Narrative:

This report addresses safety concerns regarding the commercially provided flight planning program; and is a 'first look'; real-time; B777 operational evaluation for the benefit of both flight operations and the pilot's union safety committee who will certainly be monitoring and hopefully improving the commercially provided flight planning product that will soon be used by all company flight crews. The implementation of 'commercially provided flight planning' was instituted on selected B777 transpacific flights. The augmented crew members had all attended the approved classroom training and additionally had the added benefit of the local instructor who was in operations for the preflight of the initial flight segment of these flights. Additionally; flight operations representatives at every involved station assisted in the retrieval/printing of flight papers at the beginning of each segment. On the ground - the flight planning portion of each flight is the first step in a safe flight and begins with retrieving the flight papers and printing them. The current process is cumbersome in that the steps; which should be uniform for each flight planning session; are not automatic and require a somewhat complicated series of selections within the program in order to produce the desired printed papers. This process is disruptive to the actual flight planning and should be refined to a very limited number of computer key-strokes that are all programmed to deliver a default result with all papers necessary for the flight to be printed for each flight; formatted for best functionality. It should be noted that at busy stations; where multiple flights are being planned simultaneously; the computer and printer resources can easily become overwhelmed. At one station; for example; three crews were planning flights at one time; but; only two computers and one printer were available. The lack of resources limited the effective use of these tools for the crews involved and the printer was continually running out of paper during the printing of plans; thus causing disruptions and distractions for each of the flight crews. On the aircraft the implementation of commercially provided flight planning into our cockpits; where fmcs are not programmed or properly formatted for entry of the desired data; is a major flaw in the program. Direct safety implications with possible catastrophic outcomes; due to erroneous takeoff performance data being entered or untimely 'heads-down' loss of situational awareness; cannot be ignored. Commercially provided flight planning requires a wholesale increase in data entry tasks and 'heads-down' time during ground operations resulting in a sacrifice of situational awareness of all members the crew. This is contrary to long-standing pilot training and is a threat to the stated FAA goals of reducing runway/taxi-way incursions. While the aircraft is under power; the requirements for data entry and checklist confirmations during taxi from the gate to the runway distract both the first officer and the captain. A cursory review of actual operations on a recent flight yielded that 91 FMC keystrokes were required from the gate to the runway for takeoff. 29 of these keystrokes were required after push-back was complete and while taxiing to the departure runway. Furthermore; crewmembers were required to perform 11 different tasks in different aircraft cockpit locations. This workload is in addition to regular ATC radio-work. Despite the issuance of a quick reference guide by the company; there is a lack of clear; non-interpretive procedures set to follow. The new commercially provided flight planning program seems operationally contrary to the FAA's mandate to reduce 'memory items or tasks'. Training and reference materials have emphasized the differences between the previous system and the new system and this is negative training. Implementation has lacked a coherent procedure from start to finish in real-lifesequence. Furthermore; these procedures have not been incorporated into the aircraft flight manual normal operations chapter. Instead; the procedures for entry of critical takeoff performance data have been implemented by way of bulletin and are thus learned in the actual operation. The reliance on flight crew interpretation of unclear 'bulletined' instructions for critical performance data entry of the FMC--versus long-practiced procedures--has increased the threat of improper entry of takeoff performance data. Flight crews are expected to ignore automatically generated FMC performance figures. This requirement to ignore FMC generated data is a negative and serious degradation to B777 SOP and long standing reliance on automated FMS developed performance data. The safest method to facilitate data entry requires that the aircraft be stopped on active taxiways in order to perform the tasks required. Even with the aircraft stopped; on one recent flight; the entry of the data resulted in questionable performance figures. In that instance; final FMC takeoff data obtained; yielded no reduced thrust takeoff available even though there was a decrease in actual weight and no appreciable difference in ambient temperature. Preliminary 'planned' thrust data had shown a reduced thrust takeoff was permissible. In summary; I would submit these points to assure the safest flight and encourage the company to adjust the commercially provided flight planning program procedures accordingly: 1. Movement of the aircraft should involve the attention of the entire crew. 2. Procedures that affect the safe operation/performance of the aircraft should not require undue memory tasks or the requirement for pilots to ignore long-relied on automatic aircraft system generated information. 3. Procedures should yield predictable results with adequate checks and balances for the safe operation/performance of the aircraft. 4. All 'final' performance data entry should be performed at the gate before brake release and push-back. 5. Pilots should be fully qualified in commercially provided flight planning FMC data entry through repetitive training in a simulator environment (annual training cycle) in order to assure understanding and confidence in performance of aircraft before actual line operations involving those crew members as the company has done previously for critical phases of operation like non-precision VNAV approach procedures; prm approaches; etc. 6. Fully integrate properly formatted and programmed aircraft fmcs to eliminate any need to interpret or ignore automatically generated aircraft performance information that the pilot must rely on for the safe operation of the aircraft. This should be done in concert with implementing the program in actual line operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777 Captain provided a detailed critique of the contracted flight planning services product being implemented at his airline.

Narrative: This report addresses safety concerns regarding the Commercially Provided Flight Planning program; and is a 'first look'; real-time; B777 operational evaluation for the benefit of both Flight Operations and the pilot's union safety committee who will certainly be monitoring and hopefully improving the Commercially Provided Flight Planning product that will soon be used by all company flight crews. The implementation of 'Commercially Provided Flight Planning' was instituted on selected B777 transpacific flights. The augmented crew members had all attended the approved classroom training and additionally had the added benefit of the local instructor who was in operations for the preflight of the initial flight segment of these flights. Additionally; Flight Operations Representatives at every involved station assisted in the retrieval/printing of flight papers at the beginning of each segment. On the ground - the flight planning portion of each flight is the first step in a safe flight and begins with retrieving the flight papers and printing them. The current process is cumbersome in that the steps; which should be uniform for each flight planning session; are not automatic and require a somewhat complicated series of selections within the program in order to produce the desired printed papers. This process is disruptive to the actual flight planning and should be refined to a very limited number of computer key-strokes that are all programmed to deliver a default result with all papers necessary for the flight to be printed for each flight; formatted for best functionality. It should be noted that at busy stations; where multiple flights are being planned simultaneously; the computer and printer resources can easily become overwhelmed. At one station; for example; three crews were planning flights at one time; but; only two computers and one printer were available. The lack of resources limited the effective use of these tools for the crews involved and the printer was continually running out of paper during the printing of plans; thus causing disruptions and distractions for each of the flight crews. On the aircraft the implementation of Commercially Provided Flight Planning into our cockpits; where FMCs are not programmed or properly formatted for entry of the desired data; is a major flaw in the program. Direct safety implications with possible catastrophic outcomes; due to erroneous takeoff performance data being entered or untimely 'heads-down' loss of situational awareness; cannot be ignored. Commercially Provided Flight Planning requires a wholesale increase in data entry tasks and 'heads-down' time during ground operations resulting in a sacrifice of situational awareness of all members the crew. This is contrary to long-standing pilot training and is a threat to the stated FAA goals of reducing runway/taxi-way incursions. While the aircraft is under power; the requirements for data entry and checklist confirmations during taxi from the gate to the runway distract both the First Officer and the Captain. A cursory review of actual operations on a recent flight yielded that 91 FMC keystrokes were required from the gate to the runway for takeoff. 29 of these keystrokes were required after push-back was complete and while taxiing to the departure runway. Furthermore; crewmembers were required to perform 11 different tasks in different aircraft cockpit locations. This workload is in addition to regular ATC radio-work. Despite the issuance of a Quick Reference Guide by the company; there is a lack of clear; non-interpretive procedures set to follow. The new Commercially Provided Flight Planning program seems operationally contrary to the FAA's mandate to reduce 'memory items or tasks'. Training and reference materials have emphasized the differences between the previous system and the new system and this is negative training. Implementation has lacked a coherent procedure from start to finish in real-lifesequence. Furthermore; these procedures have not been incorporated into the Aircraft Flight Manual Normal Operations Chapter. Instead; the procedures for entry of critical takeoff performance data have been implemented by way of bulletin and are thus learned in the actual operation. The reliance on flight crew interpretation of unclear 'bulletined' instructions for critical performance data entry of the FMC--versus long-practiced procedures--has increased the threat of improper entry of takeoff performance data. Flight crews are expected to ignore automatically generated FMC performance figures. This requirement to ignore FMC generated data is a negative and serious degradation to B777 SOP and long standing reliance on automated FMS developed performance data. The safest method to facilitate data entry requires that the aircraft be stopped on active taxiways in order to perform the tasks required. Even with the aircraft stopped; on one recent flight; the entry of the data resulted in questionable performance figures. In that instance; final FMC takeoff data obtained; yielded no reduced thrust takeoff available even though there was a decrease in actual weight and no appreciable difference in ambient temperature. Preliminary 'planned' thrust data had shown a reduced thrust takeoff was permissible. In summary; I would submit these points to assure the safest flight and encourage the company to adjust the Commercially Provided Flight Planning program procedures accordingly: 1. Movement of the aircraft should involve the attention of the entire crew. 2. Procedures that affect the safe operation/performance of the aircraft should not require undue memory tasks or the requirement for pilots to ignore long-relied on automatic aircraft system generated information. 3. Procedures should yield predictable results with adequate checks and balances for the safe operation/performance of the aircraft. 4. All 'final' performance data entry should be performed at the gate before brake release and push-back. 5. Pilots should be fully qualified in Commercially Provided Flight Planning FMC data entry through repetitive training in a simulator environment (annual training cycle) in order to assure understanding and confidence in performance of aircraft before actual line operations involving those crew members as the company has done previously for critical phases of operation like non-precision VNAV approach procedures; PRM approaches; etc. 6. Fully integrate properly formatted and programmed aircraft FMCs to eliminate any need to interpret or ignore automatically generated aircraft performance information that the pilot must rely on for the safe operation of the aircraft. This should be done in concert with implementing the program in actual line operations.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.