He then went on to explain that the altitude alerter and selector was stuck above 45;000 ft and uncontrollable. He stated that the altitude selector mode was also flaky and erratic; showing random indications; and that was why they deferred the autopilot. I listened to his explanation; and was planning for a very busy and difficult flight. I thanked him for the information and sent him on his way. He went on and explained to me that he was going to ferry another aircraft to our destination. He said he tried to have us swapped so we could fly a decently working plane; but dispatch would have none of that. I thanked him for his efforts and we said our good-byes. I started my preflight activities by starting the aircraft and studying the maintenance history. I noticed that there were two write-ups for the altitude alerter. The first write-up explained that at cruise; the preselected altitude would randomly change to undesired altitudes; and when selecting lower altitudes the selector would get stuck. In response; maintenance deferred the autopilot utilizing MEL 22-10-01; in stead of utilizing MEL 34-14-01 altitude alerting system. MEL 34-14-01 allows for the deferral as long as altitude hold works; which from what the previous pilot stated; it did in fact work just fine. The heading bug was also deferred utilizing MEL 22-10-02 flight director mode. When I started studying the MEL; I read that both 22-10-01 and 22-10-02 require the altitude alerting system be operative; which clearly it was not. In the corrective actions maintenance explained that they tried to ops check the system to no avail; and that the autopilot would remain deferred due to a lack of parts available. I then called my dispatcher and explained the situation. He stated to me that maintenance control said there may be a problem with these deferrals. I flat out asked the dispatcher if maintenance control knew that these were improper MEL's; he gave me a noncommittal response that was neither affirmative nor negative. I was then transferred to maintenance control where they told me they would call out local maintenance to explain it to me. When maintenance came out; they just started to process of replacing the fcp. While we were in the process of swapping to another aircraft [the ferry aircraft]; I discussed the situation with the previous captain. He had stated that he was somewhat confused; but the way maintenance explained it to him; he thought the deferrals were proper. I explained that the deferrals were not proper and that he may want to file a report himself. We made our preflight preparations and departed without incident. Climbing through about 12;000 to 14;000 ft; I felt my ears start popping more than usual. When I looked at the pressurization information on the status page; I noticed that the cabin altitude was quickly climbing past 8;000 ft. I told the first officer to tell ATC that we needed 10;000 ft now. ATC allowed us to descend to 11;000 due to traffic; and then 10;000 a few seconds later when we were clear. About the time we reached 10;600; the triple chime cabin altitude message appeared; and within a few seconds of that; we were level at 10;000. I instructed the first officer to do the immediate action card; minus the crew oxygen masks and emergency descent; as we were now level at 10;000. The QRH had us try manual pressurization; and at first it worked; but would only drive the cabin altitude to 7;600 ft or so. ATC asked if we could accept 11;000 ft for traffic. We said we could as long as our pressurization would allow that. At 11;000 ft we were able to maintain a cabin altitude of 8;400 ft. While continuing the QRH; it stated that if manual pressurization control did not work to continue unpressurized. Because it was working somewhat; we elected to continue operations at 11;000 ft with what little pressurization we had; and that we would monitor it closely; and descend if it failed completely. We decided that in the descent; when we were below 10;000 we would continue the rest of the flight unpressurized per the QRH. We discussed the situation with the dispatcher; and we all agreed to continue at 11;000 ft. I explained the situation to the flight attendant and the passengers. Upon arrival at the gate; I wrote the plane up and called maintenance control. Because of how busy my first officer and I were; I forgot to push the navigation button for about 30 seconds when were cleared direct to a fix because we were in the middle of the checklist. And I was about 20 to 30 KTS fast of our assigned airspeed of 250 KTS for a few moments while descending to 10;000 ft. I was more worried about the fact that my plane was depressurizing than traffic spacing on the arrival.we then swapped to a new aircraft. My new first officer had prepared the plane for my and my flight attendants arrival. Once my flight attendant prepared the cabin we began boarding. While I was studying the maintenance history of the aircraft; I had noticed that I had previously written up the left inboard btms [brake temperature monitoring system] readout on another day; and that it was still deferred. In the last day and a half; the outboard antiskid had failed and had also been deferred. As a side note; ignition system a was also deferred. I started studying the anti-skid deferral; 32-44-01 and noticed at note 5 both EICAS brake temperature readouts for the operative antiskid channel must be operative. With the inboard antiskid operative; both inboard temperature readouts were supposed to be operative; in this case they were not. I again called my dispatcher and maintenance. Maintenance control was confused; but when I explained it to them and the local mechanic; they decided to fix the btms. After a lengthy delay we finished the round trip only having to defer a tail position light in the outstation. This made for a very long day dealing with maintenance; and maintenance errors. Another side note; the first aircraft; when they tried to ferry it; supposedly had to do an air return for another maintenance issue. Sorry for the length of the report; but just imagine the length of my day.improper maintenance action [was] taken; improper MEL usage; misunderstanding of previous crew's and maintenance control of the MEL. Maintenance continues to plague our aircraft with problems; and MEL's specifically are a large issue. Perhaps; per operations specifications; last paragraph; our flight standards district office should deny the use of the continuing authorization because of abuse; until these types of problems are addressed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 Captain describes a day of flying and attendant delays due to maintenance required by non compatible MEL's.

Narrative: This aircraft had just arrived. Prior to getting on the airplane I spoke with the previous Captain who explained all of the MEL's. On the release; there were MEL's for 22-10-02 Flight Director Mode; 22-10-01 Autopilot System; 22-00-0 CAT 2; and 34-00-0 RVSM. The Captain explained that the flight director mode that was inoperative was the heading mode. He then went on to explain that the altitude alerter and selector was stuck above 45;000 FT and uncontrollable. He stated that the altitude selector mode was also flaky and erratic; showing random indications; and that was why they deferred the autopilot. I listened to his explanation; and was planning for a very busy and difficult flight. I thanked him for the information and sent him on his way. He went on and explained to me that he was going to ferry another aircraft to our destination. He said he tried to have us swapped so we could fly a decently working plane; but Dispatch would have none of that. I thanked him for his efforts and we said our good-byes. I started my preflight activities by starting the aircraft and studying the maintenance history. I noticed that there were two write-ups for the altitude alerter. The first write-up explained that at cruise; the preselected altitude would randomly change to undesired altitudes; and when selecting lower altitudes the selector would get stuck. In response; Maintenance deferred the autopilot utilizing MEL 22-10-01; in stead of utilizing MEL 34-14-01 Altitude Alerting System. MEL 34-14-01 allows for the deferral as long as altitude hold works; which from what the previous pilot stated; it did in fact work just fine. The heading bug was also deferred utilizing MEL 22-10-02 Flight Director Mode. When I started studying the MEL; I read that both 22-10-01 and 22-10-02 require the altitude alerting system be operative; which clearly it was not. In the corrective actions Maintenance explained that they tried to ops check the system to no avail; and that the autopilot would remain deferred due to a lack of parts available. I then called my Dispatcher and explained the situation. He stated to me that Maintenance Control said there may be a problem with these deferrals. I flat out asked the Dispatcher if Maintenance Control knew that these were improper MEL's; he gave me a noncommittal response that was neither affirmative nor negative. I was then transferred to Maintenance Control where they told me they would call out Local Maintenance to explain it to me. When Maintenance came out; they just started to process of replacing the FCP. While we were in the process of swapping to another aircraft [the ferry aircraft]; I discussed the situation with the previous Captain. He had stated that he was somewhat confused; but the way Maintenance explained it to him; he thought the deferrals were proper. I explained that the deferrals were not proper and that he may want to file a report himself. We made our preflight preparations and departed without incident. Climbing through about 12;000 to 14;000 FT; I felt my ears start popping more than usual. When I looked at the pressurization information on the status page; I noticed that the cabin altitude was quickly climbing past 8;000 FT. I told the First Officer to tell ATC that we needed 10;000 FT now. ATC allowed us to descend to 11;000 due to traffic; and then 10;000 a few seconds later when we were clear. About the time we reached 10;600; the triple chime Cabin Altitude message appeared; and within a few seconds of that; we were level at 10;000. I instructed the First Officer to do the immediate action card; minus the crew oxygen masks and emergency descent; as we were now level at 10;000. The QRH had us try manual pressurization; and at first it worked; but would only drive the cabin altitude to 7;600 FT or so. ATC asked if we could accept 11;000 FT for traffic. We said we could as long as our pressurization would allow that. At 11;000 FT we were able to maintain a cabin altitude of 8;400 FT. While continuing the QRH; it stated that if manual pressurization control did not work to continue unpressurized. Because it was working somewhat; we elected to continue operations at 11;000 FT with what little pressurization we had; and that we would monitor it closely; and descend if it failed completely. We decided that in the descent; when we were below 10;000 we would continue the rest of the flight unpressurized per the QRH. We discussed the situation with the Dispatcher; and we all agreed to continue at 11;000 FT. I explained the situation to the Flight Attendant and the passengers. Upon arrival at the gate; I wrote the plane up and called Maintenance Control. Because of how busy my First Officer and I were; I forgot to push the NAV button for about 30 seconds when were cleared direct to a fix because we were in the middle of the checklist. And I was about 20 to 30 KTS fast of our assigned airspeed of 250 KTS for a few moments while descending to 10;000 FT. I was more worried about the fact that my plane was depressurizing than traffic spacing on the arrival.We then swapped to a new aircraft. My new First Officer had prepared the plane for my and my Flight Attendants arrival. Once my Flight Attendant prepared the cabin we began boarding. While I was studying the maintenance history of the aircraft; I had noticed that I had previously written up the left inboard BTMS [Brake Temperature Monitoring System] readout on another day; and that it was still deferred. In the last day and a half; the outboard antiskid had failed and had also been deferred. As a side note; Ignition System A was also deferred. I started studying the Anti-Skid deferral; 32-44-01 and noticed at note 5 both EICAS brake temperature readouts for the operative antiskid channel must be operative. With the inboard antiskid operative; both inboard temperature readouts were supposed to be operative; in this case they were not. I again called my Dispatcher and Maintenance. Maintenance Control was confused; but when I explained it to them and the Local Mechanic; they decided to fix the BTMS. After a lengthy delay we finished the round trip only having to defer a tail position light in the outstation. This made for a very long day dealing with Maintenance; and maintenance errors. Another side note; the first aircraft; when they tried to ferry it; supposedly had to do an air return for another maintenance issue. Sorry for the length of the report; but just imagine the length of my day.Improper maintenance action [was] taken; improper MEL usage; misunderstanding of previous crew's and Maintenance Control of the MEL. Maintenance continues to plague our aircraft with problems; and MEL's specifically are a large issue. Perhaps; per operations specifications; last paragraph; our Flight Standards District Office should deny the use of the continuing authorization because of abuse; until these types of problems are addressed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.