Narrative:

The implementation of [commercially provided flight planning and aircraft performance procedures] has shown to be a threat to the safe operation of aircraft in the areas of situational awareness and correct aircraft performance. The implementation of this system has resulted in a wholesale increase in data entry tasks and 'heads-down' time during ground operations; thus causing a sacrifice in situational awareness of the crew. This is contrary and a threat to the FAA goals of reducing runway incursions and promoting the total flight crew involvement in the movement of the aircraft.a cursory review of operations yielded 91 keystrokes required from the gate to the runway for takeoff; 29 of these required during the movement of the aircraft while taxiing. Furthermore; it is required that the crewmember have 11 different tasks in different locations. This workload is in addition to regular ATC communications. The company's implementation of this system has not offered [a clear SOP to follow to standardize the tasks while maintaining situational awareness]. This is contrary to the FAA's mandate to reduce 'memory items or tasks.'training and reference materials have emphasized the differences between the previous system and the new system. Implementation has lacked a coherent procedure from start to finish in the form of cockpit tasks in real-life sequence. Furthermore; these procedures have not been fully incorporated in the aircraft flight manual normal operations chapter; but have instead been implemented by way of bulletins.the reliance on instruction versus procedures has shown a threat to proper entry of takeoff performance data. There is an additional requirement for the crew to ignore aircraft generated performance figures displayed; which constitutes a threat to proper performance data entry. This has resulted in the aircraft being stopped on active taxiways to safely perform the tasks required and resulted in questionable performance figures requiring abandoning reduced thrust takeoffs. In one instance; final takeoff data obtained yielded no reduced thrust takeoff available even though there was a decrease in actual weight and no appreciable difference in ambient temperature. Preliminary thrust data showed a reduced thrust takeoff was permissible.movement of the aircraft should involve the entire crew. Procedures that affect the safe operation/performance of the aircraft should not require undue memory tasks. Procedures should yield predictable results with adequate checks and balances for the safe operation/performance of the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An international air carrier pilot expressed his concerns regarding the user friendliness of the commercially provided flight planning and aircraft performance services recently implemented by his airline. Excessive heads down key strokes during taxi and performance data in conflict with that provided by the aircraft's FMS produced data were specifically cited.

Narrative: The implementation of [commercially provided flight planning and aircraft performance procedures] has shown to be a threat to the safe operation of aircraft in the areas of situational awareness and correct aircraft performance. The implementation of this system has resulted in a wholesale increase in data entry tasks and 'heads-down' time during ground operations; thus causing a sacrifice in situational awareness of the crew. This is contrary and a threat to the FAA goals of reducing runway incursions and promoting the total flight crew involvement in the movement of the aircraft.A cursory review of operations yielded 91 keystrokes required from the gate to the runway for takeoff; 29 of these required during the movement of the aircraft while taxiing. Furthermore; it is required that the crewmember have 11 different tasks in different locations. This workload is in addition to regular ATC communications. The company's implementation of this system has not offered [a clear SOP to follow to standardize the tasks while maintaining situational awareness]. This is contrary to the FAA's mandate to reduce 'memory items or tasks.'Training and reference materials have emphasized the differences between the previous system and the new system. Implementation has lacked a coherent procedure from start to finish in the form of cockpit tasks in real-life sequence. Furthermore; these procedures have not been fully incorporated in the aircraft flight manual normal operations chapter; but have instead been implemented by way of bulletins.The reliance on instruction versus procedures has shown a threat to proper entry of takeoff performance data. There is an additional requirement for the crew to ignore aircraft generated performance figures displayed; which constitutes a threat to proper performance data entry. This has resulted in the aircraft being stopped on active taxiways to safely perform the tasks required and resulted in questionable performance figures requiring abandoning reduced thrust takeoffs. In one instance; final takeoff data obtained yielded no reduced thrust takeoff available even though there was a decrease in actual weight and no appreciable difference in ambient temperature. Preliminary thrust data showed a reduced thrust takeoff was permissible.Movement of the aircraft should involve the entire crew. Procedures that affect the safe operation/performance of the aircraft should not require undue memory tasks. Procedures should yield predictable results with adequate checks and balances for the safe operation/performance of the aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.